Continuing our series of original translations of texts on Catholic political philosophy, we here offer an excerpt from a treatise on ethics by Fr. Ireneo González Moral, S.J. It is taken from vol. 3 of the manual Philosophiæ Scholasticæ Summa (BAC 1952), by the Jesuit Professors of the Philosophical Faculties in Spain, pp. 788-800. This particular selection deals very briefly with some matters concerning civil authority, and then proceeds to a lengthy and systematic examination of the question of what kinds of relations can and should exist between the civil power and the Church.
ARTICLE VI
ON CIVIL AUTHORITY IN PARTICULAR
1052. Nexus. We have treated of the origin and the original subject of civil authority. Now we wish to examine in more detail its extension or objective comprehension, the diverse ways in which political power is able to be acquired through derivation, the diverse forms which it is able to put on, and finally its different functions.
§1. On the comprehension of civil authority as regards its object.
1053. 1. General principles for resolving the question.[1] In this part, we wish to see how far civil power is able to extend itself in different questions which occur in civil society, that is, in material or economic, in moral, in religious questions; it is necessary, therefore, to have at the outset some general and fundamental principles for giving the right solution in all things.
1. The civil power has all those rights, and only those, which may be necessary for the fitting achievement of its end; this is clear from the end of society.
2. The civil power is able to command nothing which may be contrary to certain divine will. For since every authority descends from God, He is not able to concede to the same the power of subverting the order established by Himself.
3. The civil power, in the distributing of goods and burdens which are common, is held to observe distributive justice; for the common good demands this.
4. The civil power ought to govern according to a legitimate mode of governing in each and every society; for in this way, the rights of the subjects, both natural and positive, will be preserved.
1054. In the aforementioned four principles, the civil authority has an infallible norm in the exercise of its own activity; subjects also will find in them the guardianship of their own liberty and independence, so far as they are able to correspond with social life.
Treating of the end of civil society, we have seen that things of this sort include the protection of the rights of the subjects and the positive promotion of public prosperity; hence, the civil authority ought to defend directly all the rights of the subjects, both the private rights of individuals, families, and particular associations; and the public rights or relations between the citizens and civil society, and between civil society and other societies, in the first place the Church. Pertaining directly also to the civil authority is the positive promotion of all goods which are required for public prosperity, as has been said.
Whatever might also be necessary for the securing of the things aforesaid pertains to the civil authority, as e.g. the election and institution of public officials, the exaction of taxes, the erection of tribunals, etc.; but these pertain to it in an indirect manner.
1055. 2. On public decency. From the things just now said, there can arise a difficulty. Since decency of morals confers most of all to the public good, will care for decency of morals also pertain directly to the public authority?
a) Private decency, which consists in the especially interior acts of each person, by which he may accommodate himself to the norm of natural or supernatural morality, does not at all pertain to the civil authority, since it is not able to judge of purely interior matters; furthermore, this private decency is not referred per se to the common good, which is to be achieved by common cooperation.
b) Public decency, which consists in such a conformation of society that not only removes incitements to vice, so far as is possible, but also positively promotes virtue and encourages all toward it, certainly pertains to the necessary conditions of the common prosperity, and the activity of the civil authority extends itself to it.
1056. What the care of public decency demands. 1) That it impede all those things which are able to obstruct the practice of virtue, e.g. public prostitution, obscene houses, books contrary to good morals; 2) that legislation be of such a kind, that it not only does not impede the practice of virtue, but even positively promotes it; 3) that it should commend public offices to those men who are able to be an example to others.
1057. 3. On the care of religion in the purely natural order. It is asked, whether care of religion would pertain to the civil authority, in the hypothetical case in which there did not exist some supernatural society—the Church—to whom the care of religion was committed.
It seems that it ought to be answered affirmatively. For society itself, as such, is held to render worship to God (because of benefits received, because of the necessity of religious worship for civil society itself, and finally, because of its necessity for the subjects);[2] but since in the purely natural order, there would not be another society, at least a public one, to which the care of religion would be given, it follows that care of religion would pertain to the civil authority, which would fulfill a duty of this sort in the name of society.
But if some private society were formed for this, this society necessarily would depend upon public authority, just as any other societies of the merely private order. But this power would be contained within limits far more restricted than is the supernatural power of the Church now.
§2. On the relations between civil society and the Church
A. ON THE NEGATIVE RELATION
Thesis 58. Separation of any sort between the Church and civil society is to be rejected.
Ottaviani, A., Institutiones iuris publici ecclesiastici, 2nd ed. vol. 2, p. 75ff; R. Sotillo, Comp. Iuris publ. eccl. 2nd ed. (Santander 1951); Cappello, F., Summa iuris publici Eccles. 3rd ed. p. 266ff; Bendiscioli, La Política de la Santa Sede, span. vers. 1943, pp. 35-50; Chenon, El papel social de la Iglesia p. 146ff; G. Martínez, F., Credo Sanctam Ecclesiam Catholicam pp. 1-45; Maritain, J., Primacía de lo espiritual, span. vers. by Mariano Argüello (Buenos Aires 1947); Castañeda, E., El poder indirecto en el Dr. Navarro: Archivo Teológico Granadino 6 (1942) 63-93; Cathrein, Filos. morale vol. 2, pp. 604-624; Donat, Ethica vol. 2, p. 238ff.
1058. Nexus. We have the fact of the existence of this society which is called the Church, which declares itself to be a society perfect and supernatural, and which manifestly proves its constitution and aforementioned properties with such arguments as cannot be denied even in the merely philosophic order. This being posited, it is for us to inquire what sort of relations ought to be between these two perfect societies existing at the same time and in the same place, that is, between civil society and the Church.
1059. Notions. 1. The CHURCH: is a society that is supernatural, visible, perfect and independent, instituted by Christ our Lord, and governed by His Vicar, the Supreme Pontiff, for the direct care of religion and for the eternal salvation of souls.[3]
a) Society: or some multitude of men stably united unto a common end under some authority. b) Supernatural: on account of its origin and most of all on account of its means and end. c) Visible: for the following are visible: the material element of the Church (men), the formal element, and the means. d) Perfect: because it has all the elements and power which are required for acquiring its end, independent. e) Independent: for in no way does it depend upon any other society. f) Instituted by Christ our Lord, Who both established the Church, and gave to it His divine mission. g) Governed by His Vicar, or monarchically constituted. h) Religious, for the direct care of religion was committed to it. i) Supernatural: for it provides for the eternal salvation of souls.
1060. 2. SEPARATION: by this is understood that state of public affairs in which civil society regards the Church as something merely private and disjoined from public life.
1061. WHAT THIS IMPLIES: 1) Negatively: in a regime of separation, the Church is not had as a corporation of public right; its jurisdiction is not recognized, nor are its ordinances defended by the civil authority, nor are privileges of worship conceded to its ministers, such as exemption from military service, or from taxes, nor are subsidies given to them; the ministry of the Church in public organs, e.g. in schools and the armed forces, is not admitted. 2) Positively: Liberty, according to the right common to all, is granted to the Church so that it might establish itself after the manner of some private society, which in all things is subject to the laws of private societies, with the rights and obligations annexed to the same.
Therefore, so long as it is not opposed to civil laws, the Church will be free in internal things, in worship, in doctrine, in rule; any of its goods and rights are defended by the civil authority.
But the civil authority arrogates to itself the right to govern by its own authority all things, even religious, insofar as they touch civil life, as e.g. schools, matrimony, funerals, and ownership.
N.B. Separation properly speaking is not present if only liberty of worship is had, or if equality is granted to all religions; for, this notwithstanding, the Church is able to enjoy the rights and privileges of public corporations, most of all with respect to the ordering of schools and the regulation of marriages according to the doctrine of the Church.
In reality there is not found a perfect separation, since contact between either society is not able to be avoided; thus, at most it is able to be more or less perfect; sometimes it is established in order to avoid a regime of persecution and hostility (amicable separation); but sometimes—which more often happens—it is instituted in order to plague and oppress the Church, and restrict her liberty in preaching, in the administration of goods, in founding schools (hostile separation).
1062. State of the question. We suppose the fact of the institution of the Church, and that she is a society that is perfect, visible, spiritual, universal, and completely free.
Between it and civil society, existing mingled together, diverse relations can be found[4]:
a) Friendship or perfect concord, that is, if they are closely and perfectly united, and mutually respect and sincerely help one another.
b) Enmity and persecution (hostile separation), that is, if civil society harries and persecutes the Church, even as a private association.
c) Separation (amicable separation) of liberty and indifference, that is, if civil society neither positively assists the Church, nor persecutes her, but rather prescinds from her, considering her not as a perfect society, but as one merely private, just as any other society, e.g. literary, industrial, etc.
It is inquired in the thesis: is this regime of separation something to be admitted?
1063. Opinions. 1. The first opinion holds to the hegemony of civil society, and attributes supreme power to the civil authority, subjecting the Church entirely to civil society. After Marsilius Patavinus (14th cent.), who professed this system, many regalists of every age henceforth have defended it, as well as many modern positivist jurists.
2. The liberals in particular defend perfect separation, who prefer the Church to be free in the churches and in some activities of private life, but not in all; yet in the whole of her external activity they wish her to be subject to the civil authority, which is able to intervene directly in ecclesiastical affairs. Nor do they suffer the Church, as they say, to mix herself up in political matters; thus do they abusively call any external activity of the Church.[5]
Certain authors in our own times, led by Maritain, seem to defend something similar.
3. Our opinion. We defend as certain that a regime of separation of this sort is not at all per se to be wished for; yet we do not deny that sometimes it is able to be tolerated or even chosen per accidens as a lesser evil, in order to avoid open persecution of the Church even as a private society. But when there may be given sufficient cause for permitting a regime of this sort, is for the Church herself to determine.
1064. It is proved. 1°. From the divine wisdom. Christ, establishing the Church, was not able to will a regime disordered and liable to commotions. But such would be a regime of any kind of separation between the Church and civil society. Therefore the regime of separation between the Church and civil society is per se to be rejected.
Major: It is evident given the infinite wisdom and sanctity of the founder of the Church.
Minor: Often there are two jurisdictions to be exercised over the same subjects, in the same territory, about the same matter, at the same time, e.g. about feast days, about impediments of matrimony…Hence, if civil society should not recognize the Church as a perfect society, nor admit the juridical personality of the same, and her supreme power concerning those things which are proper to her, necessarily there will be conflicts; for one society is able to declare e.g. some day to be festive, but the other that it is not; one might say that some matrimony is valid, but the other might say it is invalid, etc.
1065. 2°. From the obligation which society has of rendering worship to God.
Civil society, in the order in which we find ourselves, is obliged to render to God Catholic worship. But this implies a necessary relation between the Church and civil society. Therefore any kind of regime of separation between the Church and civil society cannot be admitted.
Major: For to God is owed the worship which He Himself wishes; but He expressly has manifested Himself to desire that all render to Him Catholic worship.
Minor: The care of Catholic worship of this sort has been committed expressly to the Church by God; therefore civil society is not able to arrogate to itself the regulation of this kind of worship. It pertains therefore to the Church to command that magistrates and public officials be present at religious ceremonies, and to establish those things which are connected with social worship.
1066. The doctrine of the Church concerning this matter. It is best declared: by Leo XIII, Immortale Dei §§6-8, 10-15, 18, 21-22, 34-35; Libertas præstantissimum §§14-22, where the doctrines of liberalism are exposed and refuted, and most of all at §§38-41; by Pius XI, Dilectissima nobis §6-7.
1067. Objections. 1. The end of civil society is the public prosperity to be obtained in this life; but the end of the Church is eternal felicity, which is to be obtained in another life. But each society is best able to achieve its own end, so that it ought not to have any relation with the other. Therefore separation between civil society and the Church ought not to be rejected.
I respond. I distinguish the major: such that it ought to be subordinated to the final end, that is, to perfect felicity in another life, I concede; otherwise, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor.
2. That the Church might be able to achieve her end, it suffices that she have liberty within her own sphere. But in a regime of separation between the Church and civil society, this liberty is conceded to the Church. Therefore the separation of the Church from the State is not to be rejected.
I respond. I distinguish the major: the liberty due to her, I concede; only tolerance and a portion of liberty, but not all which is due to her, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor.
3. A regime different from the regime of separation supposes that social authority knows the true religion. But generally this does not happen. Therefore at least then, the regime of separation is better.
I respond. I distinguish the major: the civil authority is able, if it wishes, to know it, I concede; otherwise, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor. For the true religion, by means of evident signs, reveals itself to any who should be willing to know it.
4. In a society in which different religions are professed by the citizens—as often happens—to recognize one, but not the others, as a perfect society, would beget hostility against the worshipers of that religion. But then this regime would harm the worshipers of the true religion. Therefore at least then, the regime of separation is to be preferred.
I respond. I distinguish the major: and this harm would spring forth from the malice of those men, I concede; from the nature of the regime itself, I deny. Thus, in practice the Church will consider what is more agreeable for avoiding greater evils. For at present we set forth the doctrine from is to be supported from the nature of civil society and the Church.
5. It seems that the regime of separation of civil society from the Church is to be preferred; for in this way other civil societies which do not recognize the Church, whether from fault or inculpably, in the same manner will be moved to tolerate the Catholic religion as a society merely private; otherwise, if this tolerance for other religions is not had in Catholic nations, tolerance for the Catholic religion will not be able to be urged in other nations.
I respond. I deny the assertion. The tolerance of error, such that truth also would be destroyed, of itself is to be rejected. For the truth alone has the right to rule in the intellects of men. The trouble which would follow from other quarters would arise, not from the nature of religion and from the reverence toward the true religion, but extrinsically and from the malice of men.
6. The practice of separation, e.g. in the United States of America, demonstrates that it is the best regime.[6]
I respond. I distinguish the assertion: Per accidens in some regions, I concede; per se, and as the ideal regime, I deny.
B. ON THE POSITIVE RELATION BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND CIVIL SOCIETY
Thesis 59. In matters merely civil, the State is independent of the Church (I); in matters moral and religious, the Church is independent of the State (II); but in mixed matters, unless a mutual concord be obtained through convention, the supreme authority is with the Church (III).
1068. Nexus. We see that the Church and civil society are not able to be separated; now we wish to see what sorts of relations ought in fact to exist between them.
1069. Notions. MATTERS MERELY CIVIL. Here are understood those things which, because of their end or destination, tend toward merely temporal prosperity, e.g. exaction of taxes, the ordering of public servants, custody of order, public health, national defense, ways of communication, postal and telephone services, etc.
1070. MATTERS MERELY MORAL AND RELIGIOUS. These refer to all those things which singly look to morals or to the salvation of souls: e.g. faith, administration of the sacraments, preaching of the Gospel, etc.
1071. MIXED MATTERS. These are those things which at once have a twofold aspect, namely, temporal and religious.
a) Mixed per se are those things which by their nature have this twofold aspect, e.g. matrimony between Christians, and education.[7]
b) Mixed per accidens are those things which of their nature are merely temporal things, but per accidens take on a religious aspect, e.g. ordering of the military, which of its nature is a merely temporal action; yet to ordain it such that soldiers are not able to be present at religious rites on feast days, endues it with a religious aspect; possession of some building is a merely temporal affair, but if this building is intended for worship, or for the residence of sacred persons, it participates in a religious aspect.[8]
1072. MUTUAL CONVENTION. By mutual convention there is understood the mode of proceeding pacifically in these matters, by previously determining what, in any affair, should pertain in practice to each society, mediated by some mutual pact which is accustomed to be called a concordat or manner of living. But in this pact, each member cedes a little from its right, so that a perfect and mutual concord might be able to be had, limiting well what should pertain to either society in these mixed matters; e.g. in the military service of clergy, in youth associations, in education, in matrimony, etc.
We must note that concordats are neither the only nor the more perfect solution.[9]
1073. State of the question. There are matters and questions which, of their nature, are merely temporal, nor do they bespeak in any way a relation to spiritual things; we treat of these in the first part, so that we might see whether in them the Church may make intervention. On the other hand there are others which especially present a spiritual aspect. We treat of these latter in the second part, that we might see whether civil society is able to intervene in some way in these things. There are, finally, other matters which, of their nature, pertain to both societies; we treat of these in the third part, so that we might see whose is the ultimate and definitive decision in a case of conflict, and how these might be able to be forestalled.
1074. Opinions. 1. The first is of those who are opposed to the preceding thesis.
2. Some mediævals[10], perhaps many, asserted that all power, both spiritual and temporal, has been given by God to the Church, such that princes would not rule peoples except by power received from the Roman Pontiff, and thus they would be directly subject to the jurisdiction of the Church. They therefore conceive of the State as a counterpart of the diocese.[11]
3. Radical liberals and regalists. These make the Church entirely dependent upon the State. For them, the Church is as it were an instrument of the State; this is also the doctrine of modern statolatrists of every sort.[12]
4. All moderate liberals concede to the State supremacy over the Church in mixed matters.[13]
5. Our opinion: a) in the first part we assert the full independence of the State in merely temporal affairs; b) but in the second part, the full independence of the Church in merely moral and religious affairs, i.e. in those which look especially to the sanctification of souls; c) but in the third part we state the supremacy of the Church in mixed matters, that is, we defend that which by many is called the indirect power of the Church in temporal matters, by reason of the spiritual element conjoined with the temporal.
Hence in this third part we assert the indirect subordination of the State in all things which, although of their nature temporal, are either united with spiritual things or are referred to them; and thus they are subordinate by reason of the end or destination.[14]
The first part is proved: In merely civil affairs the State is entirely independent
1075. For this reason, that the Church does not think herself to have any power in these matters.
The State enjoys that independence which it had before the institution of the Church, unless it be proved that the limits to this independence were placed through the institution of the Church. But before the institution of the Church, the State had full independence in merely temporal affairs, nor can it be proved that limits were placed upon it through the institution of the Church. Therefore the State is independent from the Church in merely temporal matters.
Major: For the State is in possession of power.
Minor: a) In respect of the first part, from the nature of the State and from history.
b) In respect of the second part: 1) It is not proved indirectly, for this indirect limitation would not have a reason except on account of the end of the Church. But even now the end of the Church—the sanctification of souls—does not postulate these limits, since for this, it is not at all required that the Church be able to ordain merely civil affairs, e.g. to determine taxes to be required by the State, composing agrarian laws, etc.; no indeed, this would rather be harmful to the end of the Church, because it would excite innumerable offenses.
2) Nor is it proved directly from the positive will of Jesus Christ granting such power to the Church, for nowhere is such a will revealed.
3) The Church expressly acknowledges that power in merely civil affairs does not at all belong to her.[15]
The second part is proved: In moral and religious matters, the Church is independent from the State.
1076. 1. From the positive will of Christ.
The Church, as a society, must be believed to have that independence which Christ willed to confer upon it. But Christ conferred to the Church fully independent power in matters merely spiritual and religious. Therefore the Church has full independence in matters moral and spiritual.
Major: Since Christ, the founder of the Church, is God, He is able to confer to the Church the power which He freely wishes.
Minor: a) Jesus Christ communicated all regal power which He had to the Church represented in the Apostles: (John 18:37: I am a king; Matt 28:18: all power has been given to me in heaven and on earth; Matt 28:20: going therefore teach ye all nations). But now Christ is not a king without a kingdom, nor does he have a kingdom without supreme rights; but since His perduring kingdom is the Church, He granted to her the power which He Himself had, that is, supreme power, independent relative to the supernatural end committed to her.[16]
b) It had been understood thus from the beginning by the Apostles, who always conducted themselves as equipped with a supreme and independent power with regard to moral and spiritual matters, by preaching the Gospel even against supreme legislators and human kings, and administering the sacraments: which would not have been licit for them, if the Church were not independent of the State in spiritual affairs.[17]
1077. 2. From the necessity of the Church’s end.
Christ bestowed upon the Church an end, to be attained necessarily; all things therefore which might be necessary for this, He granted to her. But that the Church might be able to achieve her end, it is required that she have full independence from the State in matters moral and spiritual. Therefore the Church is independent from the State in matters moral and spiritual.
Major: Mark 16:16: He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be condemned.
Minor: The diversity of nations and the mutability of kingdoms being considered, since the Church is a spiritual kingdom, full independence is for her altogether necessary; otherwise, perpetual variations in her laws and in policy from States would be required, to the very great detriment of souls.
1078. 3. From the preeminence of the Church.
Christ could not have willed a higher power to depend upon another and inferior power. But the power of the Church is higher than the power of the State, as is clear from their origin and end. Therefore the Church does not depend upon the State in matters spiritual and moral.[18]
1079. Corollary. 1. Some applications of the independence of the Church. The Church is therefore independent in teaching; in administering the sacraments; in the ordering of divine worship; in drawing up laws and in communicating them with the faithful; in the election both of bishops and of parish priests; in the institution of clergy; in decreeing penalties, the effect of which ought to be recognized by the State; in founding and fostering religious orders, for the members of which there is the right that they might follow the evangelical counsels under the direction of the Church.
Similarly, she has the right of freely acquiring and administering material things, without which no human society is able to exist.
The State cannot in any way impede the communication of bishops or parish priests with their faithful, and a fortiori there is not required any placet regium or exequatur[19] of the civil government in order that ecclesiastical acts might have force; nor do many other similar things which modern States allot to themselves truly belong to them.
All civil laws also which are concerned with spiritual matters, if they are drawn up without the consent of the Church, and infringe upon her rights, are utterly invalid, since they lack the due competence.[20]
1080. 2. On the indirect power of the Church. It also is concluded, from the first and second part, that the Church has no direct power over the State, or vice versa, at least if the relation between the jurisdictions qua jurisdictions be considered.
A direct power of some society toward another is had when one society is subordinated to another by reason of its own end, that is, if the same end is also intended directly by another society, e.g. a province or district depends directly upon the State. An indirect power is had when one is subordinated to another by reason of an end intended by a superior power, or if both societies are referred to the same thing but under a different aspect; for order then demands that the superior right should prevail: thus the power of the head of the family is subordinated to the State. When there is had an indirect power of one society over another, then there is had an indirect independence of the inferior society from the superior society.
The third part is proved: In mixed matters, the supreme authority lies with the Church.
1081. As a corollary of the preceding thesis.
Between the powers of the Church and the State, there ought to be some relation. But no other proper relation is able to exist between them, except that the Church should have supreme authority in mixed matters. Therefore in mixed matters the supreme authority lies with the Church.
Major: From the preceding thesis.
Minor: Relations other than the aforementioned would not be proper:
1) In the first and second part of this thesis we excluded a direct power of the Church over matters merely temporal, and likewise of the State in matters moral and spiritual.
2) The supreme decision concerning a matter in which there is present something spiritual and something temporal is not able to lie indirectly with the State; for this would be a disorder, since it would subordinate a superior thing to an inferior. Therefore there remains no other option but that the supreme decision is with the spiritual power, because the temporal matter depends indirectly upon the spiritual, as is said in the second corollary of the preceding part.
1082. The doctrine of the Church concerning the relations between her and the State in mixed matters is admirably set forth by Leo XIII, Immortale Dei §§13-15.
1083. Scholion. On Concordats. Concerning concordats, we should note that a regime founded upon a concordat is not the ideal regime; for in these, the Church always cedes something without any compensation; for those things which seem to be compensations are already due to her from other quarters. Yet the Church accepts and promotes concordats, seeing that she very much desires concord and peaceful relations with civil society.[21]
1084. Objections. 1. The care of public prosperity was committed to the State by natural right. But care of public prosperity requires also care of religion. Therefore the care of religion pertains also to the State.
I respond. I distinguish the major: dependently or independently, I concede; in respect of religion, I subdistinguish: in the purely natural order, I concede; in the supernatural order, I deny. I concede the minor. I equally distinguish the consequence.
2. If this thesis is admitted, the rights of the State are diminished through the institution of the Church, and its condition is made worse, which is not able to be admitted. Therefore the State in no way depends upon the Church.
I respond. I distinguish the antecedent: in respect of things other than religion, I deny; in respect of religion, I subdistinguish: in respect of private religion, which was never subjected to the State, I deny; in respect of public religion, I subdistinguish: in respect of the power of ordering and defining it, I concede; in respect of the power of protecting and promoting it, I deny; this rather is amplified, because now it extends itself even to the protection of the rights of the Church.
The condition of the State simply speaking is not made worse, for the condition of the Christian State simply speaking is better; only per accidens is it made worse, that is, insofar as its power is diminished in the sense explained.
3. If the Church were independent from the State, then we would have a State within a State. But this state of affairs cannot be admitted. Therefore the Church is not independent from the State.
I respond. I distinguish the major: the Church is in the State, as a society of the same end and power, I deny; as a society of a higher order, I concede. Rather, the State is within the Church, for the latter is more universal. I contradistinguish the minor (cf. García, Credo Sanctam Catholicam, nos. 29-30).
4. The State has the right of impeding, lest it suffer some detriment from the Church. But if the decision in mixed matters were to pertain to the Church, the State would be able to suffer detriment at the hands of the Church. Therefore the supreme power in these matters is not with the Church.
I respond. I distinguish the major: with proportionate means, as e.g. monitions, information, postulations, etc., I concede; with disproportionate means, as by exercising jurisdiction in moral and spiritual matters without a concession of the Church, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor (cf. García, p. 37).
5. The Church is a spiritual society. But power over temporal things does not belong to a spiritual society. Therefore in mixed matters the supreme power lies with the State.
I respond. I distinguish the major: by reason of the end, I concede; by reason of persons and all means, I deny. I contradistinguish the minor: if it were spiritual in every aspect, I concede; otherwise, I subdistinguish: a direct power over temporal things, I concede; indirect, I deny.
6. The Church does not have coercive power. But in order that some society be perfect and independent, it is required that it have coercive power. Therefore the Church is not a perfect society, independent from the State.
I respond. I distinguish the major: through spiritual means, I deny; through physical means, I subdistinguish: she does not have the right to exert physical coercion either per se or through recourse to the civil power, in order to demand help of it, I deny; often she does not have the actual power of compelling through physical force directly, if the civil authority should deny cooperation to her, I concede. But this is not required for the essence of the right. I contradistinguish the minor.
7. For a perfect and independent society, it is required that it have territory. But the Church does not have territory. Therefore it is not a perfect and independent society.
I respond. I distinguish the major: in which it might be able to exercise true jurisdiction, I concede; in which it might also have civil power, that is, over temporal matters, I subdistinguish: generally it is required for civil society, I concede; for any society whatever, I deny. But the Church also has this territory, even though it be very small. I contradistinguish the minor.
8. If these things were true, then the indirect power would need to be granted to the Church in nearly all temporal matters, since all things are able to be conjoined with spiritual things. But this is an entirely inadmissible doctrine. Therefore the indirect power in mixed matters does not belong to the Church.
I respond. a) If the arguments are true, the doctrine ought not to be rejected because of the fact that it must needs be extended to more things than many believe. b) There are many things which produce no conflict with the spiritual end of the Church; and to these the indirect power of the Church does not extend itself.
9. This doctrine is agreeable neither to our times nor to the dignity of the State, and it is impossible that it be brought back into practice. Therefore it ought to be rejected.
I respond. I distinguish the antecedent: it is not agreeable in our times to the erroneous ideas which many have about the power of the State, and about its dignity, I concede; it is not agreeable to objective truth and a proper estimation of the dignity of the State, I deny. It is not able to be brought into practice in its whole purity, on account of the exaggerated statism existing nearly everywhere, I pass over; it is not able to be brought into practice at least in a determinate way through concordats between the Church and the State, in which the Church most benevolently is accustomed to cede something from her right, for the good of peace and harmony, I deny.
10. The Church has claimed for herself a direct power even over merely temporal matters. For Boniface VIII, in the Bull Ausculta fili, says: for God has set Us over kings and kingdoms; and in the Bull Unam sanctam, he says: Furthermore, We declare, say, define, and pronounce that it is absolutely necessary for salvation that every human creature be subject to the Roman Pontiff.
I respond: in these testimonies, as is clear from context as well as history, Boniface VIII only asserted the indirect power of the Church over temporal matters, or by reason of the spiritual element with which they are joined, as is shown by the classic phrase ratione peccati, “by reason of sin” (cf. Chenon, op. cit., p. 153ff; Pilati, op. cit. pp. 329-354).
[1] Cf. Cathrein, Filos. morale vol. 2, pp. 593-604; Phil. Moralis n. 623ff.
[2] Cf. Leo XIII, Immortale Dei §6.
[3] We take this definition from ecclesiastical documents; cf. e.g. Leo XIII, Immortale Dei §§8-12. The theologians and canonists prove this brilliantly; cf. e.g. Salaverri, J., De Ecclesia Christi: Sacræ Theologiæ Summa (BAC Madrid 1950) vol. 1, tract. 3, p. 785ff.
[4] Cf. Cappello, Summa Iuris publici Eccles., p.270ff; Chenon, El papel social de la Iglesia, p. 171 n. 50; Bendiscioli, La política de la Santa Sede, p. 45ff.
[5] Cf. Leo XIII, Libertas præstantissimum §14-16, 29-31, 38-41.
[6] Cf. Chenon, El papel social de la Iglesia, p. 172.
[7] Cf. Pius XI, Divini illius magistri §§26-27; Mérida, Carta pastoral sobre la restauración Cristiana de le enseñanza (Astorga 1947) pp. 40-41.
[8] Cf. Rodríguez Sotillo, Comp. publi. eccles., p. 210
[9] Cf. the best source concerning this matter, Fidel García, Credo Sanctam Catholicam, n. 38; Benoist, Las leyes de la política, p. 205ff.
[10] Cf. Castañeda, El poder indirecto…: Archivo Teológico Granadino 5 (1942) 69ff.
[11] Cf. Chenon, El papel social de la Iglesia, p. 148.
[12] Cf. Syllabus errorum, props. 19, 20, 24.
[13] Cf. Syllabus errorum, props. 41-42, 54.
[14] Cf. Código social de Malinas no. 53-56; García, Credo Sanctam Catholicam, no. 33-35, 38; Pilati, G., Bonifacio VIII e il potere indiretto: Antonianum 8 (1933) 329-354; Castañeda, El poder indirecto, p. 67-68 (here he sets forth well what are the elements of the indirect power); Yaben, El poder indirecto de la Iglesia y sus aplicaciones actuals: Revista Eclesiástica 5 (1933) 131-153; 6 (1934) 257-273.
[15] Cf. Leo XIII, Immortale Dei §14; Diuturnum illud §26.
[16] Cf. Leo XIII, Immortale Dei §§10-12.
[17] Cf. García, Credo Sanctam Catholicam, pp. 20-21; Salaverri, De Ecclesia Christi nos. 937-971.
[18] Cf. Leo XIII, Immortale Dei §§10, 14.
[19] The regium placet, as the article concerning it in the Catholic Encyclopedia relates, is “a faculty which civil rulers impart to a Bull, papal brief, or other ecclesiastical enactment in order to give it binding force in their respective territories.” Cardinal Tarquini, in his celebrated Dissertatio de regio placet, writes with the mind of the Church when he characterizes it as an egregious usurpation of the Church’s rights and jurisdiction and an overturning of the order of things, setting the student as judge over the teacher and the son over the mother: “ne quid fari libere valeat, iudicem imponit filium matri, discipulum magistræ, interdicens perduellionis scelere populos ne huic magistræ ac matri morem gerant, nisi discipulus filiusque permiserit.” — Tr.
[20] Cf. García, Credo Sanctam Catholicam, p. 23 scholion, and p. 38 scholion.
[21] Cf. García, Credo Sanctam Catholicam, n. 38 with the note.
]]>Today we continue our series of original translations of important texts relating to Catholic political philosophy. Tommaso Maria Cardinal Zigliara was a prominent Thomist philosopher and theologian in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Among many other accomplishments, he was closely involved with the preparation of the Leonine edition of the Angelic Doctor’s Opera Omnia (the first volume of which contains his synopses and annotations on St. Thomas’ Organon commentaries), and assisted in preparing the encyclicals Aeterni Patris and Rerum novarum.
The chapter translated here is taken from book two of the third part of Zigliara’s widely circulated Summa philosophica (14th ed., 1910). Having treated of domestic, civil, and religious society in their principles and particulars in the preceding books and chapters of this part, he now sets himself the task of treating in brief the relations which should obtain between those two perfect societies, the Church and the State. The original text can be found here.
This is the last of the five articles of the chapter, treating of the subordination of the State to the Church.
FIFTH ARTICLE
On the subordination of the State to the Church
I. Nature of the question. A religious society, of which sort is the Catholic Church, lives in the company of civil society, such that the spiritual power of the Roman Pontiff is as it were in contact with the civil power, and they who are civilly subjects of the temporal authority are at once subjects of Ecclesiastical authority. It is commonly conceded that the civil authority, within the limits of its ends, is independent of the Church, in that manner in which we say the Church, with respect to its end, to be independent of any civil authority. But it is wholly impossible that two societies should exist at once with equal independence, that is, without mutual subordination to one another; consequently, it is necessary that either the Church be subordinate to the civil State, or the civil State to the Church. Behold the question, concerning which we have said many things in Articles 61 and 63, and whose solution we give in this final article, so that there might more clearly be seen the notion of ethnarchy which belongs to the Catholic Church. Let the conclusion therefore be stated:
II. In no wise is the Catholic Church subordinate to the civil State, but the civil State of its nature is subordinate to the Catholic Church. This proposition is easily proved, if there are recalled to mind the principles which we made known in the preceding Chapter. For the notion or nature of the subordination of societies ought to be taken absolutely from the end: for, seeing that the nature of the society arises from the end to which it is ordered, where the ends of two societies are subordinated, the societies equally ought to be subordinated; and a society whose end is subordinate to the end of a higher society, is also subordinated to that other. These are the principles, without which there consists nothing anymore firm in determining the nature of society. But the end of civil society and the end of religious society are ordered to one another, and the end of civil society is subordinated to the end of the Catholic Church, and not vice versa. Therefore in no wise is the Catholic Church subordinate to the civil state, but the civil state of its nature is subordinate to the Catholic Church. The minor is proved.
The end of civil society and the end of religious society are ordered to one another. For man is composed from soul and body, and, as man, is a part of society. But civil society properly looks to the exterior perfection of man, because it is not able to penetrate into the interior things of conscience, and what is more, because it considers man living in this life, it has care chiefly for his temporal perfection; whereas the Catholic Church, as a spiritual society, is ordered rather to the perfection of the soul and directs men to eternal felicity. But although these things are true, yet it is true that man neither is able nor ought to be divided, but just as the soul is for the perfection of the body and the body is for the perfection of the soul, so equally corporeal perfection—to which the civil State directly attends—and spiritual perfection—which the Church of Christ bountifully imparts—both ought to provide for the whole man. Therefore the ends of both societies, although distinct amongst themselves, yet agree in one common end, which is the man to be perfected; and consequently, these ends are ordered to one another.
The end of civil society is subordinated to the end of the Catholic Church, and not vice versa. Indeed, nothing forbids that man, as a composite of soul and body, not procure for himself, in an upright manner, all those things which coincide for living this life comfortably. Nevertheless, it is irrational and repulsive to submit the soul to the body in such a manner that it is the body’s slave, and esteems less his intellectual perfection, so that in his body he leads a life according to the fashion of brute animals; but the body ought to be subservient to the soul. — It savors of dementia, moreover, to think that man should be solicitous of temporal felicity—which felicity he must lose, though he will it or not—and not think of attaining eternal happiness: For what doth it profit a man, if he gain the whole world, and suffer the loss of his own soul? Or what exchange shall a man give for his soul? (Matt. XVI, 26). For we have not here a lasting city, but we seek one that is to come (Hebr. XIII, 14). Therefore, whatever man seeks in this life, whatever he searches out for himself in civil society and from civil society, he either seeks perversely, or ought to order to the spiritual and eternal perfection of the soul. Because, therefore, the end of the Church is the interior and eternal perfection of man, but the end of civil society is his external and temporal perfection, the end of the Church is not subordinated to that of civil society, but rather the latter to the former.
III. The Catholic Church is an ethnarchic society. Before I prove that the Catholic Church truly is an ethnarchic society, and consequently that there is in it a true ethnarchy, I think it worthwhile to take a moment and put forward the doctrine of St. Thomas concerning Christ, insofar as He is the Head of all men: «There is this difference between the natural head of man and the mystical body of the Church, that the members of the natural body are all together; but the members of the mystical body are not all together: not with respect to the esse of nature, because the body of the Church is constituted from men, who have existed from the beginning of the world even to its end; neither according to the esse of grace, for, of those even who are in one time, some lack grace, to be had later, while others already possess it. Thus therefore, the members of the mystical body are taken, not only according as they are in act, but also according as they are in potency. Yet there are some in potency who are never reduced to act; whereas there are some who are reduced to act at some time or other. And this occurs according to a threefold grade: the first of which is through faith; the second through charity of the way; the third through the fruition of the patria. Thus, therefore, it should be said, that taking it generally according to the whole of the world’s time, Christ is the head of all men, but according to diverse grades. For firstly and chiefly is He head of those who are united to Him in act through glory; secondly, of those are united in act to Him through charity; thirdly, of those who are united in act to Him through faith; fourthly, of those who are only united to Him in potency not yet reduced to act, which yet is to be reduced to act according to divine predestination; fifthly, of those who are united to Him in potency, which potency is never reduced to act: as men living in this world, who are not predestined, who yet, receding from this age, entirely cease to be members of Christ, because they are no longer in potency, as to be united to Christ» (IIIa, q. 8, a. 3).
From these principles, our thesis is easily proved. Indeed the Catholic Church encompasses all nations, whether in act or in potency, as we have heard from St. Thomas; furthermore, it is of its nature a doctrinal society, and possesses an infallible magisterium in the matters which look to dogmas and morals; it is a society whose invisible head is Christ Himself, at once God and man; whose visible head is the Supreme Roman Pontiff, exalted with supernatural dignity, subject to no man, having civil powers subordinate to him, and directed, by the special assistance of the Holy Ghost, to the salvation of nations. In the Church, therefore, you have universality, you have doctrinal magisterium, you have dignity and supereminence: all the things, namely, which are required for an ethnarchy, that is, for valid authority over all peoples or nations. — This wisest kind of politics prevailed, to the good of peoples, in the Middle Ages, that is, when truly Christian peoples and kings received and venerated, in the Roman Pontiff, the Vicar of Christ—whose name, as Isaiah says, is Wonderful, Counsellor, God the Mighty, the Father of the world to come, the Prince of Peace.[1]
[1] Isaiah 9:6
]]>Today we continue our series of original translations of important texts relating to Catholic political philosophy. Tommaso Maria Cardinal Zigliara was a prominent Thomist philosopher and theologian in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Among many other accomplishments, he was closely involved with the preparation of the Leonine edition of the Angelic Doctor’s Opera Omnia (the first volume of which contains his synopses and annotations on St. Thomas’ Organon commentaries), and assisted in preparing the encyclicals Aeterni Patris and Rerum novarum.
The chapter translated here is taken from book two of the third part of Zigliara’s widely circulated Summa philosophica (14th ed., 1910). Having treated of domestic, civil, and religious society in their principles and particulars in the preceding books and chapters of this part, he now sets himself the task of treating in brief the relations which should obtain between those two perfect societies, the Church and the State. The original text can be found here.
This is the fourth of the five articles of the chapter, treating of liberty of teaching. The final article, on the subordination of the State to the Church, will be posted in the course of the next few days.
FOURTH ARTICLE
On liberty of teaching¹
I. Question. Simultaneously one with liberty of conscience and of cult, there is proclaimed by the more recent liberalism a liberty of teaching, particularly with respect to the means with which it is principally exercised, namely, with respect to liberty of the press (la libertá della stampa). We ask, therefore, whether this liberty is upright, and to be approved by the civil authority. Here again I caution that the discussion is concerned, not with tolerance, but with approbation: evils indeed are able to be tolerated, yet naught but goods ought to be approved.
II. First preliminary note. It has been said more than once by us, that man is born for society, and cannot have the helps for perfecting himself except in society and from society. But the perfection of man chiefly is found in the intellective part of him, to which it is proper to know and to love: to know the truth, and to love the good. Thence it is, that to impede man from the acquiring of truth and the virtues, is in a certain way to kill him intellectually.
III. Second preliminary note. However, there is a certain doctrine which does not instruct minds but perverts them, insinuating error under the guise of truth. On account of which, seeing that man by his nature is drawn to the truth and has the right of seeking it and the duty of shunning error, he has the right that others not induce him into error under the guise of truth. Therefore just as the liberty of truth is honorable, so the liberty of error is the death of the soul, as St. Augustine days, and does not merit the name of liberty, but of license.
IV. Point of the question. Therefore the entire question concerning the liberty of teaching does not touch upon the true liberty of teaching the truth, but the liberty of teaching as it encompasses the instruction both of truth and of error. Is this liberty able to be permitted by the civil authority? To this question, defined in this fashion, I respond with the following conclusion:
V. Liberty of teaching, whether spoken or written, is intrinsically absurd and disgraceful. For it is intrinsically absurd and shameful to concede the same rights to truth and to error; it is intrinsically absurd and shameful that the civil authority should not preserve voluntarily the citizens from the corruption of mind and heart; it is intrinsically absurd and shameful that the civil authority should permit that which it is itself compelled to condemn and punish. But liberty of teaching is of this sort. Therefore it is intrinsically absurd and shameful. — The minor is proved.
Liberty of teaching concedes the same rights to truth and to error. This is included in the very nature of liberty of teaching, as it is understood by liberalism. For it includes in its scope the right of striking down things pertaining so much to the world, as to God, and to religion, morals, individual life, and social life. Now it is not necessary to prove, that men may err in the gravest of matters, which matters natural reason itself commands to be altogether defended and most firmly held. The faculty of teaching therefore having been granted, the same right is conceded to error which is conceded to the truth, that it might propagate itself, to the detriment of truth: no indeed, error would enjoy a greater right than truth. For the truth cannot but employ those means which are honest and worthy, while on the contrary error holds all means as licit. No one of sound mind does not see how absurd and disgraceful are all of these things: for the right is truth; therefore just as error is the lack of truth, so is it the lack of right.
Liberty of teaching works to the corruption of the mind and heart. I assume two things for demonstrating this: 1° that men, from the corruption of nature, are wont to accept theories which favor their passions; 2° that the greater part of mankind is per se incapable of freeing itself from the pursuit of knowledge, and of extricating itself from false reasoning and the sophisms of error. He who would deny these two things, would deny a fact which is at once constant and manifest to all. But: 1° from the liberty of teaching there arises the liberty of error, as has been said above, through which the passions are favored and excited against the intellective part—and, the intellective part erring, it cannot happen that the whole man be not corrupted; 2° on account of the liberty of teaching, men are exposed daily to the danger of erring in those things which they are held to know and about which they are held to think truly—such as the matters which have to do with God, the human soul, morals, and religion—when through false teachers, truths of this sort are assailed with impudent license, and which the greater part of humanity is not able to defend from sophisms. Wherefore, a proclivity toward evil being supposed on one hand, and an impotence for reasoning scientifically on the other, it cannot happen that the liberty, or more truly the license, of teaching does not entirely and efficaciously work to the corruption of the minds and hearts of the citizens. — But it is the right of the citizens that the civil authority defend them from so great a calamity, nor is this authority able to abandon this duty without thereby committing a crime. How much more shameful and absurd it is, then, that the civil authority should proclaim this deformity in its laws, which through an intolerable abuse of words is called the liberty of teaching?
Liberty of teaching is simultaneously approved and punished by the civil authority. On the one hand, liberty of teaching is established, and on the other, they are punished who abuse the press in order to circulate things which in fact are, or are judged to be, opposed to the civil authority. But, either the liberty of teaching in word or writing is to be proclaimed in its whole extension; or on the contrary, it is to be confined within limits lest it lead to evil. But if it ought to be admitted in its full extension, why therefore are they who use and abuse it punished? If it ought to be constrained within certain limits, lest it devolve into license, then: firstly, it is able to be limited so that it does not work evil (la revisione preventiva), just as it is punished after evil has been perpetrated; no indeed, it would be more prudent to obstruct it, for most often the evil is irreparable; secondly, these limits are to be defined only according to truth and integrity; wherefore, just as liberty of teaching is condemned and punished by the civil authority when it inclines to the detriment of the same authority, so a fortiori it is to be condemned and punished whenever the same liberty sallies forth against God, religion, morals, and the true liberty of citizens: because the civil authority is not superior to God, religion, morals, and truth, nor is it more serious to disparage the Rulers of cities and kingdoms, than to disparage God and religion and truth, without which no authority commands and no society consists.
VI. Note. Difficulties are resolved. First objection. There is in man an innate desire of communicating to other men the discoveries of his own talent. But this natural desire is not satisfied, except by means of liberty of teaching. Therefore liberty of teaching corresponds to natural human desire.
I respond. I distinguish the major: there is in man an innate desire of communicating the discoveries of his own talent within the limits of truth, I concede; outside the limits of truth, I deny. — I distinguish also the minor: this natural desire is not satisfied except by means of liberty of teaching rightly understood, that is, through true liberty which is not contrary to truth, I concede; it is not satisfied except through liberty badly understood, that is, through license which is contrary to truth, I deny. — Nature does not give an inclination to error, just as it does not give inclination to evil; wherefore, just as the inclination to evil, which is from the corruption of nature, ought to be checked, so also the perverse inclination to error. — But the liberty of error is not true liberty, but the abuse of liberty, and is license, to be detested and curbed.
Second objection. By reason of liberty of teaching, whether in word or writing, opinions are considered and the truth is more and more made clear. But that which is of this sort not only contains nothing of evil, but indeed confers to itself the greatest good. Therefore liberty of teaching ought very much to be supported.
I respond. In the first place, the adversary concludes, from the fact that there may be some good had from liberty of teaching, to the goodness of this liberty; which conclusion we have proved is not able to be had from this aforementioned good alone, in no. IV of the preceding article. I respond secondly, by distinguishing the minor: Something of this sort contains nothing evil if, through liberty of teaching, only opinions are considered, and errors are not defended, I concede; if error is defended against truth, I deny. — It has been said that error lacks right, and indeed is the lack of right. Where the liberty of teaching is conceded to error, therefore, there is no right, but manifest injustice against truth, which in this case is not elucidated, but is denied.
Third objection. Liberty of teaching having been denied, the State is constituted as the judge of teaching, and additionally, there is conceded to it a monopoly on teaching. But the State is not the judge of teaching, and is not able to arrogate to itself the monopoly on teaching without the greatest tyranny. Therefore liberty of teaching is entirely to be permitted.
I respond. I deny the major, I concede the minor, and I deny the consequence, liberty having been accepted as it is at once a right of truth and error, as it is taken by the adversaries. — I concede that there belongs to the civil State no authority concerning teachings: but it is not necessary that one be endowed with this governance of teaching, or magisterium, in order to discern those things which are manifestly evil, so much in themselves as in relation to civil society, so that the former might be able to be inculcated and the latter prohibited; just as, if one were to defend an innocent from a manifest unjust aggressor, he would not thereby be constituted judge between the two; but the innocent has a manifest right, and in order to defend him from an unjust attacker in the act of aggression, one is able to seek out the help of another. But in the order of teaching, there are certain vices, that is, manifest errors, which indeed the State is able and ought to know and punish, just as other vices, without seizing for itself the teaching magisterium. — But in fact there exists, above the State, a teaching magisterium in the Catholic Church and in the Supreme Pontiff. Therefore the errors which the Catholic Church condemns, the State also ought to condemn, and it ought to accept the teaching magisterium of the Church.
Fourth objection. The right of the citizens, for whom it is easy to reject erroneous doctrines, is not harmed by liberty of teaching. But that which harms the rights of no one, ought to be permitted. Therefore liberty of teaching ought to be permitted.
I respond. I deny the major. For proof of this, I respond in the first place that, even granting that each and every person were able to detect the insidious devices of sophists or those who err, a right to this aggression would not thereby be something to be admitted; just as there ought not to be admitted a right in an unjust aggressor, even if there were the means for repelling his violence in the innocent, whose power to repel injury does not diminish the injustice of the aggressor. — I respond secondly, that it is false that it is easy for all to avoid the tricks of sophists, particularly when the sophisms favor the passions: in fact, we see that men—I speak not only of coarse folk, but of clever men as well—are every day entangled in false doctrines.
Fifth objection. The Church herself desires liberty of teaching, and demands that it be conceded to her from the State by right. Therefore liberty of teaching, which is good in the religious order, is not able not to be good in the civil order.
I respond. I distinguish the antecedent: The Church desires true liberty of teaching, I concede; she desires false liberty of teaching, about which our whole question is concerned, I deny. The Church has never opposed herself to the liberty of truth, but rightly opposes herself to the liberty, or more correctly the license, of error. But justly does she claim absolutely for herself the liberty of teaching, because she is the mistress of truth, whatever be the desire or aversion of her adversaries.
But concerning the liberty of teaching taken in the sense of the adversaries, the Church desires it in the same manner in which she desires the liberty of cult: namely, insofar as it is most unjust that the magisterium of the Church, which is the instrument of truth, is excluded from that liberty which is conceded to error through civil laws. Concerning this matter, let us hear our most holy lord Pope Pius IX, in his Letter of 19 July 1875 to Felice Dupanloup, bishop of Órleans, about the liberty of teaching which the Catholics in France had sought and received in the year 1875 from the French government:
«Although it is to the disadvantage of the eternal laws of justice and of right reason itself, that true and false be had in the same condition, and equal rights be granted to both, yet since the iniquity of the times has transferred right (which is proper by its very nature to the true alone) to the false; and, the word liberty being sufficiently unsuitable, has granted to it the power of proposing, publishing, and teaching its fictions; We judge you, Venerable Brother, to have made an effort, altogether skillfully and advantageously, to adapt this venom forced upon civil society into a remedy for it. Indeed, if it is lawful for anyone of unsound mind to advance fantasies upon the public by means of the laws, and to avail himself of the same also to defend and relate the dogmas of science; there plainly is no reason at hand, why it ought not to be lawful for the truth: nor is there a reason why any person whatever, although he be a follower of fables and a hater of truth—unless he were entirely mad—would be able to deny to it the perspicuity of this right. To this ineluctable strength of argument there accedes no small degree of firmness, whether from the reproach proposed by You with respect to the impediment—to the detriment of science—cast upon so many talented minds, of setting forth their ideas; or from the facts attested to by experience, of the inclination—begotten by the captivity of truth—of letters and the higher disciplines; and also of the impudence, with which principles most pernicious not only to religion, but also to the human community, are even now published. These losses, if they are to be lamented in the license by which error everywhere is proposed to the people, certainly are to be considered deadly things in the instruction of youth and young men, in which the very root of human society is so corrupted, that it is capable only of poisoned fruits, which at length lead it, already ill, ruined, and prostrated, to dissolution.»
[1] Cf. Leo XIII, encyclical Libertas præstantissimum §§24-25:
«A like judgment must be passed upon what is called liberty of teaching. There can be no doubt that truth alone should imbue the minds of men, for in it are found the well-being, the end, and the perfection of every intelligent nature; and therefore nothing but truth should be taught both to the ignorant and to the educated, so as to bring knowledge to those who have it not, and to preserve it in those who possess it. For this reason it is plainly the duty of all who teach to banish error from the mind, and by sure safeguards to close the entry to all false convictions. From this it follows, as is evident, that the liberty of which We have been speaking is greatly opposed to reason, and tends absolutely to pervert men’s minds, in as much as it claims for itself the right of teaching whatever it pleases – a liberty which the State cannot grant without failing in its duty. And the more so because the authority of teachers has great weight with their hearers, who can rarely decide for themselves as to the truth or falsehood of the instruction given to them.
Wherefore, this liberty, also, in order that it may deserve the name, must be kept within certain limits, lest the office of teaching be turned with impunity into an instrument of corruption. Now, truth, which should be the only subject matter of those who teach, is of two kinds: natural and supernatural. Of natural truths, such as the principles of nature and whatever is derived from them immediately by our reason, there is a kind of common patrimony in the human race. On this, as on a firm basis, morality, justice, religion, and the very bonds of human society rest: and to allow people to go unharmed who violate or destroy it would be most impious, most foolish, and most inhuman.»
]]>Today we continue our series of original translations of important texts relating to Catholic political philosophy. Tommaso Maria Cardinal Zigliara was a prominent Thomist philosopher and theologian in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Among many other accomplishments, he was closely involved with the preparation of the Leonine edition of the Angelic Doctor’s Opera Omnia (the first volume of which contains his synopses and annotations on St. Thomas’ Organon commentaries), and assisted in preparing the encyclicals Aeterni Patris and Rerum novarum.
The chapter translated here is taken from book two of the third part of Zigliara’s widely circulated Summa philosophica (14th ed., 1910). Having treated of domestic, civil, and religious society in their principles and particulars in the preceding books and chapters of this part, he now sets himself the task of treating in brief the relations which should obtain between those two perfect societies, the Church and the State. The original text can be found here.
This is the third of the five articles of the chapter, treating of liberty of cult. The remaining articles will be posted serially over the next few days.
THIRD ARTICLE
On liberty of cult
I. The notion of liberty of cults. Liberty of cult is intimately involved with liberty of conscience. For if each and every citizen is free to decide upon a religion for himself according to his will, since religion implies also an external cult, each and every citizen ought to be free to profess his religion by any extrinsic cult whatever: and because the State is not able to offend against liberty of conscience, so neither may it prohibit liberty of cult; no indeed, it ought to sanction it by its laws. Thus teaches liberalism, the opinion of which the Church has condemned, as has been related in no. VII of the preceding article. Since, therefore, the liberty of cult is wholly founded in the liberty of conscience, it is to be refuted by the same process and with the same principles which we have laid down against liberty of conscience. Therefore let the first conclusion be set forth:
II. Liberty of cult, considered in itself, is absurd. This proposition remains proved in the first place from the things said above. For liberty of cult is inferred from the liberty of conscience. Because, therefore, this latter is absurd, the former ought also to be called absurd. — But furthermore: liberty of cult having been conceded to man, there is removed from God the power of assigning a determinate cult to men, and there is imposed upon God an obligation of accepting or at least approving any cult shown to Him by human reason. And indeed, if God is able to command a cult, if it is clear that He has prescribed a determinate cult, if He is held by no reason to accept the arbitrary cults of men, men are not able, without manifest irreligion or impiety, to oppose the commands of God, and their cult is an arbitrary and true mockery of God, and liberty of cult is superstition and an impiety. But it is an impiety to deny to God the ability of determining cult, and to impose in any way the duty of approving any cult whatsoever indiscriminately. Therefore liberty of cult is absurd. — In addition, let the second conclusion be stated:
III. Although the civil social authority is able at times to tolerate liberty of cult, yet it is in no way able to sanction it by any law. There is nothing to be added concerning tolerance after the things said concerning tolerance of liberty of conscience. And so the thesis is proved with respect to approbative or prescriptive law. We have proved above that political atheism is entirely repugnant. Therefore, just as any citizen, so also society itself, endued as it is with the nature of a moral person, is obliged to the duties of religion, and of true religion, by a most strict precept of nature. But religion implies external cult. Therefore the civil authority, to which it belongs to direct society, is most strictly obliged to observe, inculcate, and promote this external cult: I say that the civil authority is held to a cult consentaneous to the nature of sociality, that is, public, social, and finally, proper to society as it is society, or as a public and moral personality. But a false cult is not religion, but superstition and consequently error and impiety. Therefore to sanction liberty of cult, is to sanction impiety, but the denial of some social cult is the negation of religion in society qua society. Therefore social authority, although at times it is able to tolerate liberty of cult, yet is in no wise able to sanction it in law.
These things seem to me to be evident, and I wonder that they are denied not only by the rationalists—who, since they either explicitly deny God or retain Him in word only, logically reject any religion by the individual and from society—but by the liberalism which wishes to be called Catholic. For a Catholic would know that God ought to be worshiped with a true cult, and thus a false cult is not able to be endorsed; that God has spoken to men, has commanded a determinate cult, has constituted the Catholic Church as the sole magistra in those matters which pertain to religion—and hence there ought not to be approved any cult but that ordained by the Church, commanded by God Himself.
IV. Note. A difficulty is resolved. You may say: by means of liberty of cult, the Catholic Church also is able freely to practice its worship, while on the contrary, this liberty having been removed, the Church loses even her juridical liberty. — I respond, that this sort of argument effects a sham, and confounds things which, among themselves, are distinct and ought to be distinguished. For we are able to speak in a twofold manner concerning liberty of cult, relatively and absolutely[1]. Relatively, against those who proclaim liberty of cult and yet (just as we have heard from Rousseau concerning liberty of conscience) plague the Church, and prohibit her from practicing her worship, we argue in this manner: Either liberty of cult is to be admitted as a true social principle, or not. If it is to be admitted, therefore unjustly and irrationally are Catholics prohibited from profiting by their liberty; but if not, therefore liberty of cult is merely proclaimed by means of a solemn lie. This argumentation is indeed right, and strikes against the adversaries: wherefore also the Catholic Church does not scornfully reject it, but urges it so that she might defend the claims of her liberty.
But this does not imply that the liberty of cult is able to be defended absolutely by Catholics. For liberty of cult, considered in itself, is absurd and impious, as has been proved. Therefore it is absurd and impious to defend it in an absolute manner. And although from such liberty there sometimes arise goods, namely the liberty of Catholics, Catholics are not for this reason able to teach or defend it; for it is not licit to speak error for the apparent defense of truth: «For if the truth of God hath more abounded through my lie, unto his glory, why am I also yet judged as a sinner? And not rather (as we are slandered, and as some affirm that we say) let us do evil, that there may come good? whose damnation is just» (Rom. III, 7-8).
[1] The Cardinal here refers to vol. 1 of his manual, Logica: Dialectica III, cap. 4, a. II, no. XI, where, delineating kinds of demonstration, he writes:
«Absolute demonstration, and relative demonstration or ad hominem. The first is that which proceeds from premises, the truth of which is admitted by us and is assumed for inferring something absolutely: as when we demonstrate the real existence of God from the contingency of creatures, and other things of this sort. A relative or ad hominem demonstration is that which proceeds from principles admitted by an adversary and assumed by us in order to refute him, an abstraction having been made from the truth of those principles; as if someone were to assume principles admitted by materialists or rationalists, in order to convince them of the falsity of their doctrine.»
]]>Today we continue our series of original translations of important texts relating to Catholic political philosophy. Tommaso Maria Cardinal Zigliara was a prominent Thomist philosopher and theologian in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Among many other accomplishments, he was closely involved with the preparation of the Leonine edition of the Angelic Doctor’s Opera Omnia (the first volume of which contains his synopses and annotations on St. Thomas’ Organon commentaries), and assisted in preparing the encyclicals Aeterni Patris and Rerum novarum.
The chapter translated here is taken from book two of the third part of Zigliara’s widely circulated Summa philosophica (14th ed., 1910). Having treated of domestic, civil, and religious society in their principles and particulars in the preceding books and chapters of this part, he now sets himself the task of treating in brief the relations which should obtain between those two perfect societies, the Church and the State. The original text can be found here.
This is the second of the five articles of the chapter, treating of liberty of conscience. The remaining articles will be posted serially over the next few days.
I. The notion of liberty of conscience. Everywhere today, all who profess liberalism proclaim that liberty of conscience is necessary; and not a few Catholics, from the liberal school, as they call it, who thus call themselves liberal Catholics, are of the same mind with the liberal rationalists. But what is liberty of conscience? Generally, according to its defenders, it can be called the faculty of thinking and doing those things which are more pleasing in those matters which relate to God and religion. We ask, therefore, whether man enjoys this right, or this liberty of conscience: and note the words of the question, for we inquire concerning the right.
II. First preliminary note. In the first place, I say that faith is able to be imposed upon no unbeliever through violence, which faith he refuses to admit; because to believe is of the will, as St. Thomas says in IIaIIæ, q. 10, a. 8. Wherefore the Council of Toledo commanded these things: «But concerning the Jews, the holy Synod commands, that force be inflicted upon no man in order that he believe; for God shows mercy to whom He wills, and hardens whom He wills.» (Cf. Francisco Victoria, Relect. V. de Indis, §. XV). Whence they indeed calumniate the Catholic Church, who say that she does violence to consciences in order to obtain the faith of Christ. Certainly, there has been, and is, violence—but the Church has suffered it and indeed now suffers it; she has not inflicted it, as the history of the martyrs and persecutions manifestly attest.
III. Second preliminary note. For our purposes, so that the exercise of true liberty may be had, it is necessary that it disparage no duty: for liberty is not for evil, but for good (Ps. 50, XIV). Therefore as often as a man abuses it for evil, it ought not to be called liberty, but more truly license. To ask, therefore, whether liberty of conscience is licit, is the same as to ask whether the liberty of thinking and doing those things, which are more pleasing in matters which are concerned with God and religion, disparages the duties toward God Himself. This precisely is the sense of the question, and under this aspect it is to be solved; and its solution is easy.
IV. Third preliminary note. In truth, this question, posed in this manner, is able to be defined 1° absolutely, or liberty of conscience considered in itself; 2° relatively, or liberty of conscience considered with respect to social cooperation: under which latter aspect it is chiefly defended by the adversaries. — Let the first conclusion, therefore, be stated.
V. Liberty of conscience, considered in itself, is entirely impious. And indeed, man, by a most strict duty of nature, is held to think rightly of God, and of those things which look to religion, both speculative and practical (33, II). But voluntarily to make resistance to a most strict duty is license, not liberty; and if the discussion, as in our argument, is concerned with the voluntary transgression of a duty toward God, the aforementioned license is an impiety. Since, therefore, through liberty of conscience, a right is given to man of thinking of God as it more pleases him, this liberty, this right is a true impiety. — But, because this first conclusion is hardly examined by the adversaries, the things already said suffice for its proof; and I arrive at the second part of the question. And thus let the second conclusion be stated.
VI. Liberty of conscience, socially considered, if it is able to be tolerated in given circumstances, yet never is to be approved, and much less to be protected or inculcated. That it is able to be tolerated in given cases is easily admitted: for many other evils are tolerated, or are not punished (for to tolerate is not to approve, nor simply to permit, but only not to punish)—no indeed, it sometimes happens that they ought to be tolerated in society, for otherwise worse evils would follow. But this tolerance ought not to be approbation, nor protection, nor inculcation. — The thesis is proved. Liberty of conscience, socially considered, is founded in nothing other than political atheism: it is most pernicious to society, and self-contradictory. Therefore liberty of conscience, socially considered, is in nowise able to be approved. The antecedent is proved.
It is founded in political atheism alone. And indeed, as has been said in the preceding number, liberty of conscience is a right, conceded to individuals, of thinking of God as they should please, or of submitting those things which are of God and religion, and the duties following from these, to the definition and arbitration of individual conscience, which thus is constituted as the criterion of religion. But just as in many other things, man not only errs from ignorance, but also from malice, so in the things which pertain to religion; nay more, in these more than in others, for religion imports more severe duties, to which the depraved passions make resistance: which errors, both speculative and practice, yet constitute an impiety in the religious order. But because, as has been said, in liberty of conscience, the criterion is the individual reason, the right of liberty of conscience is truly a right to error and impiety: which right indeed is not able to be approved in society and by society, unless at the same time there be set in place religious skepticism or political atheism.
It is most pernicious to society. For, as long as actions remain in the conscience, they are proper to the individual, and do not fall under judgment except that of God. But by the very fact that they are manifested, they have relation to the members of society, and consequently, when they inflict evil upon the members of society, they fall under the purview of the social authority. Now just as men suffer either scandal or any other injury whatsoever from the improbity of other men, so a fortiori they suffer scandal and injury from public and unpunished improbity, and much more from the permitted and approved dissemination of error and impiety, by which the intellectual and moral perfection of men is directly impeded. Therefore not to impede, nay more, indeed to approve these scandals, these injuries, more grave than corporal injuries, is not only impiety toward God, but is a perversion of the social order itself.
It is self-contradictory. And in fact, either liberty of conscience is a right, or it is not. If it is not, why is it noisily proclaimed? But if it is a right, why is it limited? In this limitation is clearly found the contradiction of the defenders of liberty of conscience. Indeed, not only do they prescribe religion, but they also forcibly impose in regard to civil laws, in regard to the king, etc. But neither civil laws, nor the king, nor society itself are above God, Who being removed, all other things topple, and all morality is either absurdity or the animal law of the stronger (29, II). Therefore if liberty of conscience is a right with respect to the duties of religion toward God, and political authority is scrupulous in preserving this right inviolate, the political authority itself is not able to impede it, without manifest contradiction and without open violence, so that that right is exercised fully with respect to royal power, with respect to civil laws, and finally, with respect to civil society itself. — And if it be said, that liberty of conscience should be restrained, such that duties toward society are not harmed; I rejoin, therefore much more ought not liberty to be restrained, but rather license of conscience, lest the duties toward God be abused—which duties are more weighty than social duties, such that the latter do not exist, nor are able to exist, without the former.
VII. Corollary. Rightfully therefore are the following propositions condemned in the Syllabus of Pius IX, which propositions affirm both liberty of conscience and indifferentism:
«Every man is free to embrace and profess that religion which, led by the light of reason, he shall consider true» (Prop. XV).
«Men are able to find the way of eternal salvation in the worship of any religion whatever, and therein to attain eternal salvation» (Prop. XVI).
VIII. Note. A difficulty is resolved. The things which present-day liberals teach concerning liberty of conscience in the social order are not new—indeed, Rousseau had already given them in his Social Contract, Book IV.8. Let us therefore hear this sophist, that from his mouth we might become acquainted with the arguments of the others: «Subjects are not obliged to render a reason to the civil power concerning their opinions, except so far as these are referred to the community. But it is in the interest of the State, that each and every citizen profess a religion which impresses upon him a love of his duties; but the dogmas of this religion concern neither the State nor its members, except so far as they are referred to morals and to the duties which the citizen is obliged to fulfill toward others.»[1]
That these things were written by Rousseau in hatred of the Catholic Church, is manifest from the things which he invents with respect to the will in the chapter cited. Next in order, we shall see the contradictions and absurdities which we encounter throughout in his words and in those of his imitators. — Without doubt, so long as religion is shut up in the interior conscience, it lies hidden from both the civil and ecclesiastical power; and consequently God alone is the judge of it. But when religion becomes the rule of morals, by this very fact it is referred to the community. In this sense, Rousseau thought the State to be present so that each citizen might profess that religion which impressed upon him a love of his duties. But only true religion impresses upon citizens a love of their duties. Therefore, contrary to what Rousseau illogically concludes, it ought entirely to be said, that even from his principles, it is not only fitting to the State that the true religion be at least externally observed by all the citizens, and the propagators of irreligion or of false dogmas be restrained, but it is incumbent upon it as a most grave duty of carrying out that which is proper to it.
All of which things are in such wise true, that Rousseau himself, who defends liberty or license of conscience against the Catholic Church, utterly destroys it after the words just cited by making firm the omnipotence of the State, or Statolatry: «Therefore there ought to be admitted a purely civil profession of faith, the right of which belongs to the Sovereign to determine the articles, not as dogmas of religion, but as they are sentiments of sociability, without which it is impossible that a man be a good citizen and faithful subject. The Sovereign has no faculty for imposing faith in articles of this sort, but he is yet able to make an exile of him who does not believe them, not as one who is impious, but as one who is unsociable and incapable of sincerely loving the laws and justice, and of pouring out one’s life, if necessary, for the carrying out of a duty. And if a man were publicly to admit the aforementioned dogmas, yet led a life as if he did not believe them; let him be punished by death: for he perpetrates the greatest crime, because he has spoken falsely before the law: qu’il soit puni de mort: il a commis le plus grand des crimes, il a menti devant la loi.»[2]
Thus speaks Rousseau, and thus speak they who follow after his sophisms. They set out from the principle: Nothing pertains to the Sovereign concerning the religious opinions of the subjects, so long as their exterior life is conformed to social duties, but immediately it is added, that a code of religion ought to be rendered by the Sovereign, which ought to encompass positive dogmas, that is, the existence of God, the future life, rewards for good deeds, and punishments for bad; and negative dogmas, which Rousseau reduces to intolerance alone. Finally, it is concluded that those citizens ought not to be tolerated—and indeed ought to be expelled from the State or punished by death—who do not hold to this civil religion, even if in other quarters they observe all those things which pertain to duties toward others. That is, religion is excluded from the State by reason of liberty of conscience, as if the principles of true religion should in fact be of no concern to the State; by reason of sociality, religion itself is submitted to the arbitrary will of the Sovereign; and by the arbitrary will of the Sovereign, the citizens, in admitting religion, ought to comply in a blind fashion, under pain of exile or death!
Nor could it have been concluded in any other way. For liberty of conscience, if once admitted, just as it is opposed to true religion, thus is opposed to the true felicity of the State; because there is no morality without God, and no duty without religion. But if regulation in those matters which pertain to religion is taken from the Church of God, it is necessary that it be given over to the arbitration of the civil power: which, lacking authority in religion, imposes its own tyranny upon consciences; and thus the true liberty of souls is oppressed by means of the same principles with which the false liberty of conscience is proclaimed by Rousseau and his followers. — Cf. Principes du Droit politique mis en opposition avec le Contrat social de J-J. Rousseau, par Honoré Torombert, etc., Lib. IV, par M. Lanjuinais, p. 335 (Paris, 1825).
[1] This is our direct translation of the Latin text given by the Cardinal. The 1782 translation by G.D.H. Cole from the French renders it thus:
«The subjects then owe the Sovereign an account of their opinions only to such an extent as they matter to the community. Now, it matters very much to the community that each citizen should have a religion. That will make him love his duty; but the dogmas of that religion concern the State and its members only so far as they have reference to morality and to the duties which he who professes them is bound to do to others.»
[2] Cole renders it:
«There is therefore a purely civil profession of faith of which the Sovereign should fix the articles, not exactly as religious dogmas, but as social sentiments without which a man cannot be a good citizen or a faithful subject. While it can compel no one to believe them, it can banish from the State whoever does not believe them — it can banish him, not for impiety, but as an anti-social being, incapable of truly loving the laws and justice, and of sacrificing, at need, his life to his duty. If any one, after publicly recognising these dogmas, behaves as if he does not believe them, let him be punished by death: he has committed the worst of all crimes, that of lying before the law.»
]]>Today we continue our series of original translations of important texts relating to Catholic political philosophy. Tommaso Maria Cardinal Zigliara was a prominent Thomist philosopher and theologian in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Among many other accomplishments, he was closely involved with the preparation of the Leonine edition of the Angelic Doctor’s Opera Omnia (the first volume of which contains his synopses and annotations on St. Thomas’ Organon commentaries), and assisted in preparing the encyclicals Aeterni Patris and Rerum novarum.
The chapter translated here is taken from book two of the third part of Zigliara’s widely circulated Summa philosophica (14th ed., 1910). Having treated of domestic, civil, and religious society in their principles and particulars in the preceding books and chapters of this part, he now sets himself the task of treating in brief the relations which should obtain between those two perfect societies, the Church and the State. The original text can be found here.
This is the first of the five articles of the chapter, treating of political atheism. The remaining articles will be posted serially over the next few days.
The nature of the Catholic Church having been set forth, and its power, consequently it remains to speak of the mutual relations existing between the Church and the civil State. And indeed it is proper to the Catholic Church, that it have members in every part of the world, and thus would rule over subjects of all nations; whence it comes about, that its power is found in intimate relation with civil States. It is necessary, therefore, that we speak of these mutual relations between the Church and the civil State. Indeed it is a difficult subject, not by its nature, but on account of the injustice of times and the malice of men. But that we might plainly determine the aforesaid relations, we begin from more remote principles, inquiring firstly of political atheism: whether indeed the political State thus is able to conduct itself as if no religion existed, and as if God did not exist;—secondly, of liberty of conscience, as they call it;—thirdly, of liberty of cult;—fourthly, of liberty of teaching;—fifthly, of the subordination of the State to the Church.
I. The notion of political atheism. Earlier in our treatise we distinguished atheism into the species of theoretical and practical, insofar as either the existence of God is positively denied, or life is conducted as if God did not exist. In this second sense do we inquire concerning political atheism. For the elements of society are two: the governing element, in which there rests social authority, and the governed element, or the subjects, who are ordered by the ruler to the common good. And with respect to the governing element—whether he be called a prince, or is called by another name—is he able, in the drawing up of laws, in their execution, or in exercising judiciary power, to act as if God did not exist, and consequently to have no regard for divine laws, whether natural or positive? Behold the question.
II. The principles of political atheism. To the question proposed, the political atheist responds affirmatively; it is not difficult to assign the erroneous principles from which it is logically inferred, for they are both designated and proscribed many times in the lauded Syllabus, delivered by the authority of our most holy lord Pope Pius IX. Accordingly, whether the existence of God is denied; or, as with pantheism, his nature is confounded with the nature of the world; or, the existence of God having been posited, His divine providence is denied—God is always excluded from the world, such that «any action of God upon men and the world is to be denied» (Prop. II).
From this it follows, 1° that «Human reason, having no regard at all for God, is the single arbiter of the true and false, good and evil; it is a law unto itself, and suffices, by its natural powers, for procuring the good of men and peoples» (Prop. III).
— 2° Thus, «They derive all truths of religion from the native force of human reason; hence reason is the chief norm by which man may be able and ought to arrive at knowledge of all the truths of any sort of knowledge whatsoever» (Prop. IV).
— 3° Therefore «the laws of morals by no means require divine sanction, and it is not at all necessary, that human laws should be conformed to the law of nature, or that they should receive binding force from God» (Prop. LVI).
— 4° Therefore «Knowledge of philosophic and moral matters, and likewise civil laws, are able and ought to decline from divine and ecclesiastical authority» (Prop. LVII).
— 5° «Therefore the State, as the origin and font of all rights, enjoys a certain right circumscribed by no bounds» (Prop. XXXIX).
— 6° Therefore «right consists in material fact, and all duties of men are a hollow name, and all human deeds have the force of right» (Prop. LIX).
— 7° Therefore «the chance injustice of a deed causes no harm to the sanctity of right» (Prop. LXI).
— 8° Therefore «Authority is nothing other than the sum of number and material powers» (Prop. LX).
Errors of this sort, as anyone may see, are connected: for from the denial of God, descending, one arrives at materialism, and material force is opposed to individual right, and the despotism of the stronger to social right. Behold political atheism, both in its principles, and in its inferences proved by fact itself. Bayle, with whom Voltaire himself disagreed concerning this matter, dreamt of an atheistic society; Rousseau, for the most part, consented to Bayle in Book IV, ch. 7 of the Social Contract; both are more or less followed by those politicians who argue for the absolute separation of the State from the Church. Against all these, the conclusion is set forth:
III. Political atheism is absurd. It is proved. Political atheism dissolves society itself: because it is directly opposed so much to the end as to the essential elements of society. Therefore political atheism is absurd. — The antecedent is proved.
It is directly opposed to the end of society. The end of society is the perfection of the citizens, to be obtained through means which each and every person is not able to have from himself, and has from society; which perfection consists chiefly in the knowledge of one’s proper duties, and in the virtue by which those duties are carried out. But we have proved (32, IV) that the more principal duties of religion are the foundation of all other duties.[1] Therefore in society, and from society, the citizens principally ought to have the means by which they might carry out the duties of religion. But political atheism is either the denial of those things which pertain to religion, or at least an indifference and carelessness concerning the same, as it indeed defines itself. Therefore political atheism is directly opposed to the more principal end of human society. Wherefore Rousseau himself, in the text cited, against Bayle and indeed against himself, acknowledges that never was there any State founded, the basis of which was not religion. But if religion is the basis of society, then, religion having been expelled, it is necessary that human society should collapse.
It is opposed to the essential elements of society. The elements of this sort, as has been said, are the sovereign and the subjects: the former commands; the latter should be subject to him by the laws. Again, according to the hypothesis of political atheism, social authority depends upon no moral foundation and has no reason for existing. And this is indeed the case. Social authority is not the sum of number and material powers (51, V), but is something essentially moral, claiming for itself the right of ruling the human multitude. And thus it is not from the individual reason, to which no command or authority belongs of itself over other men, nor from an impersonal source, which is something abstract and fantastical, but is immediately from God, as a derivation or participation of the divine authority (ibid. IV). Therefore, political authority is not able to call itself atheistic, lest by this very act it necessarily and essentially negate itself. — The same result comes to pass if social authority were considered with respect to setting forth laws. For civil laws are naught except either proclamations of the law of nature, or determinations of that law of nature (25, VIII): but the law of nature is nothing other than a participation of the eternal law, from which every other law has its force. In consequence, political atheism is the denial of authority in itself; it is the denial of human legislation, which is null, for according to this hypothesis, it has no moral force to obligate. — Finally it should be added, that political authority, if it removes in whatever degree from God, should be said to depend on nothing other than itself. But this is State-theism, or, as it is called in the vulgar tongue, il Dio Stato, which in fact is able to be nothing other than the individual reason or will of rulers, governed not by a moral and superior principle, but by the force of arms and a supremely powerful ruler. Evidently, in political atheism, human society is not ruled by moral authority, but by the will and violence of individual reason, in that manner by which brute animals are governed.
The same conclusion is entirely proved, if we should consider the subjects. For these are men, that is, moral beings, to be directed in their course not through violence, but through law. Seeing, therefore, that the political authority professing atheism depends upon no moral principle, and the laws drawn up by it rest upon no principle superior to the individual reason, the citizens, reasoning in an ad hominem manner (L.41, XI), are not able to consider the authority as morally superior to themselves, and its laws as having the force of moral obligation; but they oppose individual reason to the individual reason of the one ruling. There remains the material force which prevails in the ruler; but material force is not a social bond of men; thereon to be shunned by means of ill will, no indeed, it is able to be overcome; and thus, by means of force, impious and foolish sovereigns are able to rob majesty from the citizens, which majesty they abuse against God. And so it happens that political authority, rising up against God in a most impious manner, sees its subjects rising up against itself.
I do not speak of the impiety of political atheism: for this is clear in itself. For if it is impious, that a citizen deny to God the duties of religion, it is most impious among those who rule society. For these latter are men, and so are obliged to fulfill those things which are man’s for God; they are rulers, and so ought to lead the way for all their subjects in the example of virtue and religion; they are for the good of society, and so ought not to subvert or subordinate religion, but ought, with all their powers, to promote it, so that men might not draw detriment from society—from which they have the right of aspiring to moral perfection—in those things which chiefly look to perfection, that is, religion and the eternal salvation of the soul.
[1] Zigliara here makes reference to earlier sections in the Ethica (lib. I, cap. 1, a. III no. III; cap. 2, a. I, no. IV) where, treating of right, duties, and religion considered in itself as a virtue, he writes:
«III. Nevertheless, in a created moral person, duty is more prior than right. And in fact, the first thing which is found in an existing man (and the same is said of any other created moral person) is the creaturely esse, which essentially implies a dependence, physical as well as moral, upon the Creator, so that the creature might observe the laws of the Creator, pursuing faithfully the order to the end set in place by Him. This primitive and essential duty having been posited, there spring forth the rights of preserving and defending life, of employing means necessary for perfecting themselves and for achieving their end, and others of this sort; but, that primitive and essential duty having been removed, all rights crumble because destitute of rational foundation: which is also clear from other quarters from the things said before (29, II). Whence that is to be retained as an unshaken principle: Human rights proceed from duties toward God.
[…] IV. The duties of religion are the chiefest duties, and are the foundation of all duties. This proposition is the corollary of the preceding. For the duties of religion emerge from the very essence of man, and from the very essence of God, as we have proved in no. II. Therefore they are the chiefest. — In addition, God having been removed by hypothesis, there also perishes by that very fact the reason for any duty whatsoever. Therefore religion, which implies an ordering to God, as has been said, is the foundation of all duties. Let St. Thomas be heard, who, by reason of the end to which the virtues are ordered, infers that religion is preeminent among the other moral virtues, and consequently that the duties of religion are chief among all our other duties: “Those things which are for an end, draw their goodness from the order to the end; and thus, however much they are nearer to the end, so much are they better. But the moral virtues, as has been said above, are concerned with those things which are ordered to God, as to an end. But religion approaches more nearly to God than the other moral virtues, insofar as it works those things which directly and immediately are ordered to the divine honor. And thus religion is preeminent among the other moral virtues” (ST IIaIIæ, q. 81, a. 7).»
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