Translated by Timothy Wilson

Domingo de Soto, In IV Sent., dist. 25, q. 2, a. 1

QUESTION THE SECOND,

On the Ecclesiastical power, and the exemption of clerics.

ARTICLE I.

Whether the ecclesiastical power is supreme in such wise, that the civil power depends upon it, as its delegate.

We have considered it worthwhile to treat, at the end of this matter of orders, the question of the Ecclesiastical power in respect of the civil, divided into two articles.

The first of which is, whether the Ecclesiastical power is supreme, in such a way, that the civil power depends upon it as its delegate. It is argued from the affirmative part.

Christ instituted the Church as the best commonwealth: but the best commonwealth is that which, after the manner of a kingdom, is governed by one supreme head, as the Philosopher says in the Politics, lib. II: but there cannot be a supreme head in the Church, unless the civil power be wholly subject to the Ecclesiastical, so that the pope is the lord of all, as much temporal as spiritual. Otherwise there would be two heads, which the Philosopher condemns in the Metaphysics, lib. XII. And it is confirmed from Rom 12 and 1 Cor 12, where Paul says, that Christians are all one body consisting of diverse members: and there must be a single head of one body, lest it be monstrous. Jerome declares this with the example of bees, can. In apibus. 7. q. 1.

It is argued secondly. Christ left to his vicar that power which he himself had: but he, even insofar as he is man, not only was Lord of the kingdom of heaven in spiritual things, but also king of temporal things: for he says, in the final chapter of Matthew, All power is given to me in heaven and in earth: for which reason in Apoc 19 he is called the King of kings, and Lord of lords.

Thirdly, it is gathered from Canon law, for in any cause whatsoever, one may appeal from any secular judge to the apostolic see, 11. q. 1. can. Quicumque litem, and the Pope can depose kings: for Pope Zachary deposed the king of the Franks as harmful to the kingdom, 15. q. 6. can. Alius, and Innocent deposed Frederick, dist. 96. can. Duo sunt.[1]

But to the contrary, there is the authority of Pope Pelagius[2] in the same cited can. Duo sunt, where he says: Two there are, emperor Augustus, by which this world is ruled, the sacred authority of the Pontiffs, and the royal power.

Concerning this dispute, as Turrecremata says in lib. 2. cap. 113, there are two diametrically opposed opinions, between which there is a middle opinion, which shall be established as the catholic. For there are those who, out of an enthusiasm and (as they think) a zeal for religion, attempt to extol the apostolic dignity, so that they think the Roman Pontiff to be the supreme judge as much in spiritual as in temporal matters, and thus it pertains to him to institute kings and secular princes, who thus are as his vicars delegate. Augustinus de Ancona partakes of this opinion in his Tractatus de potestate ecclesiastica, whom Sylvester followed, at Papa §2. Panormitanus is also a patron of this opinion, as well as many other jurists. Others, having sunken to the other extreme, withdraw from the Supreme Pontiff absolutely any temporal power; no indeed, in temporal matters they subject him entirely to the civil power, and permit no exemption of clerics to be of divine law. Concerning this latter heresy, we shall speak at greater length in the following article.

To the present question, therefore, a response is made in five conclusions. The first is: the ecclesiastical power and the civil are two and distinct. This assertion is from Pelagius in the cited can. Duo sunt. But because this matter touches upon divine law, it is to be gathered from the testimonies of sacred scripture. For, because (I plead your good indulgence) it has not been granted to the interpreters of the sacred Canons to treat of the divine and natural law with precision, it is no wonder that they prate idly in this present matter. For the sacred Canons which speak of this matter shall have to be elucidated through sacred scripture, from which they are collected. Thus the conclusion is proved: as the Philosopher says in Ethics, lib. II, potencies and arts differ through actions, and actions through the objects and ends whither the actions are directed: but in the mystical Christian body there are two ends, the one natural, whither civil administration tends, namely, the peace and tranquility of the republic: and the other supernatural, which is occupied in the divine consideration, which, as Paul says, neither eye hath seen, nor ear heard: therefore there are diverse powers for pursuing those ends. The reason is that of Hugo, part. 2 de sacramen., where he says, that since there are two lives, the one terrestrial and the other spiritual, in order that both be preserved in justice, and that utility prosper, there is necessary a twofold power for the conservation of justice: one, which presides over terrestrial things to govern the civil life, and the other, which presides over spiritual things to order the spiritual life. Now the same truth is proved, secondly. The ecclesiastical power is the faculty of the keys of the kingdom of heaven, as is clear from Matt 16 and 18, and likewise of the remission of sins, as is had in John 20, and moreover, the power of consecrating the true body and blood of Christ: but this faculty has not been conceded to the civil power: therefore there are two powers. Thirdly, because in order to move men to ends of this sort, there are diverse laws, namely, in respect of the temporal end there are laws entirely human and civil, but in respect of the supernatural end, the supernatural mandates of the sacraments are also used: likewise there are also diverse swords: namely, diverse punishments: for civil punishments are consummated in the death of the body, nor are they extended further: while the ecclesiastical power uses a sword moreover spiritual: namely, excommunication, and other censures. Fourthly, and finally: the spiritual power is referred proximately to souls, and it is incumbent upon it to examine and consider the divine laws, and is concerned with divine worship, and thus it institutes pontiffs and priests, which functions do not belong to kings, but the rights of emperors are to treat, to create praetors, and other magistrates: there are diverse hierarchies, therefore, and thus diverse powers; and moreover, not only in the Mosaic law but also in the law of nature, the priests were different than the other magistrates, and to them was entrusted the summit of religion and divine worship. For as we have demonstrated in dist. 1 q. 2, in every law there was always some supernatural and necessary revelation of faith, which pointed out the necessary worship of God. No indeed, even in the state of nature these two powers would have flourished, although in that case no sacraments would have been necessary. But it is not proper to this place to discuss this further.

But perhaps one might argue to the contrary. The end of the civil commonwealth is, as Aristotle says in the same place, to make the citizens good, and well-instructed: now none is good but he who would be a friend of God, which friendship suffices for eternal life: whence it is gathered, that civil laws suffice for the obtaining of eternal life. And it is confirmed from Matt 22, If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments, where he was speaking of the commandments of nature, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, etc., which if it be true, the end of the civil and ecclesiastical power is one, and not many, and thus there is but one power. But the heretics of this age gather, that the spiritual power, along with the civil, lies with Kings and the civil republic. This heresy, though it is the most recent of all, never heard of before our age, yet is the most pestilential.

It is responded, therefore, that although the commands of the natural and civil law be referred to the order of eternal felicity, still they are not sufficient for obtaining it: for where Aristotle says that it is the purpose of the ruler to make the citizens good, he spoke only of moral goodness, but the moral duties do not suffice for the friendship of God without infused charity, without which no man is either called or is good, nor any work good. For this reason, beyond the natural and civil law, there is required, in the first place, the special help of God, and the laws of the sacraments, which are supernatural: for unless a man be reborn of water and the holy Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God: and except you eat the flesh of the son of man, it is said, you shall not have life in you. This power, therefore, which Christ committed in the first place to his vicar and through him to the Church, is more exalted than the civil.

But if you should ask again, surely God could have comprehended both through a single power and a single head: namely, that the king (just as has been imagined recently amongst the English) would administer all things pertaining as much to divine worship as to the civil commonwealth, or that the Pope would do both alone? It is responded, that it is not our concern to dispute on the absolute power of God; yet because, as it says in Wis 7, [wisdom] ordereth all things sweetly, and it is the task of wisdom, as Aristotle says in the Metaphysics, to order and govern all things in an orderly and apposite manner according to their ends, it was not seemly to commit such diverse offices to one power alone, for the ecclesiastical and civil administrations are very much different: indeed, the one is administered by secular magistrates, who have wives and children: while the other is appropriate to none but men free from the burden of a wife: for as the Apostle says in 1 Cor 7, he who has a wife seeks how he may please her, and they who are without a wife, seek how they may please God. If, therefore, the same power were to lie with the same supreme governor, it would be impossible for everything not to be jumbled, and thus subject to many perils. For this reason it was necessary that diverse heads be determined for matters so diverse, and that the Church would be as a queen seated at the right hand of the ruler, clothed round about with variety, and that the mystical body of Christ be compacted from various members, as Paul says in 1 Cor 10.

The second conclusion. The spiritual power is more excellent than the civil. Their very names declare this conclusion, as Innocent says in the capit. Solitæ de maior. et obedien. The Pontiff in that place reprehends the Emperor of Constantinople, who, on account of the testimony in 1 Pet 2: Be ye subject therefore to every human creature for God’s sake: whether it be to the king as excelling; or to governors as sent by him for the punishment of evildoers, etc., opined that the royal power was more excellent than all others. He reprehends him, I say, objecting that in that place the Apostle only signifies the excellence of Kings in temporal matters, in respect of dukes and others, who receive those offices from him. But nevertheless, the pontiff prevails in spiritual matters, which are as much worthier than temporal matters, as the soul surpasses the body. And so, just as the soul is that which vivifies the body, and the spirit is the commander of the body: so also the spiritual power ought to be preeminent over temporal things. To this he also joins another and most apt similitude, that God instituted the pontifical and regal authorities as two great lights, namely the Sun and the Moon, for just as the Sun presides over the day, so also the Pontiff over spiritual things: and just as the Moon presides over the night, so also the King over temporal things, which take the likeness of the night. Moreover, just as the Moon receives light from the Sun, so also does the civil power receive light from the spiritual: for the king ought so to rule and govern temporal matters, that they serve spiritual religion.

This is proved secondly from the end of both powers: for as the Philosopher says in the Ethics, lib. I, the order between ends is such as that between faculties and arts, which have them as their set ends. On account of this, the equestrian art is more excellent than the bridle-making art, and the nautical art more excellent than the art of making ships, because the ends of the former are superior to the ends of the latter: and thus the equestrian art commands to the bridle-making art how it ought to fabricate the bridle, and the nautical art to the ship-making art how it ought to make a ship: since therefore the end of the spiritual power is, as we have said, eternal beatitude, and the end of the secular power is the tranquil state of the republic, which is referred to that supernal beatitude, it happens that the ecclesiastical power is higher.

Furthermore, this is proved by the example of Paul in Heb 7, where he proves, that the priest Melchisedech was superior to the secular Abraham, because, as it is read in Gen 14, Melchisedech blessed Abraham, and (says Paul) without doubt he who blesses, is greater than he who is blessed.

The third conclusion. The excellence of the ecclesiastical power, in respect of the civil, is not of this sort, that the pope is the lord of the whole earth in temporal things. We do not speak of a particular kingdom, whether the Supreme Pontiff is truly the temporal King of those cities and provinces of which he holds supreme dominion in temporals, since in these he knows no superior on earth. So much do we not deny this, that we think it pertains to his defense and splendor. But we speak of the universal kingdom of the world, whether the whole world, or the Christian world. This conclusion follows from the first: for if the Pope were supreme lord of all things, there would not be two powers, but one: for then, just as all prelates are subject to the supreme pontiff, and dukes to the king, by the same reason and in the same manner, kings would be subject to the supreme Pontiff, and would depend upon him entirely in the same way: for this reason, just as the ecclesiastical power is one, and the whole civil power one, in like manner then the two would be simultaneously one.

So that this conclusion and those subsequent might be known through their first foundation, it should be noted, that Christ left no other power to his vicar, than that which he himself received insofar as he was man, and redeemer of the world: yet he took up no temporal kingdom, but that precise dominion of temporal things, which was necessary for the end of  redemption. I have said, insofar as he was man: for inasmuch as he was God, it is entirely acknowledged and accepted by all mortals, and not merely Christians, that he is by right of creation the absolute Lord and king of the world. For, as the Psalm has it, the earth is the Lord’s, and the fulness thereof: and as it is read in Prov 8, by him kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things. For this reason, John Faber, who in his commentary upon c. de summa Trinitate attempts to show that Christ was a king because he was God, produces nothing of relevance. For we dispute of him insomuch as he was man. But insofar as he was man, he could indeed, if he had wished, have taken up even universal secular dominion of the world. And yet it is the case, as we have asserted, that he did not accept a dominion and kingdom of this sort, but only spiritual, and accepted of temporals only so much as was necessary for that spiritual dominion. For the spiritual kingdom is that which, as we have said above, has eternal life for its proximate end: and the temporal kingdom is that which is concerned with the peaceful status of the Republic. The conclusion is therefore proved, firstly. In the whole of the gospel, there occurs no mention of the temporal kingdom of Christ: it is therefore vain, lest I say temerarious, to assert it: for if a thing of such importance were true, the Evangelists never would have been silent upon it: but they pay heed only to the spiritual kingdom, which is called the kingdom of heaven. For this reason, the protheme of the preaching of John the precursor, and then of Christ, was, as in Matt 3, Do penance: for the kingdom of heaven is at hand, and Matt 5, Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven, and many other things of that sort.

Secondly, it is confirmed by plain reason. Christ, who, since he was God, as David says, had no need of our goods, put on our humanity for that reason and end only, that he might bring about our redemption: for this reason, he preached the faith to us, and instituted laws, and created Apostles and Pontiffs, who would be our shepherds, that they might lead us to that beatitude: therefore, since Christ took up nothing superfluous, and the temporal power of a kingdom, so broadly and absolutely patent in secular kings, was not necessary to him for that end, the consequence is, that he by no means took it up.

But the patrons of the contrary opinion say, that Christ seized royal power of the whole world on account of his outstanding excellence and dignity. Yet reason stands to the contrary, because this pertained not at all to that same excellence of his. For, I ask, what increase of honor would accrue to Christ, since he was God per se, and, insofar as he was man, king also of the kingdom of heaven, if he had taken up temporal dominion and kingdoms, that is, their power? None, certainly. No indeed, how much more loftily is his majesty then commended, that, aside from that which was necessary for his office, he scorned the whole world: for he lived in poverty, and chose for Apostles men abject and humble, and ever preached against the glory and pomp of the world: poverty, and humility, and repudiation of the world he both taught and extolled with praise. Life of this sort, after the fall of Adam, is best, and suffers fewer perils. Whence Paul says, Phil 3, that he considers all these things as dung.

It is argued thirdly. Christ never discharged this office of royal power, no indeed, he always removed himself from the use of the same, which the partisans of the contrary opinion are unable to deny: for as he himself says, John 3: God sent not his son into the world, to judge the world, but that the world may be saved by him. And when the adulterous woman was brought before him [in John 8], whose cause he would judge, he passed no sentence as judge, by which he would either condemn or absolve her, but he only explicated the natural and divine law, He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her. And when the coin of the census was offered to him, he refused to judge whether or not the tax was due to Caesar, but left that to their judgment: only commending the natural and divine law, that if something be owed to Caesar, it be rendered to him, just as to God that which is his. And when others came to him, that he would sit as judge between them, he disparaged it as something lesser, saying, Who hath appointed me judge over you? Therefore, if he never discharged the office of King, it happens that he never took up such power: for that power is redundant and vain, which is never reduced to act. Sight or hearing accrue no dignity to man, except on account of their use. For this reason, if Christ was never to use that power, no dignity accrued to him from thence. Moreover, since power is made known through its acts, if the Gospel teaches us that he had neither the use nor the splendor of royal power, it is asserted without foundation that he took it up. For if he had taken it up on account of his dignity, he would have had to make it visible to men through its use. This was so far from his intent, that when the crowds set off to make him King, he withdrew himself from their attempt. A futile device, then, is that charming opinion of some, who say that in Christ there was royal power, but not its use.

Fourthly, it is also argued more evidently. Christ, as we are taught by the evangelical testimony, was naught but king of the Jews: but the king of the Jews was not to be a king of temporal goods, but of a spiritual and sempiternal inheritance: therefore he was not a king in temporals, as are secular kings. This is plainly confirmed from John 18, where, when Christ, who had been accused by them before Pilate of making himself a king, was asked by the governor whether he was a king, he asked him in turn whether he had said so from himself, or whether others had told it of him: as if to ask, of what kingdom he meant it: of that secular kingdom, by which the Romans and other nations rule, or another and higher? And when Pilate responded that he had said it not from himself, but from the relation of the Jewish nation: Christ, conceding that he is the king whom they awaited, adds, that his kingdom is not of this world, that is, of that sort which are temporal and perishable kingdoms. Hence the governor, not understanding that mystery, absolved him of the crime presented. And afterward, as if by a prophetic spirit, he affixed that epitaph to the Cross, Jesus the Nazarene, King of the Jews.

And if we consult the ancient testimonies of the prophets, they plainly manifest this. For he himself says through the prophet, Psalm 2: But I am appointed king by him (namely, God) over Sion his holy mountain (namely, the Church), preaching his commandments. Behold, he established his kingdom in the preaching only of the faith of the celestial kingdom. This is consonant with Matt 28, where he says: All power is given to me in heaven and in earth. Going therefore, teach ye all nations; baptizing them, etc., where he affirms, that no other power was given him, than that which pertains to the celestial kingdom. And Jer 23: Behold the days come, saith the Lord, and I will raise up to David a just branch: and a king shall reign, and shall be wise…In those days shall Juda be saved, that is, there will only be a king in order to save Juda. And Isaias 9: He shall sit upon the throne of David, and upon his kingdom, to establish it…from henceforth and forever. Thus David speaks of his offspring, Psalm 144: Thy kingdom is a kingdom of all ages: because it is not brought to an end, as the secular kingdom is, through the elapsing of mortal life, but without interruption endures forever. But the Angel expounded this to Mary, saying: The Lord God shall give unto him the throne of David his father, and he shall reign in the house of Jacob for ever. And of his kingdom there shall be no end.

Some have imagined that he was a king by paternal right: for Joseph descended from David through Solomon, and the blessed Virgin through Mathan; but this is not pertinent. Firstly, because that kingdom was peculiar only to that province: but we speak of a universal kingdom of the whole world. Moreover, that temporal kingdom of David was entirely extinguished in Sedecias, as is written in 4 Kings 24, according to the prophecy of Jer 22. Wherefore Ambrose, in lib. 3 super Lucam says, that although Christ the king descended from Jechonias, to whom it was threatened by the prophet, that none of his offspring was to be king, yet (he says) there is no contradiction: because he did not rule with secular honor, nor sit in the seat of Jechonias, but in the seat of David. No indeed, although Jechonias had sat in the seat of David, yet not in the same seat as Christ: the latter had an eternal kingdom, which sort David himself did not have.

Finally, the same truth is confirmed by the testimony of all the holy fathers, for whom the thing was ever undoubted, that Christ took up no other kingdom, than the spiritual kingdom of heaven. Whence Augustine, lib. 83, q. 61, and wherever else he discusses this matter, says nothing but that Christ was our king, for that he gave to us an example of battling and conquering, by whose leadership we are liberated from Egypt, and brought into the heavenly Jerusalem, as into the land of promise.

But if someone should object to us blessed Thomas, in opusculum 20, lib. 3, cap. 13, where it appears to some that he taught the contrary opinion, it is responded, that it shall be clear to no one reading him attentively that he was of such an opinion. For there he establishes only that Christ was monarch of the whole universe, which he deduces from Psalm 8, Thou hast subjected all things under his feet, and from Malachi, From the rising of the sun to its setting, great is his name. Now these testimonies are understood only of his heavenly kingdom, in respect of which all things are subject to him. Which St. Thomas himself acknowledges, adding, that that dominion and kingdom of Christ is ordered to the salvation of the soul, and to spiritual goods, although it is not excluded from temporals insofar as they are ordered to spiritual things. He does not, therefore, affirm that he was a king in temporals except precisely in the order to spiritual things. And thus to be understood are his final words in II Sent.

But Burgensis, addit. 2 super Matt 1, contrives the contrary opinion, namely, that he was king in temporals, although he admits that it cannot at all be gathered from the testimonies of the prophets, who ascribe only an eternal kingdom to him. But he says, that because the Jews were anticipating him to be a temporal king also, God ordained, that Christ would have the same dignity. Now this conjecture is so tenuous, that it rather confirms our opinion. For that opinion of the Jews was false and erroneous: for aside from the testimonies cited, they had the clear witness of Zacharias, Behold thy king will come to thee, the just and savior: he is poor, and riding upon an ass, by whom they were taught that he would come without royal pomp. It was not fitting, therefore, that Christ take up a temporal kingdom on account of that error.

Let the good reader consult whether I have confirmed this foundation of truth with so many things. We now turn to the confirmation of the third conclusion. And indeed, should Christ have taken up a temporal kingdom: yet it would not immediately follow thence, that he committed an equal power to his vicar, for we could say that such pertained to his power of excellence, just as does his power to institute sacraments, and to confer grace without these, which function he did not commit to the Pope. But since neither did he take up royal power, it is most plain, that neither did he commit it to his vicar.

But furthermore, the same truth shines forth from what Christ says, Matt 20 and Luke 22, You know that the princes of the Gentiles lord it over them; and they that are the greater, exercise power upon them. It shall not be so among you: but whosoever will be the greater among you (namely, Peter, who was to be the head of the Church), let him be your minister. Even as the Son of man is not come to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a redemption for many. Which place Bernard introduces, De consideratione lib. 2, and says: “For what else has the Apostle given to you? What I have, he says, I give thee. What is that? One thing I know, it is not gold or silver. Albeit you claim these things to yourself for any other reason: but not by Apostolical right; for he could not give to you that which he had not: that which he had, he gave, as I have said, the solicitude over the church[es].[3] Can it be that he says domination? Hear him. Neither as lording it over the clergy, he says, but being made a pattern of the flock. And lest you think this said in mere humility, and not truth also, it is the words of the Lord in the Gospel, The kings of the Gentiles lord it over them; and they that have power over them, are called beneficent: and he continues, But you not so. It is plain: mastery [dominatus] is forbidden to the Apostles. Go you therefore, venture to seize for yourself, being one who either lords it over the Apostolate, or an Apostle over the mastery. Plainly you are prohibited from one or the other. If you should wish to have both at once, you shall lose both. Do not think yourself excepted from the number of those of whom God speaks thus: They have reigned, but not by me; they have been princes, and I knew not. This is the apostolical pattern: mastery is forbidden, ministry is enjoined.” And below: “Go out into the field (the field is the world): go out not as a master, but as a servant.” Thus Bernard. With Bernard as interpreter, Christ could not have removed this temporal dominion from the apostles in a more splendid manner. Hence it is a fiction to say that the Pope has the power of this dominion without its use. For that a power is vain which cannot be reduced to act, is proven much more efficaciously of this, than of Christ.

Likewise. If he had such a power, the Pope would also be able to usurp the jurisdiction of Princes without injury, and to remove and institute Kings even outside of causes of faith: which the most holy pontiffs, whatever their flatterers should say, certainly have never dared to attempt. Indeed Innocent,[4] in the cited can. Duo sunt, recognized that the two powers of the emperor and the Pope are distinct. Nor does he attribute any power of the Pope over Kings other than that of a pastor, such that he can excommunicate them, and remove them by reason of the faith.[5] And the can. Si imperator says, that the Emperor has the privileges of his power, which he has obtained divinely for the sake of administering the public laws. And in the cap. Per venerabilem. qui filii sunt legitimi, he frankly says, that he does not have power in temporals over the King of France. And whatever others might dream up, he understood that of all Kings. And in can. Cum ad verum, Nicholas expressly says, that neither has the Emperor seized the rights of the pontificate, nor the pontiff the Imperial name: since the mediator of God and man Christ Jesus has divided the offices of both powers with their own proper acts and distinct dignities.

Moreover, these things are more clearly confirmed. The administrations of the ecclesiastical and the civil republic are so different, that the ecclesiastical is impeded most of all by secular business: for this reason all the canon laws admonish the clerical order, not to mix themselves up in secular affairs. Because of this, it was most just, that they be most removed from marriage: for as Paul says, they who have wives, seek how they may please the wife. Certainly for this reason, in the same can., Nicholas says that just as the Emperor ought not to mix himself up in divine affairs, so also the Pope, soldiering for God, ought not to entangle himself in secular business, lest he seem to preside, not over divine things, but secular.

But in order that these things might become even clearer, it is argued, again. Power, as much civil as ecclesiastical, is divinely instituted: for there is no power but from God, as the Apostle says in Rom 13: and those that are, are ordained of God: and therefore, he that resisteth the power whether civil or ecclesiastical, resisteth the ordinance of God. Yet God wisely has appointed these in different ways: for he has granted to each and every republic the civil power through the law of nature, of which he is the author, as we have demonstrated copiously in De iustitia et iure, lib. IV, q. 4. a. 1: for to each and every republic there pertains the governance of itself, as it belongs to all things to preserve themselves: namely, that they rule themselves either by the power of optimates, or of the people, or of a king: for which reason the people voluntarily transfer to the ruler all their authority and power, as is read in l. Quod principi de constitu. principum. ff. But Christ by himself conferred the ecclesiastical power to his vicar. The royal power, therefore, is derived from God through the republic: in which sense the text of Prov 8 is understood, Through me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things: but the ecclesiastical and evangelical power was committed by Christ to Peter: therefore, the secular dominions of kingdoms were not simply committed either to Peter, or to his successors.

According to these it is then plainly argued. The law of faith does not destroy the law of nature, but perfects it: but kings ruled prior to the coming of Christ by the law of nature and the law of nations, which derive from the eternal law of God: whence it is read in Daniel 2, that the God of heaven gave to Nabuchodonosor power and a kingdom: and Christ responded to Pilate, Thou shouldst not have any power against me, unless it were it were given thee from above: therefore Christ did not change the kingdoms, whence the Apostle says in Romans 13, speaking universally of the potentates even of the infidels, Let every soul be subject to higher powers: to which he urges that tribute be paid. And in 1 Peter 2, Peter commands all Christians to be subject to every human creature for God’s sake, whether to the king, he says, as excelling. And after: Servants, be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward: whence it is gathered, that Christians ought to obey even infidel Kings, so long as they rule without peril to the faith and injury to the savior: much more freely, therefore, do the Kings of Christians enjoy their power by themselves independently from the Pope, so long as they inflict no injury upon the faith.

It is therefore an unvarnished invention, to constitute the Pope thus as the ordinary judge of temporal kingdoms, and of kings, just as he is the supreme judge of the things of the church, and its prelates, or as the secular king is the judge of his dukes, and counts, and other vassals. Hence not all jurists hold to that opinion. For Ioannes Andreæ, Hugo, and others think with us. Nor should have Sylvester adhered to the contrary opinion, since blessed Thomas (whose disciple he was), although he was a most studious defender of the Apostolic see, nowhere left such an opinion.

On that account, the aforementioned patrons of this opinion provide even less reason for its probability, saying that the donation made to Sylvester by Constantine (if such existed) or by king Philip, was not a donation, but a restitution. And vice versa, that Sylvester, for the good of peace, gave to Constantine the eastern empire. Likewise that the Pope, if he does not use the administration of temporal goods in the whole Christian world, does so not from a lack of power which he truly has, but for the sake of confirming tranquility and peace with his sons. No wonder, therefore, if others, being more sensible, reject these as trifling nonsense. For if he had simply and absolutely the right of all temporals, he could have the use thereof without injury, which none of them dares to assert.

The fourth conclusion. Not only is the Pope not the lord of temporal kingdoms, no indeed neither is he their superior such that he can institute kings: indeed, someone could perhaps say, that although he is not the lord simply speaking of temporal kingdoms, yet he can in an ordinary way institute kings everywhere, just as he institutes Bishops, although he is not the lord simply speaking of Episcopates, or just as a king institutes dukes and magnates, although he is not simply speaking the lord of their patrimonies: but this conclusion of ours asserts the contrary. Hence he cannot act as judge between kings in an ordinary way absent causes of faith, just as between ecclesiastical prelates, or between dukes. Unless perchance their quarrels incline to the detriment of the faith or of religion: for then he can very rightly do so, not only by way of fraternal correction, as Innocent says, cap. Novit. de iudic., but also with coercive judgement. This is gathered from what was said above: for either power is sufficient of itself, and divinely instituted in a different way, such that any king is, in temporals, made by his commonwealth the supreme judge in his own kingdom. Hence in the same cap. the same Pontiff protests that he does not involve himself in order to usurp the judgment of kings. And Alexander III, cap. Causam. in 2. qui filii sunt legitimi, declares that judgment regarding possessions pertains, not to the church, but to the king.

From these, finally, the consequence is, that though the king were to break out into tyranny: absent injury to the faith, it is incumbent upon, not the Pontiff, but the republic to expel him from the kingdom.

In sum, in the Pope there is no merely temporal power, as there is in kings, except in the lands secularly subjected to him. This is what Cajetan, that loyal defender of the apostolic See, asserted in his Apologia de potestate papæ, cap. 6. And the reason is, that temporal power of this sort is not merely necessary for the government of the church.

Yet for greater clarity and firmness regarding these things, a fifth and likewise catholic conclusion is given against the heresy of those who deny all temporal power to the Pontiff. Any civil power whatsoever, is so subject to the ecclesiastical in the order to spiritual things, that the Pope can, through his own spiritual power, as many times as regard for the faith and religion should require, not only act against kings by means of the buffets of ecclesiastical censures, and coerce them, but also deprive Christian Princes of their temporal goods, and even proceed to their deposition. I have said, through his own spiritual power: because the power of the Pontiff, insofar as he is Pontiff, is not merely temporal, but he uses the temporal as minister of the spiritual. But this conclusion is not the same as the second: the latter only asserted, that the ecclesiastical power is superior. Wherefore perhaps someone would merely conclude, that the secular Prince is bound to measure his laws and acts according to the spiritual end, and to obey the pontiff in spiritual censures. But this [fifth] conclusion asserts moreover, that the Pope can use temporal goods for his end and spiritual purposes, and can coerce Princes by temporal punishments. To elucidate this, it should be noted, that the ecclesiastical power is not only more excellent than the civil, for that its end, which is eternal beatitude, is more perfect and more exalted than civil felicity: but also for the reason that civil felicity is not sufficiently perfect in itself, and thus it is per se ordered and related to celestial beatitude. I wish to say, that there are not two commonwealths, entirely distinct and diverse, neither of which depends upon the other, of which sort are those of the French and the Spanish, or of which sort were the Roman and Athenian, for of these, although one were more excellent and more perfect than another, yet neither was bound to serve the other. I say that the spiritual and civil powers are not to be compared thus: but the civil, whatsoever it be, is referred to the spiritual, which is unique to all Christians, because human felicity is of itself ordered to the divine. They are not as two arts wholly different, namely, as ironworking and woodworking, but as armor-making is ordered to the military art, and ship-making is ordered to the art of navigating: the inferior of which is bound to make arms and ships in such a way, that they not deviate from the end of the superior art, and thus, as the Philosopher says in I Ethic., the superior artisan commands the inferior artisans how they ought to work, because he is the judge of the inferior arts. In like manner, the civil commonwealth is referred to the spiritual: for both are simultaneously bound together into one mystical body, which is composed of both, as Paul luculently declares in Romans 12 and 1 Cor 12; but now in one body, all the members ought to be referred to one head, but spiritual things are not ordered to temporal things, which latter are less perfect, therefore on the contrary, temporals ought to be subject to the judgment of spirituals. Whence the same Apostle, in 1 Cor 2, comparing the temporal faculty to the spiritual, says that the animal man perceiveth not these things which are of the Spirit of God, but the spiritual man judgeth all things, and he himself is judged of no man. Nor is this opposed by what we have said above: namely, that the king has supreme power in temporals, because it lies with [the temporal power] to be subordinate to the spiritual in such a way, that it must not deviate from it.

This foundation having been laid down, it is argued thus. For the due government and administration of the spiritual commonwealth, it is necessary that all secular power obey it: therefore, also necessary thereupon, in the spiritual ruler, is the faculty of using temporals, insofar as they are necessary for his end, and thus of coercing princes when it should be needed, even to the point of their deposition, as of members which are now putrid and pestiferous. Now Christ was not lacking in those things which were worthwhile to his church: therefore not only did he take up in himself this sort of temporal power related to the spiritual, but also thereafter committed it to his vicar.

It is argued secondly for the same truth. The chief Pontiff was constituted by Christ as the supreme and universal shepherd of the whole Christian flock: now it is the office of the shepherd to recall to the way errant sheep, of whatever order and dignity they be, and to compel them in any regard: therefore, through that pastoral power, he can use temporals when there is need for it. And Innocent equipped himself with this reason against the Emperor of Constantinople, in the cap. Solitæ de maior. & obedi. in order to coerce him. He says, “To Us in blessed Peter have the sheep of Christ been committed,” with no difference placed between these [sheep] and those: and excepting nothing, as Christ said to Peter, Whatsoever thou shalt bind, etc. And in the same sense must Pope Nicholas be understood, cap. Omnes. 22 distin. where he says, that Christ “committed to blessed Peter, the key-bearer of eternal life, at once the laws of earthly and celestial authority.” By the laws of earthly authority, he means the earthly power of temporal goods and princes, not absolutely, as the authors cited above falsely think, but in the order to spiritual things. And thus is the Gloss to be understood, so that it be in agreement with the truth which it thence collects, that the Pope has both swords: because he can depose kings, as in 15. q. 6. can. Alius, and 96 dist., can. Duo sunt.[6] And with the same moderation should the text of Boniface be taken, in Extravag. Unam sanctam, de maiorit. & obedien. where he says, that the two swords, namely, the spiritual and the temporal, are in the power of the Roman Pontiff. Although, when he ascribes this sense to that word of the apostles in Luke 22, Behold, here are two swords, he does not mean to make such a sense an article of faith: for perhaps there Christ, when he said, He that hath not, let him buy a sword, meant nothing other than the calamity which threatened them. Hence Peter, who, taking it to be about the material sword, cut off the ear of Malchus, was reprehended. Nevertheless, it is still rightly adapted to our proposal. For this reason, kingdoms have never been changed by the pontiff except by reason of the faith: for this reason Pope Stephen transferred the empire from the Greeks to the Germans, as is clear in cap. Venerabilem. de electione, and cap. Licet, de foro competenti. And Innocent IV prohibited to the King of Portugal the administration of the kingdom, as in cap. Grandi. de supplenda negligentia prælatorum libro sexto.

But it is necessary to explain the difference between this conclusion and the two prior ones by way of examples. For however much the king administers the government of the kingdom in other kinds of offenses outside of peril to the faith, nothing falls to the Pope, except by way of fraternal correction. But if, for example, the Christian King were to make laws to the detriment of the faith: namely, laws adverse to the sacraments, or to the Christian religion in any way, or if the Pope were to call a Council, which the King impeded wrongly and contrary to right, or if he were to furnish aid to heretics, and infidels opposing our faith, or to schismatics, or move any other sort of mischief against the Apostolic see or the Church, then the Pope would be able to act against him, not only with the spiritual sword, but with the temporal also.

But you might argue the contrary, firstly. Would it not be enough to hurl at them the fulminations of the spiritual sword, namely, of anathema and other censures? For [the Church] seems to have no other arms: for as Paul says in 1 Cor 10, The weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but are spiritual. It is responded, that the church would not have been sufficiently provided for unless, when she is afflicted in her affairs by secular potentates, and spiritual arms do not suffice, she be able to compel them with the temporal sword also: because otherwise she would not have wholly coercive force, of the sort which is necessary for her.

But again, someone might ask, whether in events of this sort the Pope, omitting the spiritual sword, would be able to employ the temporal? For it seems that he could, because he has both equally. It is responded, that it neither befits him, nor is it licit, unless there were imminent peril, since the ordinary way of the Pontiff is the pastoral rod: while the secular sword is extraordinary. Now the ordinary way ought to precede, nor ought he to use the temporal sword, unless there be urgent need that requires it: namely, when, having attempted spiritual force, he recognizes that these are not sufficient for the matter at hand. No indeed, unless it were in his own lands, of which he is the temporal lord, in order to defend them, but in others it does not befit the Pope to wage war by himself, but when there is a prince of the Church rebellious and injurious to the faith, he ought to present the business of arms to another Prince. For so far is what Paul says true, that the arms of Christian warfare are not carnal. Although the legitimate sense is of the combat which each man sustains against the demons and his own flesh.

But because we have said, that the Pope can abrogate laws which would be harmful to the faith, it should be understood to mean, when they would cause manifest destruction. For that law of Princes, that a testament is not valid unless confirmed by five witnesses, contradicts absolutely no word of sacred scripture in Matthew 18 and John 8, That in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may stand: for that is understood where the sincerity of the human race flourishes: since, where human trust is so corrupted, it is not repugnant to those words to require more witnesses: because that Evangelical law does not forbid it. Likewise, the law which, in matters of cheating within a half of the just price, does not permit action, as in l. 2. C. de rescinden. venditio. and cap. Cum dilecti and cap. Cum causa de emptione et venditione, is not contrary to justice: because it does not absolve the one cheated in the forum of conscience, but it only intends to put quarrels to rest. But if the King were to make a law, so that a possessor malæ fidei prescribes, that would be both contrary to conscience and the nurse of many frauds and deceits: which would thus have to be abrogated by the pontiff: just as one reads it was abrogated in cap. Vigilanti and cap. ult. de præscriptionibus.

The solution to the first argument, therefore, is gathered from the foregoing. The civil and ecclesiastical power are two and distinct, as has been said: but Christ established only the ecclesiastical under one head of the whole earth: while he left the civil derived from the divine and natural law, so that each kingdom would have its own head: but he willed the civil to subordinated to the ecclesiastical such that its laws would not be opposed to the faith and the law which he himself preached: and in this manner is the Pontiff the unique head of all Christian kings. And that is the sense of Paul when he says, that all Christians are the one mystical body of Christ. For nothing concerns the pope in regard to the infidels, other than to send preachers to them, who convince them of the faith in a legitimate manner and order. But this does not concern the present discussion, nor does the question of whether there is one emperor of the whole world: which we have discussed at length in De iustitia et iure, lib. IV.

To the second, a sufficient response is, that Christ assumed naught but a spiritual kingdom, and of temporals, only so much as was necessary for the former. And this is what the cited sacred testimonies teach.

To the third, finally, it is responded, that that canon, Quicumque litem, 11. q. 1, has been abrogated, as the Gloss says, which it proves with many decrees, such as cap. Si duobus, de appellationibus, and 2 quæstione sexta, can. Non ita, and many others. Indeed, that text is not a sacred determination of the church, but of the emperor Theodosius, who wished to show his great affection toward the Apostolic see. At present there is no need of appealing from civil causes to the church.

But if you should argue: the pope is the judge of all sins: it is responded, that this is true in the spiritual forum, but in the exterior forum he is only the judge of ecclesiastical causes, while civil causes are to be judged by the civil laws; unless no agreement could be reached between kings after all civil laws had been consulted: for then, the Pope could interpose himself by way of fraternal correction, according to the tenor of cap. Novit. extra de iudiciis.

[1] An obvious error; evidently Soto refers here to Innocent IV’s Ad apostolicæ, de sent. et re iud. in 6. — Trans.

[2] Another obvious error; but this error seems to have been somewhat common around that time. One finds a similar attribution of the can. Duo sunt to Pelagius in Turrecremata, Guarnieri, and Marchese, to name a few. Tom. I of the 1578 Venetian edition of Turrecremata’s commentaries on the Decretum of Gratian, in a marginal note, observes that “a more modern codex ascribes this capitulum to Gelasius.” — Trans.

[3] The 1560 edition of de Soto’s commentary, from which we translate, here reads super ecclesiam in his quotation of Bernard; the 1538 Lyon edition, and the 1701 Paris edition, read super Ecclesias. — Trans.

[4] Here de Soto seems once again to misattribute the can. Duo sunt to Pope Innocent IV; cf. supra, note 1. — Trans.

[5] This is the conclusion that may be drawn, not from the can. Duo sunt of Gelasius, but from the cap. Ad apostolicæ of Innocent IV; cf. supra, note 1. — Trans.

[6] Cf. note 5 above. — Trans.

Dubbed the “Common Doctor” of the Church, St. Thomas Aquinas has constantly been upheld by the Church as a model and exemplar for theologians, both in his method and doctrine. The great work for which he is principally known, the Summa theologiæ, became in the centuries after him a standard textbook for theologians and was the subject of a great many Scholastic commentaries (including that of Cardinal Cajetan, a relevant excerpt of which has been translated on The Josias). The insuperable excellence of the Summa, however, has unfortunately obscured for many the excellence of his early Scriptum super Sententiis, his commentary upon the Liber sententiarum of Peter Lombard, which St. Thomas composed as part of the requirement for obtaining his masters in theology. Lombard’s text was the standard textbook used by theology students in high medieval universities, and hence a large portion of the great medieval works of theology are commentaries upon the Sentences. The Summa of St. Thomas, left unfinished at his death, was soon supplemented, through the labors of his disciples, with material from his Sentences commentary.

The text translated here today is taken from St. Thomas’s commentary on the forty-fourth and final distinction of Book II of the Sentences. Here the Lombard discusses the question of whether the power to sin (potentia peccandi) in man is from God, or rather from ourselves, or the devil; he answers that it is from God, and adduces many authorities to prove such. Then he considers the objection that, since it has just been proved that the devil’s power for evil (potestas mali) comes from God, it would seem that we ought not to resist the devil’s power, since according to the Apostle in Romans 13, he who resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. But he responds by clarifying that the Apostle speaks there of the secular power, and that it is the command of God that we obey no power in things that are evil.

St. Thomas’s commentary on the text of distinction 44 begins first with a divisio textus, in which he briefly divides into parts the text of the Lombard, followed by the main bulk of his own composition, in which he proposes questions and articles based upon the material in the text before him. Thus his first quæstio, on the potentia peccandi, divided into three articles; then comes his second quæstio, on obedience, which is divided into three articles as well. Finally there is the expositio textus, in which he comments directly upon the words of the Lombard in dist. 44, and which is the very last portion of his commentary on Book II. It is this expositio textus which we offer today.

St. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 44, q. 2, a. 3, exp. text.

Exposition of the text.

After what has been said, there occurs a question worthy of consideration, etc. The reason for this order is, that a power is known through its act; wherefore it was necessary first to determine regarding the act of sin, before discussing the powerof sinning; although a power is naturally prior to act.

Whether the power of sinning is in us from God or from ourselves. It seems that he ought to have said ‘powers of sinning’, plurally, because sin takes place through the acts of many powers. But it should be said, that no power may elicit an act of sin, except insofar as it is the will or is moved by the will; and thus there is one power according to which sin is first of all present, namely the will, or free choice.

An evil will is not in us from God, but from ourselves and from the devil. This is true, if the will be taken for the act of the will; but not if it is taken for the power which is the principle of the act; and thus the similitude, through which they wish to draw a conclusion from the similarity of power, is null.

But it is shown indisputably by the many testimonies of the saints, that the power for evil is from God. It seems that the proof of the Master is not valid: for the authorities following speak not of the power of sinning, but of the power of prelation. But it should be said that in the power of prelation, which is an habitual power, there is also included the habitual power of sinning: because on account of the power of prelation, prelates are able to commit many sins, which they could not commit if they were not prelates.

By me kings reign, and by me tyrants hold the earth. What the difference is between a king and a tyrant, is clear from what has been said in the third article of the first question.

But it should be known, that the Apostle speaks there of the secular power. It seems that the solution of the Master is insufficient: because he shows above that even the power to harm which the devil has, is from God; and thus it seems that if one is to obey the power, because the power is from God, one must obey even the devil. But it should be said that without doubt, the authority of the Apostle is understood only of the power of prelation; this sort of power the devil does not have over men, except insofar as they enter, as it were, into a compact with him, consenting to him by sin, and are made his slaves. But this pact is unlawful; and thus from this there is not acquired a debt of obedience, but rather the pact is to be broken, Isaias 28, Your covenant with hell shall not stand. Wherefore it is not necessary that one obey every power which is from God, but that only which is instituted by God for the purpose that due obedience be given to it, and only the power of prelation is of this sort.

Disregard power, fearing greater powers. From this, it seems that one ought to obey a greater power rather than a lesser.

1. But this seems to be false, because in some things one obeys one more than another, and in some things less, as in some things one obeys one’s father more than the general of the army, and in some things the general of the army more than one’s father, as is said in 9 Ethic. Therefore it follows that the same is greater and lesser than the same.

2. Moreover, the power of an Archbishop is greater than the power of a Bishop. But in some cases the subjects are bound to obey their bishops more than Archbishops. Therefore it is not always the case that one must rather obey the greater power.

3. Moreover, the Abbots of monasteries are subjected to Bishops, unless they be exempt. Therefore the power of a Bishop is greater than the power of an Abbot. But a monk is bound to obey the Abbot more than the Bishop. Therefore one need not always obey the greater power.

4. Moreover, the spiritual power is greater than the secular power. If therefore the greater power is rather to be obeyed, a spiritual prelate will always be able to absolve from the precept of the secular power: which is false.

I respond that it should be said, that a superior and inferior power can be related in two ways. Either such that the inferior power springs entirely from the superior; and then the whole power of the inferior is founded upon the power of the superior; and then one must simply and in all things obey the superior power rather than the inferior; just as also in natural things, the first cause has greater influence upon the thing caused by the second cause than even the second cause itself, as is said in the beginning of the Liber de causis: and the power of God is thus related to every created power; thus also is the power of the Emperor related to the power of the proconsul; thus also is the power of the Pope related to every spiritual power in the Church: because by the Pope himself are the diverse degrees of dignities in the Church both appointed and ordained; whence his power is a certain kind of foundation of the Church, as is clear from Matthew 16. And thus in all things we are bound more to obey the Pope than the Bishops or Archbishops, or a monk his Abbot, without any distinction. Again, a superior and inferior power can be related such that both spring forth from one supreme power, which subjects the one to the other according as it wishes; and then one is not superior to the other except in these things in which the one is placed under the other by the supreme power; and in these only must one obey the superior rather than the inferior: and in this way are the powers both of the Bishop and of the Archbishop, which descend from the power of the Pope.

To the first, therefore, it should be said, that it is not unfitting that the father be superior in familial matters, and the general in the affairs of war; but simply speaking one ought rather to obey him who is superior in all things, namely God, and him who plenarily holds the place of God.

To the second it should be said, that in those things in which one ought rather to obey the Bishop than the Archbishop, the Archbishop is not superior to the Bishop, but only in the cases determined by law, in which one has recourse from the Bishop to the Archbishop.

To the third it should be said, that a monk is bound rather to obey his Abbot than the Bishop in those things which pertain to the statutes of the [monastic] rule; but in the things which pertain to Ecclesiastical discipline, he is bound rather to obey the Bishop: because in these latter the Abbot is placed under the Bishop.

To the fourth it should be said, that the spiritual and secular power are both derived from the divine power; and thus, the secular power is under the spiritual to the extent that the former is placed under the latter by God, namely, in the things which pertain to the salvation of the soul; and thus in these matters, one must obey the spiritual power rather than the secular. But in the things which pertain to the civil good, one should obey the secular power rather than the spiritual, as it is said in Matthew 22:21: Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s. Unless perhaps the secular power is also conjoined to the spiritual power, as it is in the Pope, who holds the summit of both powers, namely the spiritual and the secular, this being appointed by him who is Priest and King forever according to the order of Melchisedech, King of kings, and Lord of lords, whose power shall not be taken away, and whose kingdom shall not be corrupted for ever and ever. Amen.

The term “integralist” was originally applied to Catholic anti-liberal and anti-modernist movements in the 19^th and early 20^th centuries— such as Ramón Nocedal’s party in Spain, and the Sodalitium Pianum, based in Rome. One of the main goals of such movements was to defend traditional Catholic political teaching against liberalism. Liberals have ever pretended (even to themselves) to separate politics with concern for the end of human life, hence their demand for the so-called “separation of Church and state.” In practice, however, they have ever ordered politics to the false and individualistic conception of the human good implicit in liberalism itself. Hence integralists were always particularly opposed to the liberal demand for the separation of Church and state. Integralist movements took various contingent positions on indifferent matters, on which Catholics are free to disagree with them. But on the central points of Catholic political teaching they were merely defending the perennial and infallible teaching of the Church.

It is this essence of the integralist programs that we defend at The Josias. What we mean by integralism is merely this: Political action is naturally and inevitably directed towards what we take to be good for human beings, and ought therefore to be directed towards the true human good, which is a common good. But the common good of human life is twofold: a temporal common good proportioned to human nature, and the eternal common good proportioned to the divine nature in which human beings participate by grace. Hence there are two authorities directing human beings towards these two common goods: a temporal authority and a spiritual authority. The former is subordinate to the later, just as the temporal common good is subordinate to the spiritual common good. On account of the danger of human pride, it is necessary that these two kinds of authority be placed in the hands of different persons—temporal authority in lay hands, and spiritual authority in the hands of bishops.

Integralism in this basic sense has always been taught by the greatest theologians of the Church— from St. Augustine to St. Bernard to St. Thomas. Apart from a few regalist special pleaders it was universally held by the scholastic theologians. In later scholasticism it was held not only by Thomists such as Cajetan, but also by opponents of Thomism. This is shown by the following translation of a passage from the De iustitia et iure of Luis de Molina, S.J. (1535-1600). Molina was the great opponent of Thomists in the controversies on grace and predestination. “I am convinced,” wrote Charles De Koninck, “that in philosophy the most extreme limits of opposition have been reached by Thomism and Molinism.” And yet, so basic to Catholic tradition is the integralist thesis that on this even Thomists and Molinists agree. — The Editors

Translated by Timothy Wilson

Luis de Molina, S.J.
De iustitia et iure, tract. II, disp. xxi
What power is, and regarding the civil and ecclesiastical power

Having explained dominion in general, in order that we might descend to the parts subject to it, it is necessary that we begin from the dominion of jurisdiction—as much because it is more noble, as because knowledge of it conduces to a better understanding of the titles of the dominion of property. It is also the case, that explicating it is a less involved task than that of explaining the dominion of property. But because the dominion of jurisdiction is a certain kind of power, we shall have to begin from the explication of power.

As regards the present design, therefore: power, according to Vitoria in Relectio de potestate Ecclesiæ, q. 1, at the beginning, and Navarrus, c. Novit. de iudiciis, nota. 3. corol. 16. in accordance with St. Thomas in 4. d. 24. q. 1 art. 1. quæstiunc. 2 ad 3, is the faculty of one having authority and eminence over others for their rule and government. This is consonant with Paul, Rom 13, Let every soul be subject to higher powers. In this place, rulers, who have the faculty and authority for the governance of others and thus have superiority and eminence over them in this respect, are called powers, the name of the abstract thing being transferred to signify the suppositum in which that faculty is found, but so that the suppositum is endowed with that faculty. The power, therefore, of which we speak, is only in those who have intellect and free will for ruling and governing others, and thus, amongst all corporeal things, it is in men alone.

Power is twofold, namely, Lay, and Ecclesiastical. Here it should be noted, that albeit man were not fitted for a supernatural end, to be achieved through supernatural means, but only for a natural end, yet still this twofold power could be distinguished. Though both would be natural, and could be more easily conjoined in one and the same supreme chief and head, from whom power—which would be ecclesiastical in its own mode—could be derived from him to others. This is explained thus: albeit man had been made for a natural end only, still, men would recognize that there is one first principle, supremely good, from whom they have received and await their being and other goods, and hence is worthy of being shown obedience and honor. For this reason, just as those gathered to establish one Republic would be able to choose a common ruler, who would restrain them in peace and justice, and defend them, and procure their common temporal good: thus they could also choose another who would preside for the purpose of showing worship and due service to God, and who would be, in that function, superior to the secular ruler. They could also choose at will one common ruler, who would be supreme in both functions, and who either would exercise both kinds of regime by himself, or, if one were insufficient for both, or could be exercised less fittingly by the same, for that different mores and demeanor seem to befit each function; he would substitute for himself another to carry out the functions of the other, who would do so through the power received from him. Wherefore history shows, that sometimes, amongst the gentiles there were priests and ministers of idols, distinct from kings and secular princes, and meanwhile the supreme priesthood was conjoined with the royal office. Even today amongst the Japanese, and other unbelievers, the priests are distinct from the secular princes, whether these depend upon, are promoted by, or deposed by them, or not, according to the custom of the diverse regions. And in a similar way, resting upon only the natural light and end of men, they could be instituted for the worship of the true God, as Vitoria rightly notes, De potestate Ecclesiæ relectio 1, q. 3, n. 3, and relectio 2, q. 1, n. 2.

But now, since man is made for a supernatural end to be attained through supernatural means, the ecclesiastical power is distinguished from the lay power. The lay power, of itself, is established to govern in a manner suitable to the natural end to which it is ordained by its nature. But the ecclesiastical power is instituted to govern in a manner suitable to the supernatural end, namely, by inducing to means accommodated to the supernatural end. In this way it happens, that these two powers are distinguished on the part of diverse ends subordinated one to the other: in a way similar to that by which the equestrian art is distinguished from the art of bridle-making: and this kind of distinction is a familiar one amongst the practical skills. Wherefore, just as it is for the equestrian art to command the bridle-making art, in order that the latter apply its work in a manner suitable to the superior end of the former: so also is it the concern of the ecclesiastical power to command the lay power, in order that the latter administer suitably to the supernatural end of the former, to which end the natural end of the lay power is ordered.[1] But since the nobility and eminence of any faculty is to be considered most of all from its object and end, the nobility and eminence of the ecclesiastical power above the lay power will have to be judged according to the degree that the supernatural end exceeds the natural, and the soul’s spiritual salvation does the temporal interests, and the peaceful and tranquil state of this life.

But now, since in the state of innocency every one would be conceived in grace, and hence would be born furnished with the principles sufficient to obtain by himself the fact of the supernatural end, and would easily be instructed in those things in which he would need to be instructed, and would not require coercion for it: certainly in that state, both powers, namely the ecclesiastical and the lay, would be without coercive force, the superiors directing the inferiors to their ends, as we have shown in our commentary on the Prima pars, in the treatise De opere sex dierum: and it would be expedient for both to be conjoined in the same suppositum, and, granting that supernatural state, neither in this sense would be supernatural, inasmuch as men, directed by the natural light and the illumination of faith, would not be able to set up both by themselves. But since men of that state were composed of body and soul, they would have worshiped God, not otherwise than as we do, not only with an internal but also an external and corporeal worship, and their worship would be uniform, as Vitoria rightly teaches in the cited relectio, q. 4, n. 1.

With nature having been damaged by sin, and grace having been lost, both powers have coercive force, their subjects requiring coercion in order that they might be led by direction to their ends. But it is necessary to distinguish three times, or three states, of the universal Church: namely, of the law of nature, of the written law, and of the law of grace. And indeed, in the law of nature, the faith and supernatural knowledge then necessary for salvation having been granted, and likewise the remedy instituted for that state against the sin of origin, which was of positive divine law, since the men of that state were held only to the natural law, they would have been able to institute by themselves both civil and ecclesiastical power, by which they would be directed to the natural and supernatural end. And they would have been able either to divide them, so that the one would be in one suppositum, and the other in another: or to conjoin them in one and the same suppositum. In this way was Melchisedech at once king of Salem, and priest of God the most high, as is read in Heb 7 and Gen 14. Many weighty authors think, that the firstborn in the law of nature, especially after the flood, were priests; and that Melchisedech was Sem, the firstborn of Noah. And this is the right, which Esau, as the firstborn, sold to Jacob: for which reason Paul calls him profane, in Heb 12. Vitoria, in Relectio 1 de potestate Ecclesiæ, q. 4, n. 2 and 3, and Relectio 2, q.1, n. 2, justly says, that ecclesiastical power was in the law of nature immediately after sin. Indeed I should add, that in order to institute it, in the form it then had, the natural and supernatural knowledge which remained in Adam from the state of innocency was sufficient, being joined with the knowledge of the Fall, and of the promise of a redeemer immediately made to him, and the knowledge of original sin, and of the remedy against it which God revealed to him. Yet I do not think, that there was anything of positive divine law, other than the application of the remedy against original sin, or any ecclesiastical power, or any other sort of oblation or sacrifice instituted by God by divine positive law: but the mode of ecclesiastical power and divine worship was left to men themselves, that they would institute it: and it was instituted in great part by Adam, and by Noah after the flood, who both lived for a long time, and were much illuminated by God.

At the time of the written law, when God chose a people peculiar to himself, from which would be born a redeemer, and in which he would foretell and presignify, what things were to come in the law of grace, inasmuch as in this way they would be rendered more credible, and would prepare a way for the coming of his only-begotten son, he himself instituted the ecclesiastical power, namely, the high priesthood of the Synagogue, and the other grades and ministries of that power, and the sacrifices, rites, and worship by which he would worshiped, all of which were of positive divine law. And he willed the whole ecclesiastical power to be the tribe of Levi only. All these things are plain from the sacred scriptures. Yet that power was not supernatural such as would obtain a supernatural effect, in the way that the ecclesiastical power of the law of grace instrumentally obtains the supernatural effects of the remission of sins, the granting of grace, the confection of the Eucharist, etc. Although in the old law there was the sacrament of circumcision, at whose presence grace was conferred, just as it was also conferred in the law of nature at the presence of the remedy against original sin. Because, therefore, that power obtained no supernatural effect, as Vitoria says, Relectio 1 de potestate Ecclesiæ, q. 3, n. 6, and certain others, that whole power could have been instituted by human law: although men would not have known to institute all those things so that they would be symbols of things to come in the law of grace, nor would they have known to adapt them to the ends to which they were instituted by God in that manner.

That power could have been conjoined in the same suppositum with lay and civil power. No indeed, in very fact it was conjoined in Moses, who both administered the Commonwealth in temporal things, and was a priest, and offered sacrifices, according to Psalm 98:  Moses and Aaron among his priests. It was also conjoined in Samuel, who was a priest, and governed the Commonwealth in spiritual and temporal things, as is clear from 1 Kings. Likewise afterward in the Maccabees, who were high priests, and had supreme care of the Commonwealth in temporal things, as is manifest from the books of the Maccabees. But in the time of the kings, the ecclesiastical power was disjoined from the civil and temporal: for, according to the prescript of the law, the high priest, and other priests could not be otherwise than from the tribe of Levi: but the kings were of the tribe of Benjamin, and of the tribe of Juda. Whence it was that Saul, in 1 Kings 13, offering holocausts and peace offerings, so displeased God, that his degradation from the kingdom drew its origin from that act, as is clear from the words of Samuel: Thou hast done foolishly, and hast not kept the commandments of the Lord thy God, which he commanded thee. And if thou hadst not done thus, the Lord would now have established thy kingdom over Israel for ever: but thy kingdom shall not come. The Lord hath sought him a man, etc. And Ozias, in 2 Para 26, was stricken a leper, because by burning incense, he had wished to usurp the office of the priests.

But now, the ecclesiastical power, which in the time of the law of grace is in the Christian Church, since it is wholly supernatural for the most part, inasmuch as it obtains the supernatural effects of the remission of sins, the granting of grace, the confection of the Eucharist, the creating of priests, and the conferring to these of power for doing those things, the granting of indulgences, by which sins are remitted as regards punishment, excommunication, and other similar things; indeed, of itself and on the whole, it could take its origin neither from the State, nor from human or natural law, but only from positive divine law. In truth, this power was, and is, in Christ as man, according to excellence, and not at all bound to the sacraments. For to him was given all power in heaven and on earth, as it is said in Matt 27, and he was appointed by God the Father as high priest, head, and king of the Church, according to Psalm 2: But I am appointed king by him over Sion, his holy mountain, that is the Church, preaching his commandment. And Heb 2: So Christ did not glorify himself, that he might be made a high priest, but he that said unto him, Thou art my son, this day I have begotton thee: as he saith in another place: Thou art a priest forever, according to the order of Melchisedech, and in ch. 7: For the others indeed were made priests without an oath: but this with an oath, by him that said unto him: The Lord hath sworn and he will not repent: Thou art a priest forever, according to the order of Melchisedech. Finally, the reason for that letter which Paul wrote to the Hebrews, is to show the excellence of the priesthood of Christ in the new law according to the order of Melchisedech, over the priesthood of the old law according to the order of Aaron: which has been set aside, and has ceased to be, by the priesthood and death of Christ. Now this power Christ left in the Church, yet bound by the sacraments, and by certain sure laws. But he left it, not to all of the Church, but to Peter his vicar, and the rest of the successors of Peter, as to the head in place of himself, upon whom the whole depends. For in Matt 16, to Peter especially he promised the keys of the kingdom of heaven, which keys imply this power. Likewise he promised in the same place that he would found his Church upon Peter, as upon the head and vicar in place of himself, against which Church the gates of the underworld would not prevail: which he fulfilled after the resurrection, John 21. He left it also to the other Apostles, and to the Bishops their successors, to whom he also promised the power of the keys in Matt 18, though he conferred it partly at the time of the Last Supper, and partly after the resurrection. And he instituted seventy-two disciples as their ministers and helpers, to whose place the parish priests succeed, and the other priests, inferior to the Bishops, who have a certain part of this supernatural power. And thus it happens, that just as Christ did not have ecclesiastical power from the Church, according to John 15: You have not chosen me: but I have chosen you; rather, he had it from the Father: thus also the power which today is in the Church, as much in the Supreme Pontiff as in the Bishops and inferior priests, is not from the Church, but committed by Christ to Peter, to the Apostles, and to the other disciples, and their successors: although Christ committed the future elections by which this power is applied to the Church, and to the ordinance of the Supreme Pontiffs, as has been explained broadly in the discussion on faith.

It is not our design in this place to dispute on the ecclesiastical power in itself, and the comparison of its acts and effects, since we have said many things commenting upon IIaIIæ, q. 1, a. 10,[2] especially regarding that power which resides in the Supreme Pontiff, and upon which the rest depends. The other disputations concerning the ecclesiastical power are concerned with the matter of the sacraments, and other places. What we intend in this place is nothing else, than to distinguish the ecclesiastical power from the lay, and to compare the one, as it resides in the Supreme Pontiff, with the lay power as regards the dominion of jurisdiction, concerning which we now treat.

Regarding the present matter, therefore, in the first place we have it, that the power of the Christian Church which resides in the Supreme Pontiff as in the head of the Church, is distinct from the lay and civil power of secular princes: which Gelasius affirms, capit. Duo sunt, dist. 96, saying: Two there are, emperor, by which this world is principally ruled. Which is confirmed with many things by Soto, In IV Sent., dist. 25, q. 2, a. 1, concl. 1; Vitoria, Relectio 1 de potestate Ecclesiæ, q. 1, from n. 3; Durandus, De origine iurisdictionum, q. 2; John of Paris, De potestate regia et papali, from c. 2; Castro, De potestate legis poenalis, c. 1; Navarrus, on the cap. Novit de iudiciis, from coroll. 16, n. 80, and others: but we have touched upon the chief resources in what has been said thus far.

We have it, then, that the same power of the Supreme Pontiff differs from the power of secular princes subject to him. First, on the part of the end: for the former regards the supernatural end, and the means proportionate to that end; while the latter is concerned with the natural end, and the means accommodated to it. For this reason, since the natural end is ordered to the supernatural end, and since a faculty which concerns a superior end ought to command and order the faculty which concerns an inferior and subordinate end; it happens, that it is for the Supreme Pontiff to command and order the secular princes subject to him (that is, those who are within the bosom of the Church) so that they accommodate themselves to the supernatural end, when they deviate from it in their government. It differs secondly, because the power of the Supreme Pontiff is supernatural, extending itself to supernatural effects: while the power of secular princes is merely natural. Thirdly, because the power of the Supreme Pontiff is instituted, not by the Church, but by Christ in the Church; although its application to this or that person depends upon the election of the Church: for which reason it is of positive divine law. However, the lay power of secular princes is of human law, instituted by the Commonwealth, and committed to the prince, as shall be manifest in the following disputation. It differs fourthly, in that the power of the Supreme Pontiff is one throughout the whole world: while the power of secular princes, unless there be many who, by right of war, or legitimate succession, or the consensus of the commonwealths themselves, have one common ruler, is multiplied according to the diversity of commonwealths choosing for themselves a prince. For as Christ is the single head of the whole universal Church: thus it is fitting, and expedient, that there be appointed a single Supreme Pontiff, whom Christ left on earth as head and his vicar. Moreover, since the faith is one, admitting no variety, it was most expedient, with the multiplication of things to be believed, that a single head be established, which would settle controversies which have arisen concerning the faith, from a chair having for this purpose the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit, so that the unity of faith and the Church, and peace among the faithful would be better preserved. And this is the reason why when, in the state of the law of nature, when only a very few things were proposed to man to be believed explicitly, one high priest was not established, who would preside over the Church; yet in the Synagogue, and much more in the Church of Christ, with the things to be believed explicitly having increased, one high priest was established, to whom the others would be subject, and would be bound to obey. Finally, it differs in that, although the power of the Supreme Pontiff was instituted posterior in time to the royal power, yet as Gelasius relates from Ambrose, in c. Duo sunt, dist. 96, the former exceeds the latter in nobility as much as gold does lead. Innocent III, cap. Solitæ, de maior. et obedientia, compares these two powers to those two great lights placed in the firmament of heaven: and he says that the power of the Supreme Pontiff is the greater light, which presides over the day of spiritual things: while the power of the Emperor is the lesser light, which presides over the night of temporal things. Nor is it only from the excellence of the end, common to the Ecclesiastical power in the time of the law of nature and of the written law, that the excellence of the Supreme Pontiff’s power over the royal and imperial power is to be considered, but also from the nobility and excellence of the means which it uses for that end, and of the supernatural effects which it obtains. Concerning this matter, see Vitoria, Relectio 1 de potestate Ecclesiæ, q. 3, at the beginning; Soto, In IV Sent., dist. 25, q. 2, a. 1, concl. 2; and John of Paris, c. 5.

[1] This particular similitude is somewhat common amongst the Scholastics of this time; but see the criticism which Bellarmine levels against it, in De Romano Pontifice, lib. V, c. vi. — Trans.

[2] Molina’s commentaries upon the Secunda Secundæ of St. Thomas remained in manuscript form until only very recently, when in the later part of the 20^th century they were published in the Archivo teológico granadino; in particular, his commentary De fide (In IIamIIæ, qq. 1-16) was brought out by Eduardo Moore in 1976. Cf. Alonso-Lasheras, Luis de Molina’s De Iustitia et Iure: Justice as Virtue in an Economic Context, p. 14, fn. 14. — Trans.

St. Thomas, ST IIaIIæ, q. 60, a. 6, obj. 3 and ad 3:

Obj. 3: Moreover, spiritual power is distinguished from temporal power. But sometimes prelates having spiritual power involve themselves in those matters which pertain to the secular power. Therefore usurped judgment is not unlawful.

[…]

Ad 3: To the third, it should be said that the secular power is subject to the spiritual power as the body to the soul. And thus judgment is not usurped if a spiritual prelate involves himself in temporal matters so far as concerns those matters in which the secular power is subject to the spiritual, or which are granted to the spiritual power by the secular power.

Commentary of Cardinal Cajetan, in IIamIIæ, q. 60, a. 6

Having omitted the fifth article, the matter of which (as regards subjects) has been discussed in the preceding Book; in the sixth article, in the response to the third objection, note that the Author, assuming from the decretal Solitæ benignitatis, de Maiorit. et Obed. that the temporal power is subject to the spiritual as the body to the soul, assigns two modes in which the spiritual power involves itself in temporal things: the first of which belongs to the spiritual power from its nature; while the second belongs to it from another, namely, from the secular power itself.

Now, for evidence of this assumption, know, from the De anima bk. II [415b8-12; St. Th., In libros de anima, lib. II, lect. vii], that the soul acts upon the body according to three kinds of cause: namely, effectively, because it effects the corporeal motions of the animal; formally, because it is its form; and finally, because the body is for the sake of the soul. And it is similar, proportionally speaking, regarding the spiritual power in respect of the secular power: indeed, it is as its form and mover and end. For it is manifest, that the spiritual is formal in respect of the corporeal: and by this, the power administering of spiritual things is formal in respect of the power administering of secular things, which are corporeal. It is also indubitably clear, that corporeal and temporal things are for the sake of spiritual and eternal things, and are ordered to these as an end. And since a higher end corresponds to a higher agent, moving and directing; the consequence is, that the spiritual power, which is concerned with spiritual things as its first object, moves, acts, and directs the secular power and those things which belong to it to the spiritual end. And from this it is clear that the spiritual power, of its very nature, commands the secular power to the spiritual end: for these are the things in which the secular power is subject to the spiritual. The text intends this specification with the words: so far as concerns those matters in which the secular power is subject to the spiritual. The Author observes by this, that the secular power is not wholly subject to the spiritual power. On account of this, in civil matters one ought rather to obey the governor of the city, and in military matters the general of the army, than the bishop, who should not concern himself with these things except in their order to spiritual things, just as with other temporal matters. But if it should happen that something of these temporal things occurs to the detriment of spiritual salvation, the prelate, administering of these things through prohibitions or precepts for the sake of spiritual salvation, does not move the sickle unto another’s crop, but makes use of his own authority: for as regards these things, all secular powers are subject to the spiritual power. And thus, besides the thing assumed, the first mode by which the spiritual power judges of temporal things is clear.

And the second mode, namely, from the concession of the secular power, is quite sufficiently clear in prelates who have both jurisdictions in many places, as gifts from princes.

CHAPTER VIII.

Whether the Ecclesiastical power for making laws is more excellent than the civil in its end, origin, subject, and other properties.

1. Although this question has been determined in great part in the previous chapters; nevertheless, in order that the excellence of this power be illustrated better, and so that we might answer some difficulties, we have judged it to be opportune in this place. And so firstly we set down as certain, that this Ecclesiastical power in the Evangelical law is far more excellent than the civil power. This truth can readily be shown from the things which we have adduced in chapter 1 of this book, especially the third conclusion, where we have also brought forward the Doctors. It is also the common opinion of the Fathers: Ignatius, Epistola ad Smirnenses: Now I say, honor God as the author and Lord of all, and the Bishop as the Prince of priests, bearing the image of God, and the principality according to God, and the priesthood according to Christ, and after this, it is necessary also to honor the King.[1] Ambrose, De dignitate sacerdotali, cap. 2: The Episcopal honor and loftiness can be equaled by no comparisons. If you compare it with the splendor of kings, and the diadem of princes, they will be so far inferior, as if you compare leaden metal to the brilliance of gold, for indeed I see the necks of kings and of princes bowed to the knees of the priests. These words are referred and approved by Gelasius in the c. Duo sunt, dist. 96. And Innocent [III], in the c. Solitæ, de maiorit. et obedient., compares these two powers to the Sun and the Moon. And, Chrysostom, in De sacerdotio, lib. III, says: The priesthood is so much more excellent than the kingdom, in the same degree as the spirit and the flesh are distant from one another. This opinion he follows, and amplifies, in his Homilia 60 in Matthæum, saying: If the prince be crowned with the diadem, but accedes unworthily, forbid him; you have greater power than he. And he says many similar things in Homiliæ 4 and 5 on the words of Isaiah 6, I have seen the Lord, etc., and in Homilia 3 ad populum, a little ways from the beginning, where, speaking of Flavian, he prefers him to the Emperor, and says that he has a sword, not indeed of iron, but spiritual. And we shall refer many things from the Fathers in the following chapter. But in the aforementioned places, they almost always speak generally of the priestly power according to its entire amplitude, including the power of order, according to which it embraces the power of censuring, of remitting sins, of creating priests, etc., and simultaneously the power of jurisdiction, which also includes the dispensation of the spiritual treasure of the Church, and the power of binding and loosing through censures, and many other things. This power being considered in such universality, it is clearer than day, that it is far more excellent than the civil power. Now here we speak not only in this mode, but also precisely in discussing these powers under the aspect of legislative power. And thus we also say, that the Ecclesiastical power is preeminent, as Pope Boniface clearly says in Extra., Unam sanctam, de maiorit. et obedient. And the reason can be given from what has been said in chapter 1, that this power (even insofar as it is legislative) is of the supernatural order; while the civil power is natural, as has been shown above: therefore the former is more excellent in its being [esse] and substance. And this difference can be established between these two powers, which is sufficiently clear from the things said in chapter 1, and it shall be further explained forthwith. But in order that the excellence of this power be made clearer, there are some other differences which are to be assigned on the part of the causes, and principles, and actions of both powers.

2. The second excellence of this power, therefore, is drawn from the part of the end: the end of Ecclesiastical power is supernatural, while that of the civil is contained entirely within the order of nature; the former is spiritual, the latter material; the former eternal, the latter temporal. Indeed all these things are clear from what has been said in chapter 1 and 2 of this book, and in chapter 6 of the prior. There we show, that the end of civil power and law is not eternal and supernatural felicity, but at most the natural felicity of this life; and that not final and perfect, but insomuch as it can be obtained in the perfect human community; and that power is per se and in its intention not extended to the life to come after death, or to its state. But now, one must think quite differently of the Ecclesiastical legislative power; for it has per se been given to direct men to the eternal and supernatural felicity of the life to come: for this is the final end firstly and per se intended by this power. For just as Christ the Lord poured out his blood for men unto this end, so he instituted his Church for the same end, and committed to men the power for ruling it in the order to the same end. And this is the sense of those words, I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven, etc., and of the words, The Holy Spirit hath placed you as bishops, to rule the church of God, which he hath purchased with his own blood. And thus often in the Canon laws there occurs express mention of this end, as in the cap. Inter cætera, de offic. ordin.: Amongst the other things which pertain to the salvation of the Christian people, etc., and in the cap. Quoniam, dist. 10, it is said, that Emperors have need of the Pontiffs for eternal life, and the same in cap. Cum ad verum, dist. 96. And hence it is also, that this power, through its laws, principally intends the salvation of souls, and that sins be avoided, as I have shown from many laws in the previous book, chapter 6, and the same is drawn from cap. 2 de constit. in 6 where it says, So as to meet the perils of souls, and cap. ult. de poenit. et remiss., where it says, Lest peril of souls should threaten on account of the postponement of penitence, and in the entire cap. Omnis utriusque, in the same place, and especially where it says, making use of diverse experiments in order to save him who is ill. Likewise from the cap. Ut constitueretur, dist. 50, where Augustine says, that the ancient irregularity imposed upon those doing public penance on account of unusually great crimes, was introduced from the rigor of discipline pertaining to the power of the keys, signifying, that this most of all was given for the spiritual correction of crimes, and for procuring the salvation of souls. Finally, it is manifest from almost the whole of canon law, and the decretal Letters of the Pontiffs.

3. The reason is also clear, because this power is supernatural, as we have shown broadly above in chapter 1; therefore per se and by its very nature, it tends to the supernatural end, whether that of the future life, or of the present: for these two are so connected and subordinated between themselves, that the one cannot be separated from the other; therefore in this end, this power differs most of all from the civil power, which is merely natural, and of itself can tend only to the natural end, as has been shown above. And thus it is clear, that the opinion of Fortunius discussed above, in book 3, chapter 11, insofar as it confounds the ends of these powers, is not probable, and can furnish an occasion for many errors. For surely, if the ultimate end of both powers is the same, the means will also be the same, and the matter will be the same, and consequently the acts also, and whatever the one is able to do, the other will also—all of which are plainly erroneous. Now the reason is, that these powers in their very being [esse] are very much distinct in terms of their genus; therefore it is necessary that they be distinguished in their ends also. The antecedent is clear from the things said, because the one is supernatural, not only because it is granted by God in an extraordinary mode, but because, of itself, and by its very nature, it cannot be found in nature itself, nor can it arise from its principles, which is not the case with the civil power. Wherefore the royal power, even as it was in Saul, or David, although it had in these men a kind of supernatural mode, was very different from this power: for theirs was only civil power, and of itself natural in its substance, although it had been granted in a preternatural mode; but this power is per se supernatural, and of the divine order, because it can in no way be connatural to men. Now the first consequence is clear, because the whole being [esse] of any power whatsoever is in the order to its end and object; therefore, if a power is supernatural, it is necessary that it tend, by its very nature, to a supernatural end and object.

4. You might say: canonical laws often make ordinances regarding things which are merely exterior and natural: for canon law also intends external peace, and the conservation of justice, as it is said in the proœmium of the Decretals, and unto this end it coerces and punishes vices. Many are also found in the canon laws, which pertain only to the order of causes and contracts, as is clear from Book II, and from a great part of Book III of the Decretals. Therefore, although the Ecclesiastical power, insofar as it is a power of handing on the doctrine of the faith, and the sacraments, and insofar it is a power of remitting sins, or of dispensing spiritual things, is supernatural, and concerns a supernatural end—nevertheless, insofar as it is legislative, it seems to be of the same nature and order with the civil power. It is answered by denying the consequence. First of all, because even in the matter of faith and the sacraments, it commands many supernatural things, and that supernaturally, such as, to believe this or that, to receive such sacraments in such a way, or at such a time, to offer a supernatural sacrifice, or to assist at it, and similar things: and in all these things it conducts itself insofar as it is a legislative power, according to the things which John XXII discusses in Extrav. Quia quorundam, de verbor. significat. Secondly, because even in all these things which this power establishes, and which pertain to external Ecclesiastical polity, or to lawsuits, contracts, etc., it always commands supernaturally, that is, under a supernatural aspect, and in the order to the supernatural end. For the legislative power is the same in any matter whatsoever, and always operates under the proper aspect of its object. This can be declared, according to a similitude, from the acts of the infused virtues. For by faith, e.g., we not only believe the supernatural mysteries, but also many natural things, such as, that God exists, or that the soul is immortal, yet just as faith is concerned with these things, it tends under a supernatural aspect, and operates supernaturally; the same can be seen in charity and hope, and most of all in the per se infused moral virtues; therefore this power has itself thus in making these laws which seem to be political and quasi-civil: for always in these it has regard for the salvation of souls, and for the religious worship of God, as can be regularly apparent from the tenor of the canons themselves. And there is a very good example in the cap. Qualiter et quando, 2. de accusat. where, discussing the order to be observed in judgments or denunciations, the Pontiff works to gather this from the authorities of the new and old Testament. From which, he says, canonical sanctions afterward proceed. Now the reason is, that since this power is of a superior order, it comprehends lower things also, insofar as they are of use to higher things in some way, either according to the mode of a subject, or according to the mode of an instrument, or some similar way, and thus it can make laws regarding things or matters of an inferior order, yet always under the superior and supernatural aspect.

5. The third excellence of this power can be assigned from the part of the efficient cause and of origin: for this power is as it were per se infused, wherefore it can flow immediately from God alone, insofar as he is its author, and the supernatural governor, as from its first and chief principle; while the civil power is given by God insofar as he is the author of nature, and is not properly conferred per se, but through the mode of a property flowing from nature itself, in the manner explained in book III. Whence it is clear, that even on this point, this power is far more excellent. This is more importantly declared thus: for this power, according to its adequate character and excellence, has been conferred by Christ the Lord, and in him it was as a property flowing from the hypostatic union of the humanity to the Word, as we have explained at length in the first tome of the Third Part, disp. 47. From this it is clear, that this power is so much the more excellent in its source than the civil power, as the hypostatic union surpasses the human community. Now this power is derived from Christ and through Christ to his Vicar through a certain very great kind of participation of that power of excellence which was in Christ, and thus had its foundation not only in the incarnation itself, but also in the merits of Chris the Lord, and in his blood, which cannot be said of the civil power considered in itself; therefore from all these things, the excellence of the Ecclesiastical power is manifestly apparent.

6. This excellence can be asserted, fourthly, from the part of the subject, because the Ecclesiastical power much surpasses the civil in its primary and as it were immediate subject. For the civil power is immediately in the human community; while this power resides principally in Christ the man, whence it happens, that as regards the proximate subject, the civil power is in that man to whom the community has committed it, or in his successors; whereas this power is in him to whom Christ has committed it, or his successors; or through his mediation in others. But amongst these persons, there are three differences to be noted. The first, that the civil power is able to be in any man whosoever, even one unbaptized, whereas this Ecclesiastical power can be in none except such as have the Baptismal character. For Baptism is the door of the Church, and thus, just as before the character of Baptism no man is directly subjected to the Church, so also, without that character, no man is capable of Ecclesiastical power, whence neither can he have the power of orders. You might say, hence that inconvenience can be inferred which we inferred above regarding a mental heretic, because if, faith having been lost, he were to lose power, this power would be very uncertain; so also in the present it is uncertain whether someone has the Baptismal character, because in many ways it can happen that the Sacrament is not valid; therefore the same incertitude follows from the necessity of the character. Yet it is responded, that the cases are not similar, because the certitude of Baptism, although it is not wholly infallible, nevertheless has that moral certitude which can be had in human things, and the character, once impressed, can never be removed, while faith can easily be lost.

7. Another difference is, that the civil power can be in men and women; but the Ecclesiastical power cannot be in women, at least by ordinary law. We speak regarding the power of jurisdiction, with which legislation is concerned: for as regards the power of orders, it is certain that women are incapable of it, as is to be shown explicitly in the matter on Orders against the authors of novelties stirring up the ancient heresy of the Papuzians, which was rebutted by Augustine, De hæresibus in 27, and Epiphanius in 49, from Paul, 1 Cor 14 and 1 Tim 2, where he permits women neither to teach nor to speak in the Church. Now, I have said it cannot, because this power, inasmuch as it is given immediately by Christ, that is, the supreme and Pontifical power, cannot be in a woman, because she is not capable of orders, or of Episcopal consecration, and thus is not capable of the Pontificate either. That which some have dreamt up regarding John VIII, is fabulous, as Bellarmine, De Romano pontifice, lib. III, cap. ult., has shown from Onuphrius, and Baronius copiously, ann. 853, n. 56ff, where he refers other authors. And in n. 63 he rightly notes, that even if that fabulous story had occurred as it is thus related, that woman would not have been Pontiff, but the see would have been vacant for that time, and afterward, in the election of Benedict, the succession would have continued, concerning which more elsewhere. But hence I gather, that this phrase it cannot is to be extended to the whole of ordinary Ecclesiastical jurisdiction. For he who is incapable of the power of orders, is also incapable of ordinary Ecclesiastical jurisdiction, because from the divine institution of the Church, she ought to be governed, in spiritual things, by priests or clerics, according to ordinary law. And nevertheless, I have added, at least according to ordinary law, on account of Ecclesiastical jurisdiction, insofar as it can be delegated by the Pontiff, concerning which there is a controversy whether an act of this power can be committed to a woman. In this it is certain, that it ought not to be committed, and it is the more received view that it cannot be, as I have discussed in the matter on Censures, disp. II, sect. 3, from n. 5. And as regards the present legislative power, it has never been seen in the Church, which is a sign that it cannot occur.

8. Finally, there is a difference in this part, that the civil power can be in mere laymen; while this power cannot but be in clerics, which is to be explained in the same way as the preceding. Although regarding the Pontifical power, it is not so certain that a mere layman is wholly incapable of it, if he be otherwise duly elected, provided that he be immediately ordained. But it is certain that it has never occurred in the Church, nor ought it, on account of the novelty and the peril. And it is similarly certain, that one thus elected ought not to use the power of jurisdiction, unless he be ordained, although he is able to use it prior to the Pontifical consecration, as soon as he is elected and placed on the chair. Now, regarding inferior power, the ordinary law of the Church is that it not be committed to laymen, and thus, lower than the supreme Pontiff, no one can commit it to a layman. Wherefore, although it has sometimes been seen that a layman is elected, or postulated for the Episcopate, such as Ambrose, and others, yet it has not been seen, that the use of power is given to him, until he receives some sort of ordination. And thus the supreme Pontiff, making use of the ordinary law, does not grant it except to a man constituted in some clerical grade, at least of the first tonsure, although in respect of his absolute power, he could perhaps do otherwise. Finally, there are other excellences in this Ecclesiastical power which can be considered, namely, that it is much more universal, and is, in its supreme degree, unique for the whole world, and that it is most of all necessary, and that in its mode it is the foundation of the Church, as the blessed Thomas said in 2. dist. 44 in ult. dub. lit. And finally, that it has more noble effects, which shall be made clearer by explaining its laws.

[1] But see e.g. Bardenhewer’s summary and account regarding the authenticity of the Long Recension of the letters of Ignatius, from which Suárez here quotes. — Trans.

CHAPTER IX.

Whether the Ecclesiastical power is superior to the civil, such that the latter is subject to the former.

1. Although it has been shown, in the chapter above, that the Ecclesiastical power is more excellent in perfection, it is not immediately inferred, that it is superior in subordination and proper jurisdiction: for one faculty can be less perfect than another, and yet not subject or subordinate to it. And hence there can be a reason for doubt, because this subordination does not follow intrinsically from the greater perfection; nor also can it be shown from a special concession of Christ; therefore it is not granted. The major is clear from the reason given, and can be supported by the example of the old law, in which there was also a priestly and a royal power, and nevertheless the royal was not subject to the priestly; no indeed, that the contrary seems to have been the case, is drawn from III Kings 2, where Solomon deposed Abiathar from the Priesthood; and in his place he set Sadoc; therefore the priestly power then was under the royal power, rather than the contrary. Now the minor is proved, because in the new Testament we do not read that Christ instituted the priesthood and conceded to it this superiority, because Peter, notwithstanding his power, commanded all the faithful to be subject to Princes and Kings, 1 Pet 2, and Paul in Romans 13 pronounces the same regarding every soul. Nor also is it had from tradition: for it can be gathered from the histories, rather, that the Emperors sometimes passed judgment upon the Pontiffs, and deposed them.

2. Nevertheless, it should be said, that the Ecclesiastical power is not only nobler in itself, but also superior, and has the civil power as subordinate and subject to it. For these two, as I have said, are very much distinct, which blessed Thomas also declared in II Sent., dist. 44, at the end. This conclusion, therefore, is certain, and common amongst Catholics, concerning which one can consult St. Thomas in the place cited, and Bonaventure, in the second tome of his opuscula in the 38^th, De ecclesiastica hierarchia, part 2, §1 at the end[1]; Henry, Quodlibet 6, q. 23; Victoria,  Relectio 2 de potestate Ecclesiæ, and Relectio de Indis, p. 1, n. 29, where he says, that this is true not only of this power as it is in the Pope, but also as it is in every Bishop. Which is true according to ordinary law, and Ecclesiastical law, and excluding privileges and exemptions; but in the following parts it will be expounded more amply. One can also consult Driedo, De libertate christiana, lib. II, c. 2; Turrecremata, in his Summa, lib. II, c. 113ff; Albert Pighius, De ecclesiastica hierarchia, lib. V, c. 14 and 15; Sander, De visibili monarchia, lib. II; Cajetan, in his Apologia pro Romano Pontifice, c. 13 ad 8; Soto, In IV Sent., dist. 25, q. 2, a. 5; Bellarmine, De Summo Pontifice, lib. V, from c. 6 on; Vellosillo, bishop of Lugo, in his Advertentiæ theologicæ in tom. V Hieronymi, q. 5.

3. The chief foundation of this truth is declared both by reason and authority; for it is drawn from the unity of the Church of Christ the Lord as sufficiently signified in the Gospel, and is declared by Paul, 1 Cor 12, who says, We were all baptized into one body, etc., and Romans 12, We, being many, are one body in Christ, etc., and the same in Ephesians 4 and often elsewhere; therefore Christ the Lord constituted the Church as one spiritual kingdom, in which there would also be one King and spiritual prince; therefore it is necessary, that to him the temporal power be subordinated, as the body is to the soul. With this example does Gregory of Nazianzus explain the subordination of these powers, in his Oratio XVII ad populum timore perculsum. And rightly indeed, because just as man would not be rightly composed, unless the body were subordinated to the soul, thus neither would the Church be fittingly instituted, unless the temporal power were subject to the spiritual. And the same reason can be declared and confirmed from what has been said above regarding the indirect dominion which the Pontiff has over the entire world: for this dominion is founded on nothing other than the subordination of these powers. For, as I have said in the same place, there is not in the Pontiff a twofold power, but one, which is directly concerned with spiritual things, and consequently is extended to temporal things: but this extension can only be on account of the subordination of the temporal power to the spiritual. And with this reason Bernard, De consideratione, lib. IV, c. 3, says that the Pontiff simultaneously has the spiritual and the natural sword, because either he has the one directly, and the other indirectly, or the one in himself and per se, and the other subordinated to him, which he means when he says that the spiritual sword is to be wielded by the Church; while the material sword is to be wielded by the soldier for the Church at the will of the priest, and the command of the emperor. Whence in the final chapter, he calls the Pontiff the defender of the Faith, the leader of Christians, the rod of the mighty, the hammer of tyrants, the father of kings, the moderator of laws, the God of Pharaoh. Thus also does Pope Boniface conclude in Extravag. Unam sanctam, de maiorit. et obed.: It is necessary that one sword be under the other, and that the temporal authority be subjected to the spiritual power. From this text the reason given is more amply strengthened. For where there is one body, it is necessary that there be one head, to which all things are in a certain way recalled, since otherwise there could be neither peace nor perfect unity in the body; but now the Church of Christ is one body, as we have said; therefore, although there be many powers or magistrates in it, it is necessary that amongst themselves they have subordination, such that they might in a certain way be recalled into one for the reason given, therefore either the spiritual power is subordinated to the temporal, or the contrary. The first cannot be said: for as the Pontiff says in the same place, citing Paul, The things which are from God, are ordained, but it would be a perverse order, if spiritual things were subject to temporal things; therefore the second must necessarily be said.

4. Perhaps someone might say, the Church, in order that it might be perfectly one, is sufficiently united in its one head, which is Christ. Someone could take this response incautiously from Waldo, Doctrinale fidei, lib. II, c. 78, n. 4, where he says, And that which some argue, that the church must be reduced to a monad, is true for Christ, who holds alone a two-edged sword, as a sign of his double power. But under Christ, the priest and the King maintain their powers unmixed. It is responded to the prior part, that that sentence, taken in that sense and applied here, cannot be satisfactory. For the Church militant is one visible body existing in this world, and in need of human and external governance; therefore it cannot merely be reduced immediately to a head which is invisible to mortal men, of which sort is Christ; therefore it is necessary, that the Vicar of Christ also have the excellence of power, where it had been necessary for the fitting government of the whole body; therefore he is the supreme head simply speaking. Nor does Waldo speak in the contrary sense, but he is speaking of the reduction of either power to one principle as regards origin, and by the direct participation of jurisdiction which each of these powers has in its own order. And in this sense he says that they are unmixed, and reduced only to God, or Christ: yet he does not deny, that the temporal power is at least indirectly subordinated to the spiritual, chiefly in order to avoid sin and divine offense, as he expressly declared in n. 6 with Hugo of St. Victor, De sacramentis, lib. II, c. 4, 6, and 7.

5. And hence a new confirmation can be added, founded in the words of Pope Gelasius in the c. Duo sunt, 96. dist.: For the Pontiffs shall have to render an account for the souls of kings, insinuating that in the words Feed my sheep, even Kings, and Emperors were subjected to Peter, because they must be included amongst the sheep of Christ; therefore they also must be fed, and ruled by Peter: for we have already explained that the power of ruling is also contained under the word feeding. You say; this is true as regards spiritual government. But on the contrary, since the measure of temporal government, in order that it be right and worthy, must be spiritual; therefore it is necessary, that the very power of ruling temporally be regulated by the spiritual, and this is to be subject and subordinate to the latter. And in this manner shall the Pontiffs have to render an account for Kings, and Emperors, because it pertains to them to correct, and emend whatever sins Kings have committed, not only as men, but as Kings in the use of their power.

6. Whence it is confirmed, for otherwise the Church would not be sufficiently provided for, if there were not in her a power, which could contain Kings and Princes in their duty, at least by using the spiritual sword. You say, that by this argument it would be proved, that another power is also necessary, which contains spiritual pastors in their duty: for even these are able to err, and cause perhaps greater harm to the sheep. It is responded, that it is indeed thus, in respect of all spiritual princes or pastors below the supreme Vicar of Christ, to whom it pertains to emend, or even to punish, the rest; but the supreme head himself cannot be subjected to another mortal man, because either it proceeds in infinitum, or due subordination and unity would be destroyed. And thus Christ provided for his Church in another and more sublime manner as regards this part; for in respect of doctrine and precepts of mores, he promised to his Vicar assistance, such that he would not be able to err in these and inflict some grave harm upon his Church through the abuse of power. And this was sufficient as regards legislative power, concerning which we speak. But the other disadvantages which now and then can follow from the perverse morals or deeds of such a person, are of lesser importance, and must sometimes be tolerated: for this is the fragility, and condition of men, and if betimes they are more oppressive, and clearly unjust, by right of defense men can protect themselves; yet not by right of vindication or punishment. Only in the case of heresy is an exception accustomed to be made, which we leave to be given and explained elsewhere.

7. The same assertion could be confirmed from the practice of the Church, and the various examples, which Gelasius enumerates in part in the place cited, but those which can pertain to the present matter, we shall touch upon below when treating of Canon Laws: the rest can be seen in the histories, and Bellarmine summarizes them in his De Summo Pontifice, lib. V, c. 7. From these there still remains a reason for doubt which was laid out at the beginning. For it has been shown from Scripture and tradition, that this institution is from Christ the Lord. But Peter and Paul, in the objection there alleged, speak of obedience due to Princes and powers from their respective subjects, yet in these it is not explained what sort of subordination obtains between the powers. Nor is it true that Christian Emperors  have ever judged the Pontiffs, as has been shown broadly in the treatise on Immunities.

Now the example adduced there from III Kings 2 makes for a special difficulty regarding the similar arrangement between the Pontiff and the King under the state of the old law, but this is hardly pertinent to the present design, and it shall be disputed in its proper place when treating of the Roman Pontiff. And so for now I say only two things. One is, that from this nothing is sufficiently proved, either because here there is narrated a fact, not a right, that is, it tells what Solomon did, yet not whether he did it from legitimate or usurped power; or certainly, because (as some would have it) Solomon did it from a peculiar instinct of the holy Spirit, as is suggested in the same place, and thus it does not follow, that he did it from the ordinary power which he had. The other thing is, that this comparison of the old Testament hardly matters for the present case, as much because the old law has long passed away in these ceremonial and judicial things, as we shall show in book 9: as also because the Pontificate of the new law is of a far higher order than that of the old, and thus granting, and not conceding, that the old Pontificate did not have this excellence, it does not follow that the Pontificate instituted by Christ does not have it. Just as the Pope also now has the power of remitting sins, which the priest of the old law did not have, the Pope can now concede indulgences, which the other could not do. Finally, to Peter were promised the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and it was said to him, Feed my sheep, and, Whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth, it shall be bound also in heaven, which things were not said to the old Pontiff. And thus, whatever may be regarding this, the truth set down remains unshaken.

[1] But note what the editors of the later Quaracchi edition of St. Bonaventure’s works have observed in the prolegomenon of vol. 5, c. X, §2, in explaining why they excluded the De ecclesiastica hierarchia from the genuine works of the Seraphic Doctor. — Trans.

Introduction
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Introduction

by Edmund Waldstein, O.Cist.

Pope St. Gelasius I’s letter to the Emperor Anastasius I Famuli vestrae pietatis, better known as Duo Sunt,^[1] written in 494, is the classical statement of the Church’s teaching on the relation of the authority of pontiffs to the power of worldly rulers. It was to be quoted and paraphrased again and again by later popes. The key passage has been translated numerous times, but until now there have been only two complete translations into English, neither of which is in the public domain.^[2] As the context of the letter is particularly important for understanding the meaning of the key passage correctly, we are pleased to offer the following collaborative translation of the whole letter on The Josias.^[3]

St. Gelasius’s Life and Times

St. Gelasius reigned from 492-496, when the Roman Empire had collapsed in the West, and Italy was ruled by barbarians, who stood in an ambiguous relationship to the Byzantine emperor—at times recognizing his authority, at other times styling themselves “kings” of Italy. In 476 (conventionally seen as the end of the Empire) Odoacer, who was already in power, had forced Romulus Augustulus to abdicate. In 493, the year after St. Gelasius’s accession to the See of Peter, the Arian Ostrogoth Theodoric the Great killed Odoacer and established his rule in Italy.^[4] In the unsettled situation of Italy, the pope was an important source of order for the city of Rome and beyond. Bronwen Neil and Pauline Allen have shown how St. Gelasius was a “micro-manager” of the ecclesiastical, social, and political affairs of Rome in a manner reminiscent of St. Gregory the Great a century later.^[5]

Gelasius was “a Roman born,” as he himself testifies (§1 below), and the Liber pontificalis notes that he was “of African nationality.”^[6] In “The African Gelasius,” writes Hugo Rahner, in the slightly histrionic tone of his book on the liberty of the Church, “the ideals of Augustine and the devotion of Leo for the Roman See were combined with a will of steel and eloquence of style.”^[7] Not everyone has been so admiring of Gelasius’s style.^[8] Nor has everyone credited him with a will of steel.^[9] But it is certainly true that Gelasius was formed in the traditions of St. Augustine and of St. Leo the Great. Dionysius Exiguus, who probably did not know Gelasius personally, but knew many others who had known him, writes of him in glowing terms as an exemplary pastor and scholar.^[10]

The Acacian Schism

Although Gelasius was pope for less than five years, a large number of documents from his pontificate have come down to us,^[11] as well as several letters thought to have been drafted by him as a deacon under his predecessor Pope Felix II/III (reigned 483-492).^[12] Famulae vestrae pietatis is by far the most famous of his letters. It was written in the context of the Acacian Schism, the first major schism between Rome and Constantinople.

The schism had originated in the Emperor Zeno’s attempt to reestablish ecclesial unity with the many Egyptian Christians who had rejected the Council of Chalcedon (451). Chalcedon had condemned the monophysite heresiarch Eutyches, and deposed the Alexandrian patriarch Dioscurus, appointing Proterius in his stead.^[13] In 457 the Alexandrian mob elected Timothy the Cat patriarch, and murdered Proterius.^[14] Timothy died in 477, and his followers elected his ardent disciple Peter the Hoarse to succeed him.^[15]

In 482 Zeno sent out a formula of faith, the Henotikon, to the Egyptians.^[16] The document was not heterodox in its Christological statements. But it was unacceptable to Rome from an ecclesiological point of view. Its underlying assumption was that the emperor could define the faith (“Caesaropapism”). Moreover, it was “political theology” in the derogatory sense, seeing the unity of faith as being ordered to the unity of the empire, “the origin and composition, the power and irresistible shield of our empire.”^[17] But what was least acceptable to Rome was its cavalier dismissal of Chalcedon, the great triumph of the teaching of Pope Leo. After emphasizing that the only creed is the one defined at Nicea I and Constantinople I, Zeno writes, “But we anathematize anyone who has thought, or thinks, any other opinion, either now or at any time, whether at Chalcedon or at any Synod whatsoever.”^[18]

Peter the Hoarse accepted the Henotikon, and Acacius, Patriarch of Constantinople accepted him into communion, and was therefore excommunicated by Pope Felix II/III in 484.^[19] This was the beginning of the Acacian Schism, which was to last till 519. Acacius himself died in 489.^[20] His successor, Fravitta tried to assure both Pope Felix and Peter the Hoarse that he was in communion with them.^[21] In 491 the Emperor Zeno was succeeded by Emperor Anastasius I (491-518), who had monophysite sympathies and continued Zeno’s policy.^[22]

Famuli vestræ pietatis

When Gelasius was elected to the See of Peter in 492 he did not write to the  Emperor Anastasius to announce his election, as was customary. But two Romans, Faustus and Irenaeus, having been in Constantinople as part of a legation from Theodoric the Great, brought word to him that the Emperor was offended by his failure to write. This was the occasion of Famuli vestræ pietatis.

Gelasius begins the letter by excusing himself for not having written before and addresses the Emperor patriotically as the Roman princeps. He hints that his desire to supply “something (however little) lacking from the fullness of the Catholic Faith” in Constantinople, by which he means that he wants to bring the schism to an end (§1). He then clarifies his right to do this by explaining the relation of his “sacred authority” to the “royal power” of the Emperor— this is the celebrated locus classicus for the relation of lay and clerical authority (§2). He further explicates this by laying out the primacy of the Apostolic See—the “firm foundation” laid by God (§3). He then tries to persuade the Emperor to end the schism, by having Acacius’s name deleted from the diptychs, the lists of names prayed for in the Divine Liturgy (a sign of ecclesial communion). Acacius was in Communion with heretics and should be condemned with them. (§§4-9). He rebuffs the objection that removing Acacius from the diptychs would cause a rebellion at Constantinople, and urges the emperor that he is even more bound to combat heresy than he would be bound to combat offenses against temporal laws (§§10-11). Finally, he defends himself against the charge of arrogance, by turning the accusation against those who, contrary to the tradition of the Fathers, refuse to submit to the Apostolic See (§12).

Auctoritas and Potestas

“For there are two, O emperor Augustus, by which the world is principally ruled: the sacred authority (auctoritas) of pontiffs and the royal power (potestas).” This famous line was to be cited in favor of rival medieval theories of the relation of the two: curialists cited it in favor of papal supremacy while their opponents cited it to prove imperial or royal autonomy.^[23] More recently, it has been cited by Whig Thomists in favor of American-style “religious freedom.”^[24] Its meaning continues to be debated among historians.

The modern debate has tended to focus on the meaning of the terms auctoritas and potestas. Erich Caspar argued that auctoritas meant something like moral influence, whereas potestas meant coercive power:

In Roman constitutional law there was a clear distinction between the conceptually and morally superior auctoritas, founded on tradition and social standing, which the senate, for example, enjoyed, and a potestas equipped with executive power, which in republican times belonged only to the people and was delegated to their officials only for a set period of office.^[25]

Caspar approached things from a typically modern understanding of power dynamics, but a similar reading of the auctoritas and potestas distinction has been given by authors less in thrall to Realpolitik. Allan Cotrell notes that some see potestas as “the mere ability to use force without legitimate authority.’”^[26] Michael Hanby has recently argued for such a view.^[27] According to Hanby auctoritas “possesses no extrinsic force,” but compels “by its own self-evidence.”^[28] To the extent that it is not bound and guided by auctoritas, potestas is “an indeterminate force, the brute strength to realize arbitrary possibilities.”^[29]

Readings such as Hanby’s cannot, however, be sustained. As Walter Ullmann showed, the popes of the fifth century saw themselves as having the authority to enact laws backed up by sanctions.^[30] That is, their auctoritas did possess an extrinsic as well as an intrinsic force. But it is clear also that Gelasius does not see the emperor’s potestas as mere brute force—he sees it also as a moral authority that binds the consciences of subjects: “inasmuch as it pertains to the order of public discipline, even the bishops themselves obey your laws, knowing that rule [imperium] has been bestowed to you from on high” (§2). Auctoritas and potestas are more similar than such authors think. Caspar himself seems to admit as much, when he goes on to argue that Gelasius’s letter was meant to bring the two concepts closer together:

What was new and important was that Gelasius I now defined the state’s potestas and papal auctoritas (which functioned as potestas ligandi et solvendi) as ‘the two things… through which this world is ruled,’ and thereby put them on the same level as commensurable magnitudes in the same conceptual category.^[31]

Ullmann argued for a different interpretation of the auctoritas-potestas distinction. According to him, auctoritas meant sovereign authority, whereas potestas meant delegated authority:

Auctoritas is the faculty of shaping things creatively and in a binding manner, whilst potestas is the power to execute what the auctoritas has laid down. The Roman senate had auctoritas, the Roman magistrate had potestas. The antithesis between auctoritas and potestas stated already by Augustus himself, shows the ‘outstanding charismatic political authority’ which his auctoritas contained. It was sacred, since everything connected with Roman emperorship was sacred emanating as it did from his divinity. It was therefore all the easier to transfer these characteristically Roman ideas to the function of the Pope and to his auctoritas.^[32]

While Ullmann is essentially right about how Gelasius saw his relation the emperor, he is wrong to put so much weight on the semantic distinction between auctoritas and potestas. Ernst Stein and Aloysius K. Ziegler showed convincingly that Gelasius did not mean to make any semantic distinction between auctoritas and potestas at all. For reasons of style he did not wish to use the same word twice in the same sentence, and therefore he used synonyms. In his damning review essay on Caspar, Stein points out that in Tractate IV, written only two years after Famuli vestræ pietatis, Gelasius writes of “both powers” (potestas utraque), showing that he was quite willing to use potestas to refer to the pontifical auctoritas.^[33] Ziegler, for his part, looks at the letters of Felix II/III, drafted by Gelasius as a deacon, and finds conclusive evidence for Stein’s thesis in Felix’s Epistle XV:

These things, most reverent Emperor, I do not wrest from you as vicar of the blessed Peter, by the authority of the apostolic power as it were [auctoritate velut apostolicae potestatis], but I confidently implore you as an anxious father desiring that the welfare and prosperity of my most clement son endure long.^[34]

Perhaps Epistle XV is using the two terms in slightly different senses, but it is clear that it sees both as belonging to the Apostolic See.^[35]

Gelasius’s Integralism

George Demacopoulos has recently argued that the scholarly focus on the semantic distinction between auctoritas and potestas is regrettable, since with “that singular focus, scholars have failed to acknowledge many of the other significant moves that Gelasius makes in the letter.”^[36] On that I think he is right. He is wrong, however, to fault Caspar and Ullmann (especially the later) for reading Gelasius too much in the light of the subsequent development of the papacy.^[37] Demacopoulos argues on historical-critical grounds, but it is hard not to see his approach as being motivated by Greek Orthodox suspicion of Catholic teaching on the papacy. Even from a purely historical perspective, it is helpful to look at the developments to which a teaching gives rise to understand it better. As St. John Henry Newman put it, the principle that “the stream is clearest near the spring” does not apply to the development of a teaching or belief, “which on the contrary is more equable, and purer, and stronger, when its bed has become deep, and broad, and full.”^[38] And, of course, this is all the more true if it is a question of interpreting the authoritative teachings of the Church. Since the bishops of Rome teach under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, their pronouncements can only be adequately understood in the light of later developments. Thus Gelasius ought to be read in the light of the authoritative teachings of St. Gregory VII, Innocent III, and Boniface VIII.

It is, therefore, all the more significant that, despite his methodological shortcomings, Demacopoulos ultimately comes to a reading of Gelasius very close to Ullmann’s. He argues, namely, that Gelasius is indeed teaching a certain subordination of the imperial under the pontifical power:

Among Gelasius’ impressive rhetorical demonstrations is his transformation of the argument for the divine derivation of imperial authority into an argument for the subordination of the emperor to the priesthood. […] Noting that imperial governance is a beneficium from God for which the emperor will be accountable, Gelasius quickly notes that he too will personally be required to render an account before God for whether or not Anastasius properly administers the imperial beneficium. In other words, Gelasius boldly inserts himself into the ruling/responsibility paradigm to imply that his own responsibility (and, therefore, his own authority) was superior to that of the emperor. The emperor, of course, retains a certain responsibility for the Roman population, but above that hierarchical paradigm exists another, more exalted layer, placing the pope between the emperor and God.^[39]

The “hierarchical paradigm” to which Demacopoulos refers is founded on a teleological understanding of society and authority. No one grasped this more firmly than Walter Ullmann. That is why, despite his exaggeration of the auctoritas-potestas distinction, I still think Ullmann the best reader of Gelasius.

“Gelasius,” Ullman argues, “bequeathed to all Papal generations a set of ideas based upon an interpretation of history in the light of Christian teleology.”^[40] This Christian teleology sees the Church as a body with many members who have distinct functions related to the single spiritual end of communion with God. The members of this body belong to it with all that they are: “Christianity seizes the whole of man and cannot, by its very nature, be confined to certain departmental limits.”^[41] The Christian Body therefore “is not merely a pneumatic or sacramental or spiritual body, but also an organic, concrete and earthy society.”^[42] In this visible society there are certain functions which are immediately directed to its end, what Gelasius calls “the distribution of the venerable mysteries,” (infra §2) and there are others which are mediately directed to its end—everything, for example, that serves the preservation of bodily life. It is essential that those “temporal” functions remain mediately ordered to the final end: “in the Christian corpus the administration of the temporal things should be undertaken, in order to bring about the realization of the purpose of the corpus.”^[43] In other words, “in a Christian society all human actions have an essentially religious ingredient.”^[44] What Gelasius is doing therefore, is not clarifying the relation of church and state (as Whig Thomists suppose), but rather the relation of clerical and lay power within the one Christian body. In the Henotikon Zeno had implicitly presented himself as the head of the whole Christian mundus, but Gelasius is teaching his successor that he is not qualified for headship:

[Since] in a Christian society, of which the emperor through baptism is a member, every human action has a definite purpose and in so far has an essential religious ingredient, the emperors should submit their governmental actions to the ecclesiastical superiors.^[45]

Turning to Tractate IV, Ullmann shows that Gelasius saw the purpose of the royal power in the Christian world as the care of temporal matters, so that clerics “are not distracted by the pursuit of these carnal matters.”^[46] Thus, Ullmann concludes,

The direction of [the] royal power by those who are, within the corporate union of Christians, qualified to do so, is as necessary as the direction of the whole body corporate. In this way this body will fulfil the purpose for which it was founded. The material or corporeal or temporal element in this body demands the guidance, that is orientation and government, by the spiritual or sacramental element of this self-same body.^[47]

R.W. Dyson has shown in detail how this Gelasian teaching on the relation of the temporal to the spiritual was based on premises which he found in his North African tradition: in St. Augustine’s proportioning of spiritual and carnal needs onto the offices of bishops and Roman officials. Augustine had not followed those principles through to their ultimate conclusions, but it was an easy step for Gelasius to take, since it is obvious that spiritual goods exceed bodily ones.^[48]

The same point was made earlier by Hugo Rahner:

What Augustine regarded as a lofty ideal, Gelasius made tangible: the ideal of the state as the Church’s helper, of two powers in peaceful collaboration “ruling the world”. Gelasius’ genius lay in the fact that he did not declare that the two powers deriving directly from God, Creator and Savior, should exist side by side, an impossible situation and one repugnant to God’s will, but rather that they should be hierarchically ordered, like soul and body, the spiritual superior to the material, because only in subordination is the material power’s true worth maintained.^[49]

The functional division of the two powers is not a division into separate spheres that never overlap. While Gelasius sees the purpose of the emperor as being primarily the regulation of temporal affairs, he is also emphatic that the emperor must use imperial force to help the Church more directly in the preservation of the faith from charity. In Famuli vestræ pietatis he argues that, because Anastasius curbs popular tumults arising from secular causes, so much more should he restrain heretics and thereby “lead them back into the Catholic and Apostolic communion” (§10). He is essentially calling for the emperor to act as the bracchium sæculare of the Church:

If anyone perhaps were to attempt something against public laws (perish the thought!), for no reason would you have been able to suffer it. Do you not reckon it to concern your conscience that the people subject to you should be driven back from the pure and sincere devotion of Divinity? (§10)

Far from being a Whig avant la lettre, Gelasius was in fact what we would now call an integralist.

FAMULI VESTRÆ PIETATIS

Translated by HHG et al.

Pope St. Gelasius I to the Emperor Anastasius.

§ 1 Your Piety’s servants, my sons, the master Faustus and Irenaeus, illustrious men, and their companions who exercise the public office of legate, when they returned to the City, said that Your Clemency asked why I did not send my greeting to you in written form. Not, I confess, by my design; but since those who had been dispatched a little while ago from the regions of the East had spread [word] throughout the whole City that they had been denied permission of seeing me by your commands, I thought that I ought to refrain from [writing] letters, lest I be judged burdensome rather than dutiful. You see, therefore, that it came not from my dissembling, but rather from proper caution, lest I inflict annoyance on one minded to reject me. But when I learned that the benevolence of Your Serenity had, as indicated above, expected a word from my humility, then I truly recognized that I would not unjustly be blamed if I remained silent. For, glorious son, I as a Roman born love, honor, and accept you as the Roman Prince. And as a Christian I desire to have knowledge according to the truth with one who has zeal for God. And as the Vicar of the Apostolic See (of whatever quality), whenever I see something (however little) lacking from the fullness of the Catholic Faith, I attempt to supply it by moderate and timely suggestions. For the dispensing of the divine word has been enjoined on me: «woe is unto me if I preach not the gospel» (1 Cor 9:16). Because, if the vessel of election, blessed Paul the Apostle, is afraid and cries out, how much more urgently must I fear if in my preaching I omit anything from the ministry of preaching which has been divinely inspired and handed down by the piety of the fathers.

§ 2 I pray your Piety not to judge [my] duty toward the divine plan as arrogance. Far be it from the Roman Prince, I beg, that he judge the truth that he senses in his heart to be an injury. For there are two, O emperor Augustus, by which the world is principally ruled: the sacred authority of pontiffs and the royal power. Among which how much heavier is the burden of priests, such that they will have to render an account to the Lord at the time of judgment even for those very kings. For you know, O most merciful son, that although by dignity you preside over the human race, nevertheless you devoutly bow your neck to the leaders of divine matters, and from them you await the causes of your salvation, and you recognize that, in partaking of the celestial sacraments, and being disposed to them (as is appropriate), you must be submitted to the order of religion rather than rule over it. Therefore you know that in these matters you depend on their judgement, not willing to force them to your will. For if, inasmuch as it pertains to the order of public discipline, even the bishops themselves obey your laws, knowing that rule [imperium] has been bestowed to you from on high, lest they seem in mundane things to oppose the eminent sentence; with what passion, I ask, does it become you to obey those, who have been assigned for the distribution of the venerable mysteries? Just as the danger does not fall upon pontiffs lightly, to have been silent on behalf of the cult of the Divinity, which is fitting; thus there is no slight peril to those who (perish the thought!) when they ought to obey, look askance. And if it is settled that the faithful submit their hearts to all the priests in general who pass on divine things rightly, how much more must they submit to the prelate of that See, whom the highest Divinity willed also to be preëminent above all priests, and which the piety of the universal Church subsequently celebrated.

§ 3 Clearly, wherever Your Piety turns, no one at all has been able to raise himself to the privilege or confession of that one, whom the voice of Christ has put over all, who has been always confessed and venerated by the Church, and has the first devotion. Those things which have been constituted by divine judgement can be attacked by human presumption, but they cannot be conquered by any power. And if only boldness would not be so pernicious against those struggling, as those things which have been fixed by the very founder of sacred religion cannot be dislodged by any force: the foundation of God stands firm (2 Tim 2:19). For is religion, when it is infested by some [persons], able to be overcome by novelties? Does it not rather remain unconquered by the thing supposed to be able to defeat it? And I ask you therefore, may they desist, who under your aegis run about headlong seeking the disruption of the church, which is not permitted: or at least that these should in no way achieve those things which they wickedly desire, and not keep their measure before God and men.

§ 4 For this reason, before God, I beg, adjure, and exhort your piety purely and earnestly that you not receive my request disdainfully: I say again: I ask that you hear me beseeching you now in this life rather than (later) accusing you—perish the thought!—before the divine tribunal. Nor is it hidden from me, O Emperor Augustus, what the devotion of Your Piety has been in private life. You always chose to be a participator of the eternal promise. Wherefore, I pray you, be not angry with me, if I love you so much that I want you to have that reign, which you have temporarily, forever, and that you who rule the age, might be able to rule with Christ. Certainly, by your laws, Emperor, you do not allow anything to perish, nor do you allow any damage to be done to the Roman name. Surely then it is not true, Excellent Prince, who desires not only the present benefits of Christ but also the future ones, that you would suffer anyone under your aegis to bring loss to religion, to truth, to the sincerity of the Catholic Communion, and to the Faith? By what faith (I ask you) will you ask reward of him there, whose loss you do not prohibit here?

§ 5 Be they not heavy, I pray thee, those things that are said for your eternal salvation. You have read it written: «the wounds of a friend are better than the kisses of an enemy» (Prov. 27:8). I ask your piety to receive what I say into your mind in the same sentiment in which I say it. No one should deceive Your Piety. What the Scriptures witness figuratively through the prophet is true: «One is my dove, one is my perfect one» (Cant. 6:8), one is the Christian faith, which is Catholic. But that faith is truly Catholic, which is divided by a sincere, pure, and unspotted communion from all the perfidious and their successors and associates. Otherwise there would not be the divinely commanded distinction, but a deplorable muddle. Nor would there be any reason left, if we allow this contagion in anyone, not to open wide the gate to all the heresies. For who in one thing offends, is guilty of all (James 2:10); and: who despises little things shall little by little fall (Sirach 19:1)

§ 6 This is what the Apostolic See vigorously guards against, that since the pure root is the glorious confession of the Apostle, it might not be soiled by any fissure of perversity, nor by any direct contagion. For if something like that were to happen (which God forbid, and which we trust is impossible), how could we dare to resist any error, or from whence could we request the correction to those in error? Moreover, if Your Piety denies that the people of a single city can be brought together in peace, what would we do with the whole world, if (God forbid) it were to be deceived by our prevarication? If the whole world has been set right, despising the profane traditions of its fathers, how could the people of a single city not be converted if the preaching of the faith persevere. Therefore, glorious Emperor, do I not will the peace, I who would embrace it even if it came at the price of my blood? But, I prithee, let us hold in our mind of what sort the peace ought to be; not any kind, but a truly Christian peace. For how can there be a true peace where chaste charity is lacking? But how charity ought to be, the Apostle evidently preaches for us, who says, Charity is from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith (1 Tim. 1:5). How, I pray thee, shall it be from a pure heart, if it is poisoned by an external contagion? How shall it be from a good conscience, if it is commingled with depraved and evil things? How shall it be from an unfeigned faith if it remains united with the perfidious? While these things have often been said by us, it is nevertheless necessary to repeat them incessantly, and not to be silent as long as the name of “peace” continues to be put forward as an excuse; it is not for us (as the is enviously asserted) to make “peace”, but we nevertheless teach that we want that true peace, which is the only peace, apart from which none other can be shown.

§ 7 Certainly if the dogma of Eutyches, against which the caution of the Apostolic See vigilantly watches, is believed to be consistent with the saving Catholic faith, then it ought to be brought forward plainly and asserted and supported with as much force as possible, for then it will be possible to show not only how inimical it is to the Christian faith itself, but also how many and how deadly are the heresies it contains in its dregs. But if rather (as we are confident you will) you judge that this dogma should be excluded from Catholic minds, I ask you why you do not also suppress the contagion of those who have been shown to be contaminated by it? As the Apostle says: Are only those who do things that ought not to be done guilty, and not also they that consent to them that do them? (cf. Rom 1:32). Accordingly, just as one cannot accept a participant in perversity without equally approving of the perversity, so too, one cannot refute perversity while admitting an accomplice and partisan of perversity.

§ 8 Certainly, by your laws, accomplices of crimes and harbourers of thieves are judged to be bound equally by the same punishment; nor is he considered to have no part in a crime, who, though he did not do it himself, nevertheless accepts the familiarity and the alliance of the doer. Accordingly, when the Council of Chalcedon, celebrated for the Catholic and Apostolic faith and the true communion, condemned Eutyches, the progenitor of those detestable ravings, it did not leave it at that, but likewise also struck down his consort Dioscorus and the rest. In this way, therefore, just as in the case of every heresy there is no ambiguity about what has always been done or what is being done: their successors Timothy [the Cat], Peter [the Hoarse], and the other Peter, the Antiochian, have been cut out— not individually by councils called again to deal with them singly, but once and for all as a consequence of the regular acts of the synod. Therefore, as it has not been clear that even those who were their correspondents and accomplices are all bound with a similar strictness, and are by right wholly separated from the Catholic and Apostolic communion, We hereby declare that Acacius, too, is to be removed from communion with Us, since he preferred to cast in his lot with perfidy rather than to remain in the authentic Catholic and Apostolic communion (though for almost three years he has been authoritatively advised by letters of the Apostolic See, lest it should come to this). But after he went over to another communion, nothing was possible except that he should be at once cut off from association with the Apostolic See, lest on his account, if We delayed even a little, We also should seem to have come into contact with the perfidious. But when he was struck with such a blow, did he come to his senses, did he promise correction, did he emend his error? Would he have been coerced by more lenient treatment, when even harsh blows left no impression? While he tarries in his perfidy and damnation, it is both impossible to use his name in the liturgy of the church, and unnecessary to tolerate any external contact with him. Wherefore he will be led in good faith away from the heretical communion into which he has mixed himself, or there will be no choice but to drive him away with them.

§ 9 But if the bishops of the East murmur, that the Apostolic See did not apply such judgments to them, as if they had either convinced the Apostolic See that Peter [the Hoarse] was to be accepted as legitimate, or had not yet been fully complicit in this unheard-of acceptation: just as they cannot demonstrate that he was free of heretical depravity, neither can they in anyway excuse themselves, being in communion with heretics. If perhaps they should add that they all with one voice reported the reception of Peter [the Hoarse] by Acacius to the Apostolic See, then by the same token they know how he responded to them. But the authority of the Apostolic See— that in all Christian ages it has been set over the universal Church— is confirmed both by a series of canons of the Fathers, and by manifold tradition. But even hence, whether anyone should prevail to usurp anything for himself against the ordinances of the Synod of Nicaea, this can be shown to the college of the one communion, not to the opinion of external society. If anyone has confidence amongst them, let him go out into the midst, and disprove and instruct the Apostolic See concerning each part. Therefore let his name [Acacius] be removed from our midst, which works the separation of churches far from Catholic communion, in order that sincere peace of faith and of communion should be repaired, and unity: and then let it competently and legitimately be investigated which of us either has risen up or struggles to rise up against venerable antiquity. And then shall appear who by modest intention guards the form and tradition of the elders, and who irreverently leaping beyond these, reckons himself able to become equal by robbery.

§ 10 But if it is proposed to me that the character [persona] of the Constantinopolitan people makes it impossible (it is said) that the name of scandal, that is Acacius, be removed; I am silent, because with both the heretic Macedonius formerly having been driven out, and Nestorius recently having been thrown out, the Constantinopolitan people have elected to remain Catholic rather than be retained by affection for their condemned greater prelates. I am silent, because those who had been baptized by these very same condemned prelates, remaining in the Catholic faith, are disturbed by no agitation. I am silent, because for ludicrous things the authority of Your Piety now restrains popular tumults; and thus much more for the necessary salvation of their souls the multitude of the Constantinopolitan city obeys you, if you princes should lead them back unto the Catholic and Apostolic communion. For, Emperor Augustus, if anyone perhaps were to attempt something against public laws (perish the thought!), for no reason would you have been able to suffer it. Do you not reckon it to concern your conscience that the people subject to you should be driven back from the pure and sincere devotion of Divinity? Finally, if the mind of the people of one city is not reckoned to be offended if divine things (as the matter demands) are corrected— how much more does it hold that, lest divine things should be offended, we ought not (nor can we) strike the pious faith of all those of the Catholic name?

§ 11 And nevertheless these same ones demand that they should be healed by our will. Therefore they allow that they can be cured by competent remedies: otherwise (Heaven forfend!) by crossing over into their ruin, we can perish with them, whereas we cannot save them. Now here I leave to your conscience under divine judgement what must rather be done: whether, as We desire, we should return all at once unto certain life; or, as those demand, we should tend unto manifest death.

§ 12 But still they strain to call the Apostolic See proud and arrogant for furnishing them with medicines. The quality of the languishing often has this: that they should accuse rather the medics calling them back to healthful things by fitting observations, than that they themselves should consent to depose or reprove their noxious appetites. If we are proud, because we minister fitting remedies of souls, what are those to be called who resist? If we are proud who say that obedience must be given to paternal decrees, by what name should those be called who oppose them? If we are puffed up, who desire that the divine cult should be served with pure and unblemished tenor; let them say how those who think even against divinity should be named. Thus also do the rest, who are in error, reckon us, because we do not consent to their insanity. Nevertheless, truth herself indicates where the spirit of pride really stands and fights.

^[1] Sometimes also as Ad Anastasium, Epistle XII (Thiel), or Epistle VIII (Migne).

^[2] Matthew Briel, trans. in: George E. Demacopoulos, The Invention of Peter: Apostolic Discourse and Papal Authority in Late Antiquity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), pp. 173-180; Bronwen Neil and Pauline Allen, trans., The Letters of Gelasius I (492-496) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014), pp. 73-80.

^[3] The translation was made by numerous online friends of The Josias in a shared google spreadsheet. The style is therefore uneven. For technical reasons we used Migne’s edition in PL 59, col. 41-47, but we have corrected it in some places with reference to Thiel’s critical edition: Andreas Thiel, ed., Epistolae Romanorum pontificum genuinae et quae ad eos scriptae sunt: a S. Hilaro usque ad Pelagium II., vol. 1 (Braunsberg: E. Peter, 1867), pp. 349-358. For the paragraph numbering we have followed Thiel.

^[4] For an account of the period, see: Guy Halsall, Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, 376–568 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), chs. 9-10.

^[5] Neil and Allen, trans., The Letters of Gelasius I, Introduction.

^[6] Neil and Allen, trans., The Letters of Gelasius I, p. 71.

^[7] Hugo Rahner, S.J., Church and State in Early Christianity, trans. Leo Donald Davis, S.J. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1961), p. 151. As Rahner notes, his book was originally written at a time “when the struggle between Church and state in Nazi Germany was at its height” (p. xi), which goes someway in explaining its tone.

^[8] Bronwen Neil and Pauline Allen call it “sententious and pompous” and complain that it is repetitive and overburdens subordinate clauses: The Letters of Gelasius I, p. 67.

^[9] George Demacopoulos portrays him as an ineffectual blusterer The Invention of Peter, ch. 3.

^[10] See: Aloysius K. Ziegler, “Pope Gelasius I and His Teaching on the Relation of Church and State,” in: The Catholic Historical Review 27.4 (1942), pp. 412-437, at pp. 416-417.

^[11] Thiel’s edition contains 43 letters, 49 fragments, and six tractates, filling over 300 pages: Thiel, Epistolae, vol. 1, pp. 285-618.

^[12] See: Mario Spinelli, s.v. “Gelasius I,” in: Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, 3rd ed., vol. IV, eds. Walter Kasper, et al. (Freiburg: Herder, 1995), col. 401-402.

^[13] Dioscurus had (verbally) agreed with Eutyches that there was only one nature in Christ. In Alexandria this was held to be the orthodox position, since St. Cyril of Alexandria had used the formula μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένη (“one incarnate nature of God the Logos”). Chalcedon, however, defined that Christ was in two natures (ἐν δύο φύσεσιν). It is now generally held that the disagreement is based on an equivocal use of the word φύσις (nature). See: Theresia Hainthaler, s.v. “Monophysitismus,” in: Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, vol. VII, (1998), col. 418-421; W. H. C. Frend, The Rise of the Monophysite Movement: Chapters in the History of the Church in the Fifth and Sixth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

^[14] Frend, The Rise of the Monophysite Movement, p. 155.

^[15] Frend, The Rise of the Monophysite Movement,, p. 174.

^[16] For the story of the Henotikon see: Ibid., pp. 174-183.

^[17] Zeno, Henotikon, in: The Ecclesiastical History of Evagrius Scholasticus, trans. Michael Whitby (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000), III,14; pp. 147-149, at p. 147.

^[18] Zeno, Henotikon, p. 149.

^[19] One of the orthodox “Sleepless Monks” was able to pin the pope’s excommunication to Acacius’s vestments during the celebration of the Divine Liturgy: Frend, The Rise of the Monophysite Movement, pp. 182-183.

^[20] Frend, The Rise of the Monophysite Movement,, p. 190.

^[21] Neil and Allen, trans., The Letters of Gelasius I, pp. 37-38.

^[22] Rahner, Church and State, pp. 154-155.

^[23] See: Brian Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), p. 10; Robert Louis Benson, “The Gelasian Doctrine: Uses And Transformations,” in: George Makdisi, et al., eds., La notion d’autorité au Moyen Age: Islam, Byzance, Occident: Colloques internationaux de La Napoule, session des 23-26 octobre 1978 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1982), pp. 13-44.

^[24] See: John Courtney Murray, S.J., We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960), especially pp. 202-203; George Weigel, “Catholicism and Democracy: Parsing the Other Twentieth-Century Revolution,” in: Michael Novak, William Brailsford, and Cornelis Heesters, eds. A Free Society Reader: Principles for the New Millennium (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2000), pp. 141-165, at pp. 150-151. Cf. my critique of the Whig Thomists: “Integralism and Gelasian Dyarchy,” in: The Josias, March 3, 2016: https://thejosias.net/2016/03/03/integralism-and-gelasian-dyarchy (accessed March 28, 2020), part 4.

^[25] Erich Caspar, Geschichte des Papsttums von den Anfängen bis zur Höhe der Weltherrschaft, vol. 2 (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1933), p. 67 (translation my own).

^[26] Alan Cottrell, “Auctoritas and Potestas: A Reevaluation of the Correspondence of Gelasius I on Papal-Imperial Relations,” in: Medieval Studies 55 (1993), pp. 95-109, at p. 96. (This is not Cottrell’s own view).

^[27] Michael Hanby, “For and Against Integralism,” in: First Things 301.4 (2020), pp. 43-50. Hanby does not explicitly mention Gelasius, but it is clear that the Gelasian teaching is in the background of his discussion of auctoritas and potestas, especially since he quotes Walter Ullmann’s interpretation of Gelasius (p. 45).

^[28] Hanby, “For and Against Integralism,” p. 45.

^[29] Hanby, “For and Against Integralism,” p. 45.

^[30] Walter Ullmann, The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages: A Study in the Ideological Relation of Clerical to Lay Power, 2^nd ed. (London: Methuen, 1962), pp. 12-13, note 5.

^[31] Caspar, Geschichte des Papsttums, p. 66.

^[32] Ullmann, The Growth of Papal Government, p. 21.

^[33] Ernst Stein, “La Période Byzantine de la Papauté,” in: The Catholic Historical Review 21.2 (1935), pp. 129-163, at p. 135. Hanby complains about me: “Waldstein does not think philosophically about the distinction between auctoritas and potestas, which he treats more or less synonymously” (Hanby, “For and Against Integralism,” p. 47). I wonder if he would make the same complaint about St. Gelasius in Tractate IV.

^[34] Ziegler, “Pope Gelasius I and His Teaching,” p. 432, note 66; the quotation from Felix can be found in: Thiel, Epistolae, vol. 1, p. 272; translation in: Jeffrey Richards, The Popes and the Papacy in the Early Middle Ages, 476-752 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 62.

^[35] In the light of the subsequent development of Church teaching one could save something like Erich Caspar’s interpretation as follows: The relationship between the spiritual and temporal powers in temporal matters would be modeled on the relationship between the senate and the magistrates in the Republic. Auctoritas would mean moral authority. Potestas would be coercive force, prescinding from whether it is united to moral authority or not. So it would be wrong to see potestas as mere violence but violence would be included as well as rightly ordered force. The pope would have both auctoritas and potestas in the spiritual order. In the temporal order he would exercise auctorias, and his auctoritas would guarantee the right order of the potestas of temporal rulers. See: Thomas Crean and Alan Fimister, Integralism: A Manual of Political Philosophy (Neunkirchen-Seelscheid: Editiones Scholasticae, 2020), p. 72.

^[36] Demacopoulos, The Invention of Peter, p. 90.

^[37] Demacopoulos, The Invention of Peter, pp. 8-9.

^[38] John Henry Newman, An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, 8th ed. (London: Longmans, Green, and co., 1891), p. 40.

^[39] Demacopoulos, The Invention of Peter, pp. 90-91; cf. Ullmann’s similar argument in The Growth of Papal Government, pp. 23-26.

^[40] Ullmann, The Growth of Papal Government, p. 28.

^[41] Ullmann, The Growth of Papal Government, p. 11.

^[42] Ullmann, The Growth of Papal Government, p. 3.

^[43] Ullmann, The Growth of Papal Government, p. 12.

^[44] Ullmann, The Growth of Papal Government, p. 20.

^[45] Ullmann, The Growth of Papal Government, p. 22.

^[46] Ullmann, The Growth of Papal Government, p. 24.

^[47] Ullmann, The Growth of Papal Government, p. 28.

^[48] Robert W. Dyson, St. Augustine of Hippo: The Christian Transformation of Political Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2005), ch. 5.

^[49] Rahner, Church and State, p. 157.

1. L’antinomia contemporanea

È un ben noto assioma dell’ etica tomistica che, qualunque bene si ami, lo si ama come bene proprio (bonum suum). Ma allora come può esservi una vera extasis, un vero andare fuori da se stessi per amore di un altro?[1] Come può esservi autentico amore dell’ altro per l’altro? L’amore non si riduce a egoismo? E l’unica alternativa pratica o teorica non sarebbe l’altruismo, cioè una sorta di spontaneo donare agli altri senza alcun riferimento a sestessi e al proprio bene?

Lo stato democratico liberale e lo stato collettivista o comunista sono gigantesche incarnazioni sociali dell’ antinomia apparentemente ineludibile fra egoismo e altruismo. L’uno dei due sistemi riduce la motivazione umana all’interesse egoistico, precludendo con ciò la comunione interpersonale, che richiede il dono di sé. L’altro minaccia la felicità umana ignorando la dignità della persona in quanto tale e consentendo di sacrificare l’individuo per un “bene sociale” a lui estraneo. Tutto il clima politico della modernità ci costringe quasi a vedere la realtà come un conflitto insanabile fra egoismo e altruismo.

Poiché la società moderna ha rifiutato le virtù tradizionali in favore del consumismo materialistico e dell’ edonismo, l’uomo moderno, avvezzo a pensare, sentire e agire come consumatore in cerca di piacere, è perciò abituato all’ errore dell’ egoismo e vi è intrappolato dentro. Dal momento che vi sono tanti bisognosi di cui egli non si cura, l’egoista va “costretto” ad aiutare gli altri. A questo proposito penso al socialismo dilagante, ai programmi previdenziali governativi e all’ assistenza sanitaria obbligatoria che hanno perso il posto di una sussidiarietà organica guidata dalla giustizia sociale e dalla carità. Questo welfare state alimenta il cinismo, poi il risentimento e infine la violenza, perché non emerge da una virtù autenticamente posseduta né fa appello ad essa; rappresenta un attacco al mostruoso ego prodotto dalla società moderna. In altri termini, la società moderna instilla l’egoismo anziché la giustizia e la carità, ma poi, riconosciuto che il risultato è disastroso, tenta di obbligare all’ altruismo, che si contrappone all’ egoismo ma al tempo stesso lo rafforza. Il risultato sono tensioni sociali, mancanza di empatia, conflitti civili.

I presupposti di questa diffusa concezione si trovano in quell’influente pensatore politico che è Thomas Hobbes: tutto è strumentale rispetto al mio bene, inteso come bene meramente sensibile; poiché sé = corpo (anzi realtà = corpo), non si può estendere l’amore oltre il sé, oltre il corpo.[2] Per Hobbes tutto ciò che è al di fuori di noi è nel caso peggiore una minaccia contro di noi, nel caso migliore un mezzo rivolto al fine dell’ autoconservazione. Il contratto sociale è un meccanismo che consente a me di ottenere di più di ciò che desidero e al tempo stesso promette a te di ottenere ciò che vuoi. Non possiamo desiderare qualcosa di comune perché non vi è nulla di veramente comune. Ogni bene è bene privato. Quindi non posso “volere il bene di un altro”; non posso volere che un altro stia bene per amor suo. Qualsiasi cosa io voglia per un altro (potenzialmente o attualmente) toglie qualcosa a me.

Hobbes mette a nudo le radici della moderna antinomia fra egoismo e altruismo, fra cui esiste una profonda affinità che si può dimostrare come segue. Se sono egoista, subordino il bene di tutti gli altri al mio bene personale e privato. Se sono altruista, subordino il mio bene a quello che finisce per essere il bene personale e privato di qualcun altro: l’ironia è che l’altruismo, in teoria o in pratica, dipende dal presupposto fondamentale dell’ egoismo, e cioè che il mio bene e il tuo bene si escludano semplicemente a vicenda, e che io possa aiutare te solo a spese del mio bene. Ambedue le alternative sono irrazionali, anzi anticristiane: comportano infatti l’ordinamento indiscriminato degli altri a sé o di sé agli altri.

Questa contrapposizione fra egoismo e altruismo è del tutto estranea alla dottrina dell’amore di san Tommaso. Nel suo sottile realismo, Tommaso coglie bene il rapporto fra il mio bene, il bene altrui e la fonte trascendente di ogni bene, cioè il Dio tripersonale. La perfezione umana non consiste né nella realizzazione di un sé isolato dagli altri, né in una radicale negazione delvalore e dell’individualità della persona. La perfezione dell’uomo consiste nel dare se stesso a Dio e al prossimo, andare fuori da se stesso verso r altro in un’ oblazione dimentica di sé che è anche la vetta della perfezione di sé, perché comporta comunicazione nel bene comune. Questa dottrina offre un’autentica alternativa ai tediosi dibattiti su egoismo e altruismo, interesse egoistico e beneficenza spontanea.[3]

2. L’io umano non è isolato dagli altri

2.1. La generosità estatica come regola della creazione

Cominciamo con l’osservazione che l’io umano non è isolato dagli altri nella sua realizzazione, bensì propende naturalmente verso ciò che chiamo …. generosità estatica”. Insito nella natura umana—o più precisamente nella sua voluntas ut natura—è l’amore del bene in quanto tale. In quanto essere che è ed è buono tramite la partecipazione, l’uomo dipende dal semplice Bene ed è naturalmente ordinato ad esso; è pertanto incline, già prima della scelta, a vivere più autenticamente in e per Dio che in e per se stesso. Le numerose manifestazioni consce dell’ extasis seguono a quest’innata extasis di essere creato a essere increato, di bene finito a Bene infinito, di copia a originale, di immagine imperfetta a Immagine perfetta. L’extasis ontologica precede e sostiene 1’extasis psicologica come la natura precede la potenza e la potenza precede l’attività.

Al pari di tutte le creature, l’uomo ha capacità estatica (Dionigi la definisce eros), perché è fatto a immagine del Dio onnipotente il cui amore generoso crea, conserva e governa il mondo. Il Dio che non esce fuori da Se stesso perché Egli è ovunque, da nulla trattenuto, è l’Amante i cui effetti sono maggiormente estatici, perché Egli crea gli esseri stessi per mezzo dell’amore e poi induce in essi l’extasis di un amore corrispondente. Nella Sua bontà sovrabbondante, grazie alla quale Egli resta in Se stesso, Egli crea un mondo di esseri i quali, in misura maggiore e minore, escono fuori da se stessi, imitando Lui.[4]

Dio ha fatto le creature perché non fossero soltanto destinatarie di bene, ma anche fonti di bene. Ens creatum, 1’essere creato, ha non soltanto il lato negativo della povertà, che provoca appetito per il bene assente, ma anche il lato positivo della ricchezza, che promuove la diffusione del bene agli altri. Come spiega Norris Clarke:

«Gli esseri reali del nostro universo escono da se stessi nell’azione per due motivi: primo, perché sono poveri, nella misura in cui in quanto limitati e imperfetti cercano il completamento di se stes~i da altri esseri; secondo, perché sono ricchi, in quanto esistono attualmente e quindi possiedono qualche grado di perfezione attuale e hanno una tendenza intrinseca a condividerla in qualche maniera con altri».[5] 

Come dice 1’assioma, bonum est diffusivum sui. Il bene ha la ratio di essere diffusivo di se stesso.[6] Più un bene è nobile, più essere ha, e più può essere amato non soltanto in sé ma anche come qualcosa di condivisibile, diffusibile, partecipabile. L’infinito bene divino è infinitamente condivisibile e quindi è quanto mai opportuno che il divino amore, che è identico con questo bene, debba liberamente condividerlo facendo essere dei beneficiari dello stesso bene. Poiché il beneficiario creato rispecchia la sua fonte increata e imita la Sua attività—in breve, perché 1’essere creato è estasi mimetica verso Dio—esso è naturalmente idoneo a comunicare se stesso ad altri nel modo in cui ciò è possibile, cioè causando efficientemente in un altro una copia della sua stessa attualità e così condividendo il suo bene. Per questo motivo, è naturale per tutte le cose non soltanto ottenere e conservare il proprio bene, ma anche condividerlo con altri. Tutte le cose, secondo la loro capacità, ne amano naturalmente altre[7] e operano per il loro bene. li passero che nutre i suoi piccoli appena usciti dall’uovo fa nel suo nido qualcosa di analogo a ciò che Dio fa nell’universo: dà qualcosa di buono a qualcuno che dipende da lui, e non per il bene di chi dona, ma di chi dipende. Forse la migliore espressione di questa verità si trova nella Summa contra gentiles:

«Da ciò risulta che nella misura in cui un essere ha una virtù più perfetta, ed è più alto nei gradi della bontà, ha un desiderio più universale del bene, così da cercare e compiere il bene su cose da lui più distanti. Infatti gli esseri imperfetti cercano solo il bene proprio dell’individuo; invece quelli perfetti cercano il bene della specie; quelli più perfetti il bene in genere; e Dio, il quale è perfettissimo nella bontà, vuole il bene di tutti gli esseri. Ecco perché giustamente alcuni affermano che “il bene in quanto tale tende a diffondersi”, poiché quanto più una cosa è migliore, tanto più estende la sua bontà. E poiché “in ciascun genere l’essere più perfetto è modello e misura di tutti gli esseri che appartengono a questo genere”, è necessario che Dio, il quale è perfettissimo nella bontà che espande più di ogni altro, sia il modello delle creature che diffondono il bene. Ma in quanto ciascuna cosa diffonde su altre la bontà, ne diviene la causa. Perciò è pure evidente che ciascun essere, nel tendere ad essere causa delle altre cose, tende a una somiglianza con Dio, e tuttavia tende al proprio bene».[8]

Quanto più elevata la creatura, tanto più dà di se stessa, perché ha più sé all’ origine del dare. «La parola “amicizia”», dice san Tommaso, «si applica propriamente a un amore che si diffonde agli altri».[9]

2.2. La natura non è intrinsecamente egoista

Ecco la radice dell’ energico dissenso di san Tommaso da un assioma che può essere ricondotto a scolastici precedenti e, risalendo ancor più indietro, a san Bernardo: natura semper in se curva est, ovvero natura est recurva in se ipsa.[10] Un’affermazione nettissima di questo assioma si trova in sant’Alberto Magno: «L’amore di concupiscenza appartiene alla natura, che è sempre ripiegata su se stessa; e qualsiasi cosa ami, lo riconduce a se stessa, cioè al suo bene proprio, privato; e a meno che la grazia non la faccia liberamente elevare al di sopra di se stessa, tutto ciò che ama lo riconduce al suo proprio bene, e ama per amore di se stessa».[11]

Ciò che disturba san Tommaso non è l’idea che qualche amore possa essere autoreferenziale, ma che l’amore naturale in quanto tale meriti di essere definito cosÌ. Perché se l’amore naturale è necessariamente diretto verso di sé, allora qualsiasi genere di amore per gli altri, qualsiasi extasis, non soltanto è esclusivamente frutto della grazia ma è anche contrario alla natura, distruttivo dell’ordine degli appetiti. Abbiamo visto che, per san Tommaso, l’appetito è costruito lungo linee estatiche, e persino nei casi più chiari di appetito autoreferenziale—come l’elettrone che balza in cerca di un luogo più stabile, l’animale che ha fame di cibo o la pianta che si protende verso la luce del sole—la creatura, senza saperlo o volerlo, cerca l’assimilazione a Dio, consolidando il suo essere fatta a immagine di Dio. Ma questo processo non è isolato e introspettivo: è comune ed estroverso. La creatura, spontaneamente e naturalmente, non è meno incline a condividere il suo bene che a preservarlo e accrescerlo. Per dirla con san Tommaso: «Le cose naturali hanno un’inclinazione non soltanto rispetto al proprio bene—ad acquistarlo quando non lo hanno, a riposare in esso quando lo hanno—ma anche, per quanto possibile, a riversare bene negli altri».[12]

L’amore comporta sempre una trascendenza estatica, che si tratti della totale oblazione della creatura nei confronti del Creatore, della reverenza gerarchicamente proporzionata di ogni inferiore verso il suo superiore, dell’ affetto e dell’ aiuto reciproco fra uguali uniti nell’ amicizia, o della graziosa condiscendenza di un superiore verso l’inferiore che dipende dal superiore per il proprio essere o benessere. Pertanto amore ed estasi non sono compagni per caso, ma la seconda è il segno infallibile della specie, della qualità e dell’intensità del primo. Se un uomo si può riconoscere dalle compagnie che frequenta, l’amore si può riconoscere dall’estasi che suscita. La partecipazione dell’ amore alla realtà personale, spirituale è determinata dalla presenza di dedizione e dono estatico. L’amore delle cose come strumenti o perfezioni accidentali genera un amore quasi-estatico che va verso l’esterno solo per poi ritornare verso l’interno recando doni per il soggetto. L’amore delle persone per amor loro genera un amore autenticamente estatico, che reca il sé in dono a un altro soggetto, sotto forma di condivisione di una vita comune che aspira soprattutto ai beni comuni. L’estasi verso l’altro abbraccia tutto e tutto consuma in un unico amore: l’amore incondizionato dell’uomo o dell’angelo per il suo divino Signore, nel quale si trova ogni bene, al quale ogni culto è dovuto. Come spiega David Gallagher:

«Conformemente alla sua dottrina della partecipazione, T ommaso sostiene che le perfezioni di tutte le creature, esseri razionali compresi, si trovano più perfettamente nella fonte non-partecipata che nei soggetti partecipanti. Proprio questo serve a spiegare l’amore di Dio per amor Suo (amor amicitiae) anche più dell’io. Lo stesso bene che uno ama se stesso si trova più perfettamente nella fonte increata di quel bene [ … ]. Così, troviamo più piacere (cioè abbiamo più complacentia) nel nostro bene così come esiste in Dio che così come esiste in noi stessi, e di conseguenza amiamo Dio ancor più che noi stessi. Ciò si potrebbe esprimere anche così: il bene completo del tutto che è Dio è mio bene più del bene particolare e parziale che io in quanto bene particolare sussistente possiedo. Dio, in quanto pura fonte di ogni bene, è più amabile di qualsiasi bene particolare, anche di noi stessi».[13]

Abbiamo cominciato col dire che l’io umano non è isolato dagli altri nella sua realizzazione, e qui troviamo il modo più diretto di dimostrare perché: la creatura è incline ad amare il bene comune, che è più come il Dio che è naturalmente amato, rispetto al suo bene privato, che Lo imita di meno e pertanto è meno il bene della creatura e meno amato. Se l’amore naturale non fosse già, in qualche misura, estatico, l’amor amicitiae—amore di amicizia—sarebbe impossibile indipendentemente dalla grazia. Si potrebbe dir cosÌ: l’egoismo, l’esaltazione del privato sul comune, è soltanto una corruzione e non è mai naturale.[14] L’intera vita morale, e forse addirittura l’intero essere creato, è così soffusa di una luce nuova: tutte le relazioni, salvo per la relazione meramente logica dell’io con l’io, sono governate dalla legge della comunicazione estatica, che varia per potenza così come le relative variano per peso dell’ essere, per dignità della sussistenza.

3. Il sé umano si realizza nel bene comune

3. 1. Beni comuni e beni privati

Fin qui, nelle nostre riflessioni, abbiamo visto che il modo in cui è presentato di solito “il problema dell’ amore” — cioè che occorre restare fedeli o all’altruismo o all’egoismo—comporta fin dall’inizio una falsa contrapposizione costruita su una metafisica superficiale. Poiché nessuna delle due posizioni riconosce la generosità estatica come norma della creazione, nessuna delle due riconosce la fondamentale distinzione fra beni privati, che non possono essere condivisi da molti, e beni comuni, che possono essere condivisi da molti. A questa distinzione ci vogliamo adesso.

Come abbiamo visto nel caso di Hobbes, il fondamento della moderna antinomia egoismo/altruismo è la concezione secondo cui realtà = corpo. Ma in effetti Hobbes si sbagliava: ometteva cioè la sfera della razionalità. Poiché noi uomini siamo animali razionali, siamo uniti da beni spirituali tramite le loro manifestazioni sensibili. Non possiamo mangiare lo stesso pezzo di carne, ma possiamo condividere lo stesso pasto. Non possiamo usare lo stesso cucchiaio, ma possiamo vivere da fratelli sotto lo stesso tetto. Non possiamo pronunciare la stessa parola, ma possiamo condividere una conversazione che ci lega nella ricerca della verità o nel suo gioioso raggiungimento. Non possiamo vedere con gli stessi occhi né udire con le stesse orecchie, ma la bellezza intelligibile che sta sotto la bellezza visibile o udibile può penetrare tutta la nostra anima di modo che siamo attirati verso di essa con un’ammirazione e un piacere condivisi. Non possiamo pensare lo stesso pensiero, ma le nostre menti si possono conformare allo stesso oggetto ed essere così unite nella verità.

In tutti questi modi diventiamo uno anche se siamo molti. Essere razionali significa poter entrare in beni che trascendono l’ordine materiale, lo hic et nunc. Ciò significa che possiamo essere un “uno-molti”: non una semplice unità come lo è Dio, né una molteplicità sempre mutevole come lo sono le cose materiali, ma una pluralità unificata in e tramite l’aderenza a un bene superiore. L’amicizia è “due-come-uno”, “molti-come-uno”. Gli animali del campo possono essere insieme nello stesso luogo, ma non possono essere davvero uno. Soltanto le persone, create a immagine del Dio Trinitario, hanno il divino potere di formare una realtà interpersonale, una communio o koinonia che abbraccia e conferisce il senso ultimo alla loro peculiarità, ai loro sé separati. Tale communio sarà intrinsecamente spirituale, fondata sui beni spirituali e a essi ordinata. 

Quest’ultimo punto merita un’attenta riflessione. San Tommaso osserva che«i beni spirituali sono più comunicabili di quelli corporali».[15] La proposizione inversa a questa è formulata da R. Garrigou-Lagrange come “una veritàspesso pronunciata da Sant’Agostino e da san Tommaso”, e cioè: “Contrariamente ai beni spirituali, i beni materiali dividono gli uomini perché non possono appartenere simultaneamente e integralmente a molti.” Garrigou-Lagrange spiega: 

«Una molteplicità di persone non può possedere integralmente e simultaneamente la stessa casa, lo stesso campo, lo stesso territorio; dal che scaturiscono dissensi, liti, azioni legali, guerre. Al contrario i beni spirituali, come la verità, la virtù, Dio Stesso, possono appartenere simultaneamente e integralmente a molti; molte persone possono possedere simultaneamente la stessa virtù, la stessa verità, lo stesso Dio che Si dà interamente a ciascuno di noi nella [Santa] Comunione. Pertanto, mentre la ricerca sfrenata di beni materiali divide profondamente gli uomini, la ricerca dei beni spirituali li unisce. E ci unisce tanto più strettamente quanto più ricerchiamo questi beni superiori. Addirittura, possediamo Dio tanto più quanto più Lo diamo agli altri. Quando regaliamo del denaro, non lo possediamo più; al contrario, quando diamo Dio alle anime, non Lo perdiamo, ma piuttosto Lo possediamo di più. E se dovessimo rifiutare di darLo a chi ce Lo chiede, Lo perderemmo».[16]

Il fatto che Garrigou-Lagrange menzioni Sant’Agostino ci ricorda un brnoso passo del Libro XII delle Confessioni, dove Agostino mette in contrapposizione chi interpreta le Scritture per superbia e chi le interpreta per carità. I superbi, dice,

«amano la loro

[idea]

non perché sia vera, ma perché è la loro. Diversamente amerebbero allo stesso modo anche la verità degli altri, come io amo le loro asserzioni quando sono vere, non perché sono loro, ma perché sono vere, e in quanto vere non sono più nemmeno loro. Se poi l’amano in quanto vere, ormai sono e loro e mie, essendo un bene comune di tutti gli amanti della verità [ … ]. Perché la tua verità non appartiene né a me né a chiunque altro, ma a tutti noi, e tu ci chiami pubblicamente a parteciparne, con questo terribile avvertimento, di non pretenderne il possesso privato per non esserne privati. Chiunque rivendica come proprio ciò che tu metti a disposizione di tutti, e pretende di detenere ciò che a tutti appartiene, viene respinto dal patrimonio comune verso il suo, ossia dalla verità verso la menzogna. Chi infatti dice una menzogna, dice del suo (Gv 8,44).[17]

La verità è il tipo di bene che si può avere soltanto se non lo si ha come proprio, come di proprietà. Nel momento in cui tale bene è requisito come privato, cessa di essere vero; diventa una verità falsificata o distorta, una mezza verità o una non verità. È per questo che la verità del credo cristiano, o anche l’atto di eroico sacrificio, non è nulla senza carità, come insegna san Paolo (1 Cor 13). Benché queste cose siano buone e vere astrattamente, sono buone e vere concretamente, per il soggetto, solo quando questo le abbraccia con una volontà buona, cioè a dire, con il giusto amore di sé, quello che richiede l’amore di Dio e del prossimo. 

È in questo contesto che diviene evidente il fondamentale rapporto fra bonum privatum e bonum commune: il bene comune, rettamente inteso, non è qualcosa che sta al disopra e oltre ciò che è “buono per me” personalmente; è proprio ciò che semplicemente è meglio per me ed è perfettivo di me. Ciò che è più comunemente condivisibile è, nell’ essere condiviso, più benefico per tutti coloro che ne partecipano.[18]

Il “proprio bene” non soltanto permette, ma richiede che il proprio sé si amplifichi amando gli altri per amor loro, il che comporta amare beni veramente comuni a molti. Il mio bene come persona è più dei beni privati o delle perfezioni che io possiedo. La mia identità cresce, la mia bontà è amplificata quando mio unisco affettivamente a un’altra persona o a una comunità in un amore che ricerca il bene di questo altro per amor suo. 

Come tante verità basilari, suona paradossale. Il mio bene non è semplicemente il bene mio, ma comprende il tuo bene; invero il nostro bene è ciò che è buono per me più autenticamente di qualsiasi bene che sia solo mio. La base di un’amicizia veramente umana è l’unione delle menti o degli spiriti tramite beni che sono comuni, comunicabili e inesauribili; una relazione siffatta ha la potenzialità di una crescita e di una fruizione continua. I beni materiali, che sono intrinsecamente privati (cioè condivisibili soltanto per predicazione), divisibili, esauribili e potenzialmente causa di divisione, nonpossono costituire una base stabile per l’amicizia. 

L’amore autentico non soltanto costruisce l’unione personale, ma disuugge tutto ciò che con essa è incompatibile. L’amore non soltanto fa sÌ che gli amici siano radicati nel bene comune, ma li sradica da qualsiasi bene privato si frapponga alla comunione. Per unire, l’amore divide anche; costringe l’uomo a cessare di stare attaccato a se stesso cosÌ da potersi attaccare a un altro—così che possa dedicare il suo tempo, le sue energie, le sue azioni, i suoi possedimenti ad altri. Gli amici non si fondono mai nell’identità numerica, ma entrano in autentica comunione fra loro attraverso il potere unificante, trasformativo dell’ amore. Quando una persona ne ama un’ altra come ama se stessa, si ritrova al di fuori di se stessa amando e promuovendo il bene dell’ altra come il suo proprio. La sua identità si colora, e finisce per trasfigurarsi, per mezzo di un’ azione estatica.

3.2. Amore di sé buono e amore di sé cattivo: la verità che si cela dietro l’antinomia moderna

Abbiamo esposto e confutato a grandi linee la presunta antinomia fra egoismo e altruismo, ma ora dobbiamo ammettere che la sua persuasività per l’uomo moderno affonda le radici, almeno in parte, nella sua rassomiglianza alla verità circa la nostra condizione di peccatori. N ella nostra esperienza, vi è—o spesso può esservi—un vero conflitto fra amore di sé e amore dell’altro. Questa nostra esperienza va spiegata da una risposta esauriente alla contrapposizione fra egoismo e altruismo. E allora, quale vera contrapposizione c’è fra e di sé e amore dell’altro?

Cominceremo con il ricordare qualcosa che abbiamo già detto: il bene che è più il mio bene—il bene divino, che è di per sé infinitamente comune—è ontologicamente altro da me e può farmi del bene soltanto quando è amato per se stesso e in quanto condivisibile da tutti. Ciò che è più profondo nel causare la perfezione, intimamente presente a tutte le cose, comunicando loro l’essere e la bontà, è ciò che più trascende l’io e più esige l’omaggio dell’auto-trascendenza. Il “sé” di cui parla san Tommaso è sempre e più fondamentalmente ordinato a Dio nel Quale il suo stesso bene esiste più perfettamente. Per natura e per grazia, io sono estaticamente ordinato a Dio. L’amore di sé è pertanto inteso come buono o ben ordinato quando—e solo quando—ordina l’uomo a Dio, suo bene vero e finale al di fuori di lui stesso. 

Sta qui la differenza essenziale fra il modo in cui l’uomo buono ama se stesso e il modo in cui ama se stesso il malvagio. Secondo san Tommaso, l’uomo buono ama ciò che è più veramente lui stesso -la sua mente, in cui è iscritta l’imago Dei[19]—ordinando le potenze inferiori alle superiori e, se necessario, sacrificando qualcosa dell’inferiore in nome della perfezione più piena del superiore.[20] Invece il malvagio, ordinando tutto alle sue potenze inferiori, contraddittoriamente sacrifica ciò che è più veramente se stesso a cose che sono meno veramente lui stesso. Come osserva san Tommaso:

«L’amore di Dio è fonte di coesione (congregativus), perché riconduce ad unità l’affezione dell’uomo; così le virtù che sono causate dall’amore di Dio sono unite tra di loro. Ma l’amore di sé disgrega (amor sui disgregat) l’affezione dell’uomo in molteplici beni, così che l’uomo ama sé desiderando per sé questi beni temporali che sono molteplici e vari».[21]

Ai loro estremi, i due tipi di amore di sé esauriscono tutte le possibilità della natura umana. Il santo si eleva al disopra di se stesso entrando in beni più grandi, più comuni, più permanenti, che la sua mente abbraccia per mezzo dell’ amore spirituale; il peccatore cade al disotto di se stesso in beni più ristretti, privati, fugaci in cui si dissipa. Colui che ha perso ciò che era meno lui stesso trova ciò che è più lui stesso, cioè l’immagine di Dio, e tramite questa l’unione con Dio; colui che ha trovato ciò che è meno lui stesso perde l’anima, e attraverso questa perdita perde Dio.[22]

Parte della difficoltà di questa discussione è il concetto sfuggente e ambiguo di “sé”. Chi o che cosa è il “sé”? Se lo intendiamo come individualità incarnata, la mia identità umana in quanto peculiarmente mia, la mia interiorità unica in quanto espressa nel mio corpo e tramite esso, allora è evidente che il sé non è precedente, in termini assoluti, a tutto il resto, in particolare agli altri sé. Prima di tutto vi è il mistero della mia origine: io non vengo all’ essere “da me stesso” bensì da altri, entrando in un mondo che mi circonda, e con una natura che mi è data. Poi vi è il mistero della mia socialità. Dall’inizio e lungo tutto l’arco della vita, il proprio sé è intrecciato e plasmato da relazioni con altre persone, relazioni attraverso le quali il sé raggiunge (o manca di raggiungere) la sua maturità e la sua condizione più eccellente. L’agente virtuoso si assoggetta a—ed è pronto a sacrificare la sua vita per—il bene comune, in cui trova massimamente il suo proprio bene, la sua propria identità. La perfezione comporta una dedizione o consacrazione a ciò che è bene in termini assoluti; quindi fa richieste assolute, e l’uomo buono è precisamente quello che ascolta tali richieste per amore della bontà stessa e non in vista di vantaggi privati. Vivendo così, egli «attribuisce a sé le cose più belle sommamente buone» (come dice Aristotele),[23] poiché di un bene comune si partecipa subordinandosi ad esso. Come abbiamo visto nel passo di Sant’ Agostino, un bene comune può essere posseduto soltanto in quanto comune, non “in quanto mio” a esclusione di un altro. Se l’uomo buono deve assegnare il bene più nobile a se stesso, allora deve riferirsi e subordinarsi a quel bene più nobile, il che lo pone nella relazione della parte al tutto.

La distinzione essenziale fra creature razionali è stata voluta da Dio in vista del loro associarsi, formare una società, della loro amicizia e reciproca inabitazione (mutua inhaesio).[24]Ciò che vi è di meglio nell’essere un individuo di natura razionale è che si può entrare in comunione: innanzitutto con Dio, e secondariamente con altre creature razionali e al fine di aderire più pienamente a Dio e di gioire più pienamente in Lui. L’altro diviene “un altro sé”; altrimenti detto, il mio “sé” si espande o si allarga fino a includere altri sé. Considero l’amico parte di ciò che io sono, cosicché il suo bene diventa il mio bene, e pertanto quando opero per il suo bene non faccio qualcosa di estraneo al mio bene. Le persone rimangono ontologicamente distinte, ma quanto più partecipano di ciò che è veramente comune agli esseri razionali, tanto più sviluppano un’unità o communio spirituale che trascende le loro limitazioni individuali e al contempo fa venire fuori l’immagine di Dio nella loro anima. Per le creature, essere parte è l’unico modo di diventare intere.

4. Conclusione: Una società della carità

La dottrina dell’ amore di San T ommaso rende onore in ogni sua parte al carattere paradossale dell’ amore stesso: chi ama è reso perfetto solo quando, e nella misura in cui, ama Dio più di se stesso, cioè ordina se stesso e tutto ciò che è suo a Dio perché Egli è Dio, e ricerca il bene degli altri senza subordinare il loro bene al proprio. La virtù fa tutt’uno col considerare il bene umano primariamente spirituale e comune a molti: l’uomo virtuoso vede se stesso come un “uno-molti”, una componente che ha dei ruoli da svolgere, dei doveri da assolvere e dei diritti da godere. Il vizio fa tutt’uno con il ridurre il bene a beni materiali o corporali che non si possono condividere: l’uomo malvagio si comporta come un ciclope morale, un’isola autosufficiente che non ha esigenze né responsabilità nei confronti degli altri. Se un uomo è virtuoso, è perché è capace di agire per il bene in quanto tale, che può e deve appartenere a molti; se è malvagio, è perché sceglie costantemente di agire per beni che possono essere suoi soltanto, o spesso, a spese altrui (basta pensare alla mentalità abortista della cultura di morte). Come ha sempre sostenuto la dottrina sociale cattolica, l’unico modo di superare la falsa opposizione fra “mio” e “tuo” è acquisire quelle virtù che vedono i beni migliori come “nostri”.

Le due alternative che si escludono a vicenda, egoismo e altruismo, al pari dei loro corrispondenti eros e agape nella concezione di Anders Nygren, sono assolutamente inadeguate fin dall’inizio al compito della spiegazione, e costringono a trarre conclusioni che contrastano sia con la ragionevole riflessione sull’ esperienza, sia con la parola rivelata di Dio.

Nel concludere le mie riflessioni vorrei condividere con voi un magnifico testo di Jacques Maritain. Il pensatore francese individua tre possibilità teoretiche che si potrebbero parafrasare così: 1. auto-assorbimento, morte per contrazione, pura soggettività: in una parola, egoismo; 2. auto-dissoluzione,

morte per espansione, pura oggettività: in una parola, altruismo; 3.resa di sé, vivere di più morendo agli estremi, dispiegamento della soggettività in seno al divino Soggetto: in una parola, carità.

«Se mi abbandono alla prospettiva della soggettività, assorbo ogni cosa dentro di me e, sacrificando tutto alla mia unicità, resto inchiodato all’ assoluto dell’ egoismo e della superbia [leggasi: egoismo sclerotizzato]. Se mi abbandono alla prospettiva dell’ oggettività, resto assorbito in ogni cosa, e dissolvendomi nel mondo, sono falso rispetto alla mia unicità e rinuncio al mio destino [leggasi: altruismo ebbro]. È soltanto dall’ alto

[leggasi: infusione della divina carità]

che si può risolvere l’antinomia. Se Dio esiste, allora non io ma Lui è il centro; e stavolta non in relazione a una certa prospettiva particolare, come quella in cui ciascuna soggettività creata è il centro dell’universo che conosce, bensÌ in termini assoluti, e come soggettività trascendente cui tutte le soggettività sono riferite. In quel momento posso sapere sia che sono privo d’importanza, sia che il mio destino è della massima importanza. Posso sapere questo senza cadere nella superbia, saperlo senza essere falso rispetto alla mia unicità. Perché amando il divino Soggetto più di me stesso, è per Lui che amo me stesso, è per fare ciò che Lui desidera che io desidero sopra ogni altra cosa realizzare il mio destino; e perché, privo d’importanza come sono nel mondo, sono importante per Lui; non soltanto io, ma anche tutte le altre soggettività la cui amabilità è rivelata in Lui e per Lui e che sono da qui in poi, insieme con me, un noi chiamato a godere della Sua vita».[25]

In ultima analisi la nostra perfezione consiste nell’ essere ordinati a qualcosa—o meglio: a Qualcuno—che è interior intimo meo et superior summo nreo,[26] più interno di ciò che è intimo in me e più alto di ciò che è altissimo in me: la fonte del mio essere, della mia bontà, del mio essere persona, del mio destino. Ciò che mi rende perfetto risiede al di là di me, eppure è reso mio dalla carità. Questo Bene non lo prendo in me assimilandolo come fosse un cibo: sono io a esserne preso e assimilato, insieme con tutti gli altri che si lasciano attrarre nel suo abbraccio. Questa è la base per una società della carità, una società i cui membri attualizzano la loro dignità di figli di Dio attraverso il culto divino, la contemplazione, l’amicizia e il servizio attivo agli umili; una società che persegue beni autenticamente comuni e ne gode: la verità naturale e soprannaturale, le virtù morali e intellettuali, la bellezza intangibile delle belle arti, la gioia di comunità in pace; una società che comincia persino a conformarsi, da lontano, al luminoso esempio della Beata Trinità, conducendoci ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem. 

* Originally Published in: Juan José Pérez-Soba and Marija Magdic, L’amore principio di vita sociale. “Caritas aedificat” (ICor 8,1), Cantagalli, Siena 2011, pp. 73–87.

[1] Lungo tutta la sua vita di studioso, san Tommaso ha elaborato la sua dottrina dell’ ex tasis amoris in una serie di testi di eccezionale interesse. Per i testi e per la loro analisi critica: cfr. P.A. KWASNIEWSKI, “St. Thomas, Extasis, and Union with the Beloved”, in The Thomist 61/4 (1997) 587-603; ID., The Ecstasy of Love in Aquinas’s Commentary on the Sentences, in Angelicum 83 (2006) 51-93.

[2] Legato a questo è il “culto del corpo” contemporaneo. Questo assume molte e varie forme, che vanno da quelle relativamente innocue a quelle spiritualmente velenose, come la smodata attenzione alle immagini della televisione e delle riviste, l’ossessione per la salute e la forma fisica, i prodotti capitalistici di cura del corpo, le tecnologie medicali sempre più costose e invasive, i tatuaggi e il piercing, la pornografia. Queste forme hanno tutte in comune l’errore di partire dall’idea che il corpo o il sensibile siano il luogo del sé, cioè il luogo dell’ attenzione, della coltivazione e della finalità.

[3] Cfr. D. GALLAGHER, “Gewirth, Sterba, and the ]ustification of Morality”, in M. BOYLAN (ed.), Gewirth: Criticai Essays on Action, Rationality, and Community, Rowman & Littlefield, New York 1999,183-189.

[4] Soltanto in Dio la mancanza di extasis è pura positività, perché non vi è finitezza che Egli debba trascendere per essere Se stesso cosÌ come noi dobbiamo trascendere i nostri limiti se vogliamo entrare appieno in ciò che siamo destinati a essere.

[5] W. NORRIS CLARKE, The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics, University ofNotre Dame Press, Notre Dame 2001,33.

[6] Ecco i testi in cui San Tommaso d’Aquino si rifa a questo assioma: Scriptum super Sententiis, I, d. 34, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4; Summa contra gentiles, I, c. 37 e II, c. 24; Summa theologiae I, q. 5, a. 4 e q. 27, a. 5, ad 2; I-II, q. 1, a. 4, ad 1; II-II, q. 117, a. 6, argo 2 etad 2; Quaestiones disputatae De veritate, q. 21, a. 1, ad 4. Sul principio bonum se communicat, a questo legato; cfr. Super Sent., I, q. 2, q. 1, a. 4, sc.; Super Sent., I, d. 10, q. 1,a. 5, arg. 3 et ad 3; STh., I, q. 19, a. 2 e q. 106, a. 4; STh., II, q. 1, a. 1; Compendium Theologiae I, C. 124.

[7] Il principio di somiglianza sarà importante perché «ogni creatura vivente ama il suo simile, ogni uomo il suo vicino» (Sir 13,15).

[8] SAN TOMMASO D’AQUINO, SCC, III, c. 24.

[9] ID., Super Sent., III, d. 28, a. 6.

[10] ID., Quaestiones quodlibetales q. 1, a. 4, ad. 3; STh., I, q. 60, a. 5; I-II, q. 109, a. 3; II-II, q. 26, a. 3; Super Sent., III, d. 29, a. 1, ad. 3; cfr. R. GARRIGOu-LAGRANGE, The Love of God and the Cross of Jesus, Herder, St. Louis 1947, voI. 1, 89ss.

[11] SANT’ALBERTO MAGNO, Summae Theologiae 2.4.14.4.2., corp., in Opera omnia, vol. 32, Vivès, Paris 1895.

[12] STh., I, q. 19, a. 2.

[13] D. GALLAGHER, “Desire for Beatitude and Love ofFriendship in Thomas Aquinas”, in Medieval 5tudies 58 (1996) 1-47,37.

[14] Il peccato non è soltanto rifiuto della grazia; allivello più profondo è negazione della natura. Il peccato è la privazione o la diminuzione del modo, della specie e dell’ordine (Cfr. 5Th., I-II, q. 85, a. 4). L’amore di Dio al disopra del sé è naturale per la natura integrale; non è più naturale per la natura peccaminosa (ibidem, I-II, q. 109, a. 3). Nell’ordine peccaminoso, un amore estatico, generosamente diffusivo di sé è possibile soltanto per l’infusione della grazia, attuale o abituale, che mette gli uomini in condizione di amare Dio sopra ogni cosa e in ogni cosa, e di amare il prossimo come se stessi.

[15] STh., Suppl., q. 56, a. 4; cfr. III, q. 23, a. 1, ad 3; I-II, q. 28, a. 4, ad 2. Per un’applicazione estensiva di questo principio, cfr. P. KWASNIEWSKI, “On the IdeaI Basis and Fruition of Marriage”, in Second Spring 12 (2010) 43-53.

[16] R. GARRIGOu-LAGRANGE, The Three Ages of the Interior Life: Prelude of Eternal Life, TAN, Rockford 1989, vol. 2, 141; cfr. anche ID., “The Fecundity of Goodness”, in The Thomist 2 (1940) 226-236.

[17] SANT’AGOSTINO, Confessioni, XII, c. 25.

[18] Ogni creatura, purché sia parte di un tutto più grande, è naturalmente incline (e, qualora sia un libero agente, moralmente obbligata) ad amare il bene del tutto—tanto il bene comune intrinseco che è l’ordine dell’universo quanto il bene comune estrinseco che è Dio—più del suo bene come parte. Essendo per sua stessa natura parte di un tutto, o, più precisamente, parte di molti “tutti” concentrici, la creatura è ordinata al tutto non semplicemente come a qualcosa di superiore ad essa e di essa costitutivo, ma come a ciò che, nella sua stessa universalità, è più causativo della sua propria perfezione e a questa integrale. Il trattamento definitivo di questo argomento è quello che dà CH. DE KONINCK, “The Primacy of the Common Good”, che insieme ad altre opere a questa legate si trova in R. McINERNEY (ed.), The Writings of Charles De Koninck, University ofNotre Dame Press, South Bend 2009, voI. 2. Vedi anche M. WALDSTEIN, “The Common Good in St. Thomas andJohn Paul II’’, in Nova et Vetera (ed. ingl.) 3/3 (2005) 569-578; O. BLANCHETTE, The Peifection of the Universe According to Aquinas, The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park 1992.

[19] Cfr. STh., I, q. 93; cfr. CATECHISMO DELLA CHIESA CATTOLICA, nn. 356-368.

[20] Secondo STh., II-II, q. 25, a. 7, gli uomini probi ritengono che in loro sia primaria la mens rationalis, la rationalem naturam, mentre i malvagi giudicano primaria la naturam sensitivam et corporalem.

[21] STh., II-II, q. 73, a. 1, ad 3; cfr. R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, The Three Ages of the Interior Life, cit. , 399.

[22] Le 9,24-25; Cv 12,25 e paralleli; Mt 13,12; 25,29 e paralleli; cfr. anche la parabola del figlio prodigo (Le 15,11-32), il quale dissipavit substantiam suam vivendo luxunose (“sperperò le sue sostanze vivendo da dissoluto”).

[23] Cfr. ARISTOTELE, Etica Nicomachea, IX, 9.

[24] Cfr. STh., II-II, q. 28, a. 2.

[25] J. MARITAIN, Court traité de l’existence et de l‘existant, Hartmann, Paris 1947.

[26] SANT’AGOSTINO, Confessioni, III, c. 6.11.

It really came into its own, however, in the 1930s when Catholic Youth (the youth branch of Catholic Action) adopted it as a kind of anthem, and as a protest against the rising tide of totalitarianism. Heinrich Missalla describes the ceremonies surrounding the singing of the hymn as follows:

For the Catholic Youth in the “Third Reich” there were two highpoints to the year: the “profession day” on Trinity Sunday, and the Feast of Christ the King on the last Sunday of October. On these two Sundays all the members of Catholic Youth in each city assembled in a large Church. The boys were dressed in black trousers and white shirts. A procession was made with banners. The banners were kept rolled up as long as they were on the street, since they were not allowed to show them in public. But they were unfurled as soon as they entered the Church, and held at a slant, so that the Symbols of Christ became fully visible— a sight that made hearts beats faster. The sermon called for fidelity to Christ and His Church. The highpoint was the singing of the song “O Thou my Saviour glorious/ High Heaven bows before thee.” At the final stanza, “Christ my great King, to Thee alone / I pledge my love lily-pure, Even to death my faithfulness,” with the organist pulling all the stops, the youth held their right hands with three fingers extended as a gesture of oath-taking. This ceremony was meant to rival the cult of the Führer, and that is how we understood it. I remember that I felt like a resistance fighter in those moments.[1]

The pledge of fidelity to Christ the King was experienced as liberating. Fidelity to the Highest King meant being able to reject the totalitarian claims of earthly rulers whenever those rulers went against Christ. It meant having the true freedom of knowing where the true good was to be found.

But in the 1960s the words came to be an embarrassment for many in the Church in Germany. Allegiance to Christ the King was seen as bound up with an antiquated “integralism”[2] incompatible with the liberal political order that many German theologians were eager to embrace, with its claim that religion ought to make no use of political power, and that politics should maintain neutrality toward religious claims. Missalla claims that even Przywara himself admitted to being somewhat embarrassed by his words when he looked back on them at the end of the 1960s.[3]

O Du mein Heiland was not included in the Gotteslob, the post-conciliar, German hymnbook. It continued, however, to be sung in many places, especially in Austria and Southern Germany, on the (new) Feast of Christ the King (either from photo-copies, or from diocesan appendices to the Gotteslob). And some German theologians were willing to admit that that sort of allegiance to the highest King was necessary to resist the totalizing tendencies of even the most (supposedly) “liberal” states. Thus Joseph Ratzinger wrote in the 1980s:

…the greatness of soul of the human vocation reaches beyond the individual aspect of human existence and cannot be squashed back into the merely private sphere. A society that turns what is specifically human into something purely private and defines itself in terms of a complete secularity (which moreover inevitably becomes a pseudo-religion and a new all-embracing system that enslaves people)— this kind of society will of its nature be sorrowful, a place of despair: it rests on a diminution of human dignity. A society whose public order is consistently determined by agnosticism is not a society that has become free but a society that has despaired, marked by the sorrow of man who is fleeing from God and in contradiction with himself. A Church that did not have the courage to underline the public status of its image of man would no longer be the salt of the earth, the light of the world, the city set on a hill.[4]

If we wish the Church of our time to be the salt of the earth in a secular society, which ever more denies the true nature and destiny of man, and exalts mortal sins as “rights,” then we might do well to imitate the German Catholic Youth of the 1930s, and sing “O Thou my Saviour Glorious.” We are therefore happy to offer the following English translation.

Oh Thou my Saviour Glorious

Music: Josef Kreitmaier, S.J.
Words: Erich Przywara, S.J.
English Translation: Edmund Waldstein, O.Cist.

[1] Heinrich Missalla, Erinnern um der Zukunft willen: Wie die katholischen Bischöfe Hitlers Krieg unterstützt haben (Oberursel: Publik-Forum, 2015), the translation is my own.

[2] Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Integralismus heute,” Diakonia 19 (1988), pp. 221-29.

[3] Missalla, Erinnern um der Zukunft willen.

[4] Joseph Ratzinger, The Yes of Jesus Christ: Spiritual Exercises in Faith, Hope, and Love, trans. Robert Nowell (New York: Cross Road, 2011), p. 76.

Translated by Timothy Wilson

Continuing our series of original translations of texts on Catholic political philosophy, we here offer an excerpt from a treatise on ethics by Fr. Ireneo González Moral, S.J. It is taken from vol. 3 of the manual Philosophiæ Scholasticæ Summa (BAC 1952), by the Jesuit Professors of the Philosophical Faculties in Spain, pp. 788-800. This particular selection deals very briefly with some matters concerning civil authority, and then proceeds to a lengthy and systematic examination of the question of what kinds of relations can and should exist between the civil power and the Church.

ARTICLE VI

ON CIVIL AUTHORITY IN PARTICULAR

1052. Nexus. We have treated of the origin and the original subject of civil authority. Now we wish to examine in more detail its extension or objective comprehension, the diverse ways in which political power is able to be acquired through derivation, the diverse forms which it is able to put on, and finally its different functions.

§1. On the comprehension of civil authority as regards its object.

1053. 1. General principles for resolving the question.[1] In this part, we wish to see how far civil power is able to extend itself in different questions which occur in civil society, that is, in material or economic, in moral, in religious questions; it is necessary, therefore, to have at the outset some general and fundamental principles for giving the right solution in all things.

1. The civil power has all those rights, and only those, which may be necessary for the fitting achievement of its end; this is clear from the end of society.

2. The civil power is able to command nothing which may be contrary to certain divine will. For since every authority descends from God, He is not able to concede to the same the power of subverting the order established by Himself.

3. The civil power, in the distributing of goods and burdens which are common, is held to observe distributive justice; for the common good demands this.

4. The civil power ought to govern according to a legitimate mode of governing in each and every society; for in this way, the rights of the subjects, both natural and positive, will be preserved.

1054. In the aforementioned four principles, the civil authority has an infallible norm in the exercise of its own activity; subjects also will find in them the guardianship of their own liberty and independence, so far as they are able to correspond with social life.

Treating of the end of civil society, we have seen that things of this sort include the protection of the rights of the subjects and the positive promotion of public prosperity; hence, the civil authority ought to defend directly all the rights of the subjects, both the private rights of individuals, families, and particular associations; and the public rights or relations between the citizens and civil society, and between civil society and other societies, in the first place the Church. Pertaining directly also to the civil authority is the positive promotion of all goods which are required for public prosperity, as has been said.

Whatever might also be necessary for the securing of the things aforesaid pertains to the civil authority, as e.g. the election and institution of public officials, the exaction of taxes, the erection of tribunals, etc.; but these pertain to it in an indirect manner.

1055. 2. On public decency. From the things just now said, there can arise a difficulty. Since decency of morals confers most of all to the public good, will care for decency of morals also pertain directly to the public authority?

a) Private decency, which consists in the especially interior acts of each person, by which he may accommodate himself to the norm of natural or supernatural morality, does not at all pertain to the civil authority, since it is not able to judge of purely interior matters; furthermore, this private decency is not referred per se to the common good, which is to be achieved by common cooperation.

b) Public decency, which consists in such a conformation of society that not only removes incitements to vice, so far as is possible, but also positively promotes virtue and encourages all toward it, certainly pertains to the necessary conditions of the common prosperity, and the activity of the civil authority extends itself to it.

1056. What the care of public decency demands. 1) That it impede all those things which are able to obstruct the practice of virtue, e.g. public prostitution, obscene houses, books contrary to good morals; 2) that legislation be of such a kind, that it not only does not impede the practice of virtue, but even positively promotes it; 3) that it should commend public offices to those men who are able to be an example to others.

1057. 3. On the care of religion in the purely natural order. It is asked, whether care of religion would pertain to the civil authority, in the hypothetical case in which there did not exist some supernatural society—the Church—to whom the care of religion was committed.

It seems that it ought to be answered affirmatively. For society itself, as such, is held to render worship to God (because of benefits received, because of the necessity of religious worship for civil society itself, and finally, because of its necessity for the subjects);[2] but since in the purely natural order, there would not be another society, at least a public one, to which the care of religion would be given, it follows that care of religion would pertain to the civil authority, which would fulfill a duty of this sort in the name of society.

But if some private society were formed for this, this society necessarily would depend upon public authority, just as any other societies of the merely private order. But this power would be contained within limits far more restricted than is the supernatural power of the Church now.

§2. On the relations between civil society and the Church

A. ON THE NEGATIVE RELATION

Thesis 58. Separation of any sort between the Church and civil society is to be rejected.

Ottaviani, A., Institutiones iuris publici ecclesiastici, 2^nd ed. vol. 2, p. 75ff; R. Sotillo, Comp. Iuris publ. eccl. 2^nd ed. (Santander 1951); Cappello, F., Summa iuris publici Eccles. 3^rd ed. p. 266ff; Bendiscioli, La Política de la Santa Sede, span. vers. 1943, pp. 35-50; Chenon, El papel social de la Iglesia p. 146ff; G. Martínez, F., Credo Sanctam Ecclesiam Catholicam pp. 1-45; Maritain, J., Primacía de lo espiritual, span. vers. by Mariano Argüello (Buenos Aires 1947); Castañeda, E., El poder indirecto en el Dr. Navarro: Archivo Teológico Granadino 6 (1942) 63-93; Cathrein, Filos. morale vol. 2, pp. 604-624; Donat, Ethica vol. 2, p. 238ff.

1058. Nexus. We have the fact of the existence of this society which is called the Church, which declares itself to be a society perfect and supernatural, and which manifestly proves its constitution and aforementioned properties with such arguments as cannot be denied even in the merely philosophic order. This being posited, it is for us to inquire what sort of relations ought to be between these two perfect societies existing at the same time and in the same place, that is, between civil society and the Church.

1059. Notions. 1. The CHURCH: is a society that is supernatural, visible, perfect and independent, instituted by Christ our Lord, and governed by His Vicar, the Supreme Pontiff, for the direct care of religion and for the eternal salvation of souls.[3]

a) Society: or some multitude of men stably united unto a common end under some authority. b) Supernatural: on account of its origin and most of all on account of its means and end. c) Visible: for the following are visible: the material element of the Church (men), the formal element, and the means. d) Perfect: because it has all the elements and power which are required for acquiring its end, independent. e) Independent: for in no way does it depend upon any other society. f) Instituted by Christ our Lord, Who both established the Church, and gave to it His divine mission. g) Governed by His Vicar, or monarchically constituted. h) Religious, for the direct care of religion was committed to it. i) Supernatural: for it provides for the eternal salvation of souls.

1060. 2. SEPARATION: by this is understood that state of public affairs in which civil society regards the Church as something merely private and disjoined from public life.

1061. WHAT THIS IMPLIES: 1) Negatively: in a regime of separation, the Church is not had as a corporation of public right; its jurisdiction is not recognized, nor are its ordinances defended by the civil authority, nor are privileges of worship conceded to its ministers, such as exemption from military service, or from taxes, nor are subsidies given to them; the ministry of the Church in public organs, e.g. in schools and the armed forces, is not admitted. 2) Positively: Liberty, according to the right common to all, is granted to the Church so that it might establish itself after the manner of some private society, which in all things is subject to the laws of private societies, with the rights and obligations annexed to the same.

Therefore, so long as it is not opposed to civil laws, the Church will be free in internal things, in worship, in doctrine, in rule; any of its goods and rights are defended by the civil authority.

But the civil authority arrogates to itself the right to govern by its own authority all things, even religious, insofar as they touch civil life, as e.g. schools, matrimony, funerals, and ownership.

N.B. Separation properly speaking is not present if only liberty of worship is had, or if equality is granted to all religions; for, this notwithstanding, the Church is able to enjoy the rights and privileges of public corporations, most of all with respect to the ordering of schools and the regulation of marriages according to the doctrine of the Church.

In reality there is not found a perfect separation, since contact between either society is not able to be avoided; thus, at most it is able to be more or less perfect; sometimes it is established in order to avoid a regime of persecution and hostility (amicable separation); but sometimes—which more often happens—it is instituted in order to plague and oppress the Church, and restrict her liberty in preaching, in the administration of goods, in founding schools (hostile separation).

1062. State of the question. We suppose the fact of the institution of the Church, and that she is a society that is perfect, visible, spiritual, universal, and completely free.

Between it and civil society, existing mingled together, diverse relations can be found[4]:

a) Friendship or perfect concord, that is, if they are closely and perfectly united, and mutually respect and sincerely help one another.

b) Enmity and persecution (hostile separation), that is, if civil society harries and persecutes the Church, even as a private association.

c) Separation (amicable separation) of liberty and indifference, that is, if civil society neither positively assists the Church, nor persecutes her, but rather prescinds from her, considering her not as a perfect society, but as one merely private, just as any other society, e.g. literary, industrial, etc.

It is inquired in the thesis: is this regime of separation something to be admitted?

1063. Opinions. 1. The first opinion holds to the hegemony of civil society, and attributes supreme power to the civil authority, subjecting the Church entirely to civil society. After Marsilius Patavinus (14^th cent.), who professed this system, many regalists of every age henceforth have defended it, as well as many modern positivist jurists.

2. The liberals in particular defend perfect separation, who prefer the Church to be free in the churches and in some activities of private life, but not in all; yet in the whole of her external activity they wish her to be subject to the civil authority, which is able to intervene directly in ecclesiastical affairs. Nor do they suffer the Church, as they say, to mix herself up in political matters; thus do they abusively call any external activity of the Church.[5]

Certain authors in our own times, led by Maritain, seem to defend something similar.

3. Our opinion. We defend as certain that a regime of separation of this sort is not at all per se to be wished for; yet we do not deny that sometimes it is able to be tolerated or even chosen per accidens as a lesser evil, in order to avoid open persecution of the Church even as a private society. But when there may be given sufficient cause for permitting a regime of this sort, is for the Church herself to determine.

1064. It is proved. 1°. From the divine wisdom. Christ, establishing the Church, was not able to will a regime disordered and liable to commotions. But such would be a regime of any kind of separation between the Church and civil society. Therefore the regime of separation between the Church and civil society is per se to be rejected.

Major: It is evident given the infinite wisdom and sanctity of the founder of the Church.

Minor: Often there are two jurisdictions to be exercised over the same subjects, in the same territory, about the same matter, at the same time, e.g. about feast days, about impediments of matrimony…Hence, if civil society should not recognize the Church as a perfect society, nor admit the juridical personality of the same, and her supreme power concerning those things which are proper to her, necessarily there will be conflicts; for one society is able to declare e.g. some day to be festive, but the other that it is not; one might say that some matrimony is valid, but the other might say it is invalid, etc.

1065. 2°. From the obligation which society has of rendering worship to God.

Civil society, in the order in which we find ourselves, is obliged to render to God Catholic worship. But this implies a necessary relation between the Church and civil society. Therefore any kind of regime of separation between the Church and civil society cannot be admitted.

Major: For to God is owed the worship which He Himself wishes; but He expressly has manifested Himself to desire that all render to Him Catholic worship.

Minor: The care of Catholic worship of this sort has been committed expressly to the Church by God; therefore civil society is not able to arrogate to itself the regulation of this kind of worship. It pertains therefore to the Church to command that magistrates and public officials be present at religious ceremonies, and to establish those things which are connected with social worship.

1066. The doctrine of the Church concerning this matter. It is best declared: by Leo XIII, Immortale Dei §§6-8, 10-15, 18, 21-22, 34-35; Libertas præstantissimum §§14-22, where the doctrines of liberalism are exposed and refuted, and most of all at §§38-41; by Pius XI, Dilectissima nobis §6-7.

1067. Objections. 1. The end of civil society is the public prosperity to be obtained in this life; but the end of the Church is eternal felicity, which is to be obtained in another life. But each society is best able to achieve its own end, so that it ought not to have any relation with the other. Therefore separation between civil society and the Church ought not to be rejected.

I respond. I distinguish the major: such that it ought to be subordinated to the final end, that is, to perfect felicity in another life, I concede; otherwise, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor.

2. That the Church might be able to achieve her end, it suffices that she have liberty within her own sphere. But in a regime of separation between the Church and civil society, this liberty is conceded to the Church. Therefore the separation of the Church from the State is not to be rejected.

I respond. I distinguish the major: the liberty due to her, I concede; only tolerance and a portion of liberty, but not all which is due to her, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor.

3. A regime different from the regime of separation supposes that social authority knows the true religion. But generally this does not happen. Therefore at least then, the regime of separation is better.

I respond. I distinguish the major: the civil authority is able, if it wishes, to know it, I concede; otherwise, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor. For the true religion, by means of evident signs, reveals itself to any who should be willing to know it.

4. In a society in which different religions are professed by the citizens—as often happens—to recognize one, but not the others, as a perfect society, would beget hostility against the worshipers of that religion. But then this regime would harm the worshipers of the true religion. Therefore at least then, the regime of separation is to be preferred.

I respond. I distinguish the major: and this harm would spring forth from the malice of those men, I concede; from the nature of the regime itself, I deny. Thus, in practice the Church will consider what is more agreeable for avoiding greater evils. For at present we set forth the doctrine from is to be supported from the nature of civil society and the Church.

5. It seems that the regime of separation of civil society from the Church is to be preferred; for in this way other civil societies which do not recognize the Church, whether from fault or inculpably, in the same manner will be moved to tolerate the Catholic religion as a society merely private; otherwise, if this tolerance for other religions is not had in Catholic nations, tolerance for the Catholic religion will not be able to be urged in other nations.

I respond. I deny the assertion. The tolerance of error, such that truth also would be destroyed, of itself is to be rejected. For the truth alone has the right to rule in the intellects of men. The trouble which would follow from other quarters would arise, not from the nature of religion and from the reverence toward the true religion, but extrinsically and from the malice of men.

6. The practice of separation, e.g. in the United States of America, demonstrates that it is the best regime.[6]

I respond. I distinguish the assertion: Per accidens in some regions, I concede; per se, and as the ideal regime, I deny.

B. ON THE POSITIVE RELATION BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Thesis 59. In matters merely civil, the State is independent of the Church (I); in matters moral and religious, the Church is independent of the State (II); but in mixed matters, unless a mutual concord be obtained through convention, the supreme authority is with the Church (III).

1068. Nexus. We see that the Church and civil society are not able to be separated; now we wish to see what sorts of relations ought in fact to exist between them.

1069. Notions. MATTERS MERELY CIVIL. Here are understood those things which, because of their end or destination, tend toward merely temporal prosperity, e.g. exaction of taxes, the ordering of public servants, custody of order, public health, national defense, ways of communication, postal and telephone services, etc.

1070. MATTERS MERELY MORAL AND RELIGIOUS. These refer to all those things which singly look to morals or to the salvation of souls: e.g. faith, administration of the sacraments, preaching of the Gospel, etc.

1071. MIXED MATTERS. These are those things which at once have a twofold aspect, namely, temporal and religious.

a) Mixed per se are those things which by their nature have this twofold aspect, e.g. matrimony between Christians, and education.[7]

b) Mixed per accidens are those things which of their nature are merely temporal things, but per accidens take on a religious aspect, e.g. ordering of the military, which of its nature is a merely temporal action; yet to ordain it such that soldiers are not able to be present at religious rites on feast days, endues it with a religious aspect; possession of some building is a merely temporal affair, but if this building is intended for worship, or for the residence of sacred persons, it participates in a religious aspect.[8]

1072. MUTUAL CONVENTION. By mutual convention there is understood the mode of proceeding pacifically in these matters, by previously determining what, in any affair, should pertain in practice to each society, mediated by some mutual pact which is accustomed to be called a concordat or manner of living. But in this pact, each member cedes a little from its right, so that a perfect and mutual concord might be able to be had, limiting well what should pertain to either society in these mixed matters; e.g. in the military service of clergy, in youth associations, in education, in matrimony, etc.

We must note that concordats are neither the only nor the more perfect solution.[9]

1073. State of the question. There are matters and questions which, of their nature, are merely temporal, nor do they bespeak in any way a relation to spiritual things; we treat of these in the first part, so that we might see whether in them the Church may make intervention. On the other hand there are others which especially present a spiritual aspect. We treat of these latter in the second part, that we might see whether civil society is able to intervene in some way in these things. There are, finally, other matters which, of their nature, pertain to both societies; we treat of these in the third part, so that we might see whose is the ultimate and definitive decision in a case of conflict, and how these might be able to be forestalled.

1074. Opinions. 1. The first is of those who are opposed to the preceding thesis.

2. Some mediævals[10], perhaps many, asserted that all power, both spiritual and temporal, has been given by God to the Church, such that princes would not rule peoples except by power received from the Roman Pontiff, and thus they would be directly subject to the jurisdiction of the Church. They therefore conceive of the State as a counterpart of the diocese.[11]

3. Radical liberals and regalists. These make the Church entirely dependent upon the State. For them, the Church is as it were an instrument of the State; this is also the doctrine of modern statolatrists of every sort.[12]

4. All moderate liberals concede to the State supremacy over the Church in mixed matters.[13]

5. Our opinion: a) in the first part we assert the full independence of the State in merely temporal affairs; b) but in the second part, the full independence of the Church in merely moral and religious affairs, i.e. in those which look especially to the sanctification of souls; c) but in the third part we state the supremacy of the Church in mixed matters, that is, we defend that which by many is called the indirect power of the Church in temporal matters, by reason of the spiritual element conjoined with the temporal.

Hence in this third part we assert the indirect subordination of the State in all things which, although of their nature temporal, are either united with spiritual things or are referred to them; and thus they are subordinate by reason of the end or destination.[14]

The first part is proved: In merely civil affairs the State is entirely independent

1075. For this reason, that the Church does not think herself to have any power in these matters.

The State enjoys that independence which it had before the institution of the Church, unless it be proved that the limits to this independence were placed through the institution of the Church. But before the institution of the Church, the State had full independence in merely temporal affairs, nor can it be proved that limits were placed upon it through the institution of the Church. Therefore the State is independent from the Church in merely temporal matters.

Major: For the State is in possession of power.

Minor: a) In respect of the first part, from the nature of the State and from history.

b) In respect of the second part: 1) It is not proved indirectly, for this indirect limitation would not have a reason except on account of the end of the Church. But even now the end of the Church—the sanctification of souls—does not postulate these limits, since for this, it is not at all required that the Church be able to ordain merely civil affairs, e.g. to determine taxes to be required by the State, composing agrarian laws, etc.; no indeed, this would rather be harmful to the end of the Church, because it would excite innumerable offenses.

2) Nor is it proved directly from the positive will of Jesus Christ granting such power to the Church, for nowhere is such a will revealed.

3) The Church expressly acknowledges that power in merely civil affairs does not at all belong to her.[15]

The second part is proved: In moral and religious matters, the Church is independent from the State.

1076. 1. From the positive will of Christ.

The Church, as a society, must be believed to have that independence which Christ willed to confer upon it. But Christ conferred to the Church fully independent power in matters merely spiritual and religious. Therefore the Church has full independence in matters moral and spiritual.

Major: Since Christ, the founder of the Church, is God, He is able to confer to the Church the power which He freely wishes.

Minor: a) Jesus Christ communicated all regal power which He had to the Church represented in the Apostles: (John 18:37: I am a king; Matt 28:18: all power has been given to me in heaven and on earth; Matt 28:20: going therefore teach ye all nations). But now Christ is not a king without a kingdom, nor does he have a kingdom without supreme rights; but since His perduring kingdom is the Church, He granted to her the power which He Himself had, that is, supreme power, independent relative to the supernatural end committed to her.[16]

b) It had been understood thus from the beginning by the Apostles, who always conducted themselves as equipped with a supreme and independent power with regard to moral and spiritual matters, by preaching the Gospel even against supreme legislators and human kings, and administering the sacraments: which would not have been licit for them, if the Church were not independent of the State in spiritual affairs.[17]

1077. 2. From the necessity of the Church’s end.

Christ bestowed upon the Church an end, to be attained necessarily; all things therefore which might be necessary for this, He granted to her. But that the Church might be able to achieve her end, it is required that she have full independence from the State in matters moral and spiritual. Therefore the Church is independent from the State in matters moral and spiritual.

Major: Mark 16:16: He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be condemned.

Minor: The diversity of nations and the mutability of kingdoms being considered, since the Church is a spiritual kingdom, full independence is for her altogether necessary; otherwise, perpetual variations in her laws and in policy from States would be required, to the very great detriment of souls.

1078. 3. From the preeminence of the Church.

Christ could not have willed a higher power to depend upon another and inferior power. But the power of the Church is higher than the power of the State, as is clear from their origin and end. Therefore the Church does not depend upon the State in matters spiritual and moral.[18]

1079. Corollary. 1. Some applications of the independence of the Church. The Church is therefore independent in teaching; in administering the sacraments; in the ordering of divine worship; in drawing up laws and in communicating them with the faithful; in the election both of bishops and of parish priests; in the institution of clergy; in decreeing penalties, the effect of which ought to be recognized by the State; in founding and fostering religious orders, for the members of which there is the right that they might follow the evangelical counsels under the direction of the Church.

Similarly, she has the right of freely acquiring and administering material things, without which no human society is able to exist.

The State cannot in any way impede the communication of bishops or parish priests with their faithful, and a fortiori there is not required any placet regium or exequatur[19] of the civil government in order that ecclesiastical acts might have force; nor do many other similar things which modern States allot to themselves truly belong to them.

All civil laws also which are concerned with spiritual matters, if they are drawn up without the consent of the Church, and infringe upon her rights, are utterly invalid, since they lack the due competence.[20]

1080. 2. On the indirect power of the Church. It also is concluded, from the first and second part, that the Church has no direct power over the State, or vice versa, at least if the relation between the jurisdictions qua jurisdictions be considered.

A direct power of some society toward another is had when one society is subordinated to another by reason of its own end, that is, if the same end is also intended directly by another society, e.g. a province or district depends directly upon the State. An indirect power is had when one is subordinated to another by reason of an end intended by a superior power, or if both societies are referred to the same thing but under a different aspect; for order then demands that the superior right should prevail: thus the power of the head of the family is subordinated to the State. When there is had an indirect power of one society over another, then there is had an indirect independence of the inferior society from the superior society.

The third part is proved: In mixed matters, the supreme authority lies with the Church.

1081. As a corollary of the preceding thesis.

Between the powers of the Church and the State, there ought to be some relation. But no other proper relation is able to exist between them, except that the Church should have supreme authority in mixed matters. Therefore in mixed matters the supreme authority lies with the Church.

Major: From the preceding thesis.

Minor: Relations other than the aforementioned would not be proper:

1) In the first and second part of this thesis we excluded a direct power of the Church over matters merely temporal, and likewise of the State in matters moral and spiritual.

2) The supreme decision concerning a matter in which there is present something spiritual and something temporal is not able to lie indirectly with the State; for this would be a disorder, since it would subordinate a superior thing to an inferior. Therefore there remains no other option but that the supreme decision is with the spiritual power, because the temporal matter depends indirectly upon the spiritual, as is said in the second corollary of the preceding part.

1082. The doctrine of the Church concerning the relations between her and the State in mixed matters is admirably set forth by Leo XIII, Immortale Dei §§13-15.

1083. Scholion. On Concordats. Concerning concordats, we should note that a regime founded upon a concordat is not the ideal regime; for in these, the Church always cedes something without any compensation; for those things which seem to be compensations are already due to her from other quarters. Yet the Church accepts and promotes concordats, seeing that she very much desires concord and peaceful relations with civil society.[21]

1084. Objections. 1. The care of public prosperity was committed to the State by natural right. But care of public prosperity requires also care of religion. Therefore the care of religion pertains also to the State.

I respond. I distinguish the major: dependently or independently, I concede; in respect of religion, I subdistinguish: in the purely natural order, I concede; in the supernatural order, I deny. I concede the minor. I equally distinguish the consequence.

2. If this thesis is admitted, the rights of the State are diminished through the institution of the Church, and its condition is made worse, which is not able to be admitted. Therefore the State in no way depends upon the Church.

I respond. I distinguish the antecedent: in respect of things other than religion, I deny; in respect of religion, I subdistinguish: in respect of private religion, which was never subjected to the State, I deny; in respect of public religion, I subdistinguish: in respect of the power of ordering and defining it, I concede; in respect of the power of protecting and promoting it, I deny; this rather is amplified, because now it extends itself even to the protection of the rights of the Church.

The condition of the State simply speaking is not made worse, for the condition of the Christian State simply speaking is better; only per accidens is it made worse, that is, insofar as its power is diminished in the sense explained.

3. If the Church were independent from the State, then we would have a State within a State. But this state of affairs cannot be admitted. Therefore the Church is not independent from the State.

I respond. I distinguish the major: the Church is in the State, as a society of the same end and power, I deny; as a society of a higher order, I concede. Rather, the State is within the Church, for the latter is more universal. I contradistinguish the minor (cf. García, Credo Sanctam Catholicam, nos. 29-30).

4. The State has the right of impeding, lest it suffer some detriment from the Church. But if the decision in mixed matters were to pertain to the Church, the State would be able to suffer detriment at the hands of the Church. Therefore the supreme power in these matters is not with the Church.

I respond. I distinguish the major: with proportionate means, as e.g. monitions, information, postulations, etc., I concede; with disproportionate means, as by exercising jurisdiction in moral and spiritual matters without a concession of the Church, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor (cf. García, p. 37).

5. The Church is a spiritual society. But power over temporal things does not belong to a spiritual society. Therefore in mixed matters the supreme power lies with the State.

I respond. I distinguish the major: by reason of the end, I concede; by reason of persons and all means, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: if it were spiritual in every aspect, I concede; otherwise, I subdistinguish: a direct power over temporal things, I concede; indirect, I deny.

6. The Church does not have coercive power. But in order that some society be perfect and independent, it is required that it have coercive power. Therefore the Church is not a perfect society, independent from the State.

I respond. I distinguish the major: through spiritual means, I deny; through physical means, I subdistinguish: she does not have the right to exert physical coercion either per se or through recourse to the civil power, in order to demand help of it, I deny; often she does not have the actual power of compelling through physical force directly, if the civil authority should deny cooperation to her, I concede. But this is not required for the essence of the right. I contradistinguish the minor.

7. For a perfect and independent society, it is required that it have territory. But the Church does not have territory. Therefore it is not a perfect and independent society.

I respond. I distinguish the major: in which it might be able to exercise true jurisdiction, I concede; in which it might also have civil power, that is, over temporal matters, I subdistinguish: generally it is required for civil society, I concede; for any society whatever, I deny. But the Church also has this territory, even though it be very small. I contradistinguish the minor.

8. If these things were true, then the indirect power would need to be granted to the Church in nearly all temporal matters, since all things are able to be conjoined with spiritual things. But this is an entirely inadmissible doctrine. Therefore the indirect power in mixed matters does not belong to the Church.

I respond. a) If the arguments are true, the doctrine ought not to be rejected because of the fact that it must needs be extended to more things than many believe. b) There are many things which produce no conflict with the spiritual end of the Church; and to these the indirect power of the Church does not extend itself.

9. This doctrine is agreeable neither to our times nor to the dignity of the State, and it is impossible that it be brought back into practice. Therefore it ought to be rejected.

I respond. I distinguish the antecedent: it is not agreeable in our times to the erroneous ideas which many have about the power of the State, and about its dignity, I concede; it is not agreeable to objective truth and a proper estimation of the dignity of the State, I deny. It is not able to be brought into practice in its whole purity, on account of the exaggerated statism existing nearly everywhere, I pass over; it is not able to be brought into practice at least in a determinate way through concordats between the Church and the State, in which the Church most benevolently is accustomed to cede something from her right, for the good of peace and harmony, I deny.

10. The Church has claimed for herself a direct power even over merely temporal matters. For Boniface VIII, in the Bull Ausculta fili, says: for God has set Us over kings and kingdoms; and in the Bull Unam sanctam, he says: Furthermore, We declare, say, define, and pronounce that it is absolutely necessary for salvation that every human creature be subject to the Roman Pontiff.

I respond: in these testimonies, as is clear from context as well as history, Boniface VIII only asserted the indirect power of the Church over temporal matters, or by reason of the spiritual element with which they are joined, as is shown by the classic phrase ratione peccati, “by reason of sin” (cf. Chenon, op. cit., p. 153ff; Pilati, op. cit. pp. 329-354).

[1] Cf. Cathrein, Filos. morale vol. 2, pp. 593-604; Phil. Moralis n. 623ff.

[2] Cf. Leo XIII, Immortale Dei §6.

[3] We take this definition from ecclesiastical documents; cf. e.g. Leo XIII, Immortale Dei §§8-12. The theologians and canonists prove this brilliantly; cf. e.g. Salaverri, J., De Ecclesia Christi: Sacræ Theologiæ Summa (BAC Madrid 1950) vol. 1, tract. 3, p. 785ff.

[4] Cf. Cappello, Summa Iuris publici Eccles., p.270ff; Chenon, El papel social de la Iglesia, p. 171 n. 50; Bendiscioli, La política de la Santa Sede, p. 45ff.

[5] Cf. Leo XIII, Libertas præstantissimum §14-16, 29-31, 38-41.

[6] Cf. Chenon, El papel social de la Iglesia, p. 172.

[7] Cf. Pius XI, Divini illius magistri §§26-27; Mérida, Carta pastoral sobre la restauración Cristiana de le enseñanza (Astorga 1947) pp. 40-41.

[8] Cf. Rodríguez Sotillo, Comp. publi. eccles., p. 210

[9] Cf. the best source concerning this matter, Fidel García, Credo Sanctam Catholicam, n. 38; Benoist, Las leyes de la política, p. 205ff.

[10] Cf. Castañeda, El poder indirecto…: Archivo Teológico Granadino 5 (1942) 69ff.

[11] Cf. Chenon, El papel social de la Iglesia, p. 148.

[12] Cf. Syllabus errorum, props. 19, 20, 24.

[13] Cf. Syllabus errorum, props. 41-42, 54.

[14] Cf. Código social de Malinas no. 53-56; García, Credo Sanctam Catholicam, no. 33-35, 38; Pilati, G., Bonifacio VIII e il potere indiretto: Antonianum 8 (1933) 329-354; Castañeda, El poder indirecto, p. 67-68 (here he sets forth well what are the elements of the indirect power); Yaben, El poder indirecto de la Iglesia y sus aplicaciones actuals: Revista Eclesiástica 5 (1933) 131-153; 6 (1934) 257-273.

[15] Cf. Leo XIII, Immortale Dei §14; Diuturnum illud §26.

[16] Cf. Leo XIII, Immortale Dei §§10-12.

[17] Cf. García, Credo Sanctam Catholicam, pp. 20-21; Salaverri, De Ecclesia Christi nos. 937-971.

[18] Cf. Leo XIII, Immortale Dei §§10, 14.

[19] The regium placet, as the article concerning it in the Catholic Encyclopedia relates, is “a faculty which civil rulers impart to a Bull, papal brief, or other ecclesiastical enactment in order to give it binding force in their respective territories.” Cardinal Tarquini, in his celebrated Dissertatio de regio placet, writes with the mind of the Church when he characterizes it as an egregious usurpation of the Church’s rights and jurisdiction and an overturning of the order of things, setting the student as judge over the teacher and the son over the mother: “ne quid fari libere valeat, iudicem imponit filium matri, discipulum magistræ, interdicens perduellionis scelere populos ne huic magistræ ac matri morem gerant, nisi discipulus filiusque permiserit.” — Tr.

[20] Cf. García, Credo Sanctam Catholicam, p. 23 scholion, and p. 38 scholion.

[21] Cf. García, Credo Sanctam Catholicam, n. 38 with the note.