In any\ncase, the Latin virtus, <\/em>from which\nthe Modern English \u201cvirtue\u201d is derived, has a similar history to dohtig. Virtus <\/em>is derived from vir, <\/em>man, and originally meant\nmanliness, bravery, or valour. It was thus the equivalent to the Greek \u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\n(andreia<\/em>)(courage). <\/em>It was,\nhowever, used as a translation of the Greek \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae (arete<\/em>), <\/em>which is probably\nrelated to the name of Ares, <\/em>the God\nof war. Arete<\/em> too originally meant\nbravery, valour, etc. Arete <\/em>is the\nword used for virtue in Greek philosophy and in the Septuagint and the New\nTestament. It is therefore worth examining more closely.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In Homer arete <\/em>means in the first place the qualities that make a good warrior, namely, those qualities that allow a warrior to be effective in battle. But it is also extended to mean the qualities that allow men, women, and children to do well the actions their respective station in life requires, whatever that station might be: \u201cIn the Homeric poems a virtue is a quality the manifestation of which enables someone to do exactly what their well-defined social role requires.\u201d[3]<\/a> This is then extended beyond human beings to animals and even inanimate objects: \u201cthe arete<\/em> of a horse consists in its swiftness of foot, the arete<\/em> of soil in its fertility, the arete<\/em> of a woman in her being a good housewife, the arete<\/em> of a slave in his or her loyalty to a master.\u201d[4]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n It is basically the Homeric idea of virtue that\nMeno gives in his first attempt at defining virtue in The Meno<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n First of all, if you take the virtue of a man, it is easily stated that a man\u2019s virtue is this\u2014that he be competent to manage the affairs of his city, and to manage them so as to benefit his friends and harm his enemies, and to take care to avoid suffering harm himself. Or take a woman\u2019s virtue: there is no difficulty in describing it as the duty of ordering the house well, looking after the property indoors, and obeying her husband. And the child has another virtue\u2014one for the female, and one for the male; and there is another for elderly men\u2014one, if you like, for freemen, and yet another for slaves. And there are very many other virtues besides, so that one cannot be at a loss to explain what virtue is; for it is according to each activity and age that every one of us, in whatever we do, has his virtue; and the same, I take it, Socrates, will hold also of vice.<\/em>[5]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n Meno merely lists the various kinds of\nvirtue, without making the implicit account explicit. Aristotle, in the Ethics, <\/em>will, however follow this line\nof reasoning to come to a general definition:<\/p>\n\n\n\n We must explain, therefore, that virtue perfects everything of which it, is the virtue, rendering both the possessor good and his work (\u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6) good. Thus the virtue or power of the eye makes good both the eye and its operation, for it is by the power of the eye that we see well. Likewise the virtue or excellence of a horse makes the horse good and also makes him good for running, riding, and awaiting the enemy. If this be true in all other things, then human virtue will be a habit making man good and rendering his work good.<\/em>[6]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n The key term here \u201chis work,\u201d ergon autou. <\/em>This is what is often translated as a thing’s \u201cown act\u201d or \u201cproper act.\u201d As Duane Berquist puts it, \u201cA thing\u2019s own act is the act which that thing alone can do or, at least, do better than other things.\u201d[7]<\/a> From this he derives Aristotle\u2019s entirely general definition of virtue: \u201cVirtue is the disposition of a thing which makes it good and its own act good.\u201d[8]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n If virtue is what enables a thing to do its\nown act or work well, then human virtue is what enables a human being to do the\nproper act of a human being well. But what is the proper act of a human being?\nAristotle raises this question in determining the end of human life in Ethics <\/em>I:<\/p>\n\n\n\n For just as the fluteplayer and the sculptor and every artist and generally everyone for whom there is something to do (\u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd) and some act (\u03c0\u03c1\u1fb6\u03be\u03b9\u03c2), the good and well-being seems to be in doing this, so also it would seem for man if there is something he does (\u1f14\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd). Are there then some doings and acts of the carpenter and the shoemaker, but of man there is none, and he is by nature without anything to do? Or just as there seems to be something done by the eye and the hand and the foot and generally by each of the parts, should one also lay down something that man does besides all these? What then will this be? To live seems to be common even to the plants, but what is man\u2019s own is sought. The nourishing and growing life therefore should be set aside. Following this, there would be something sensing. But this also seems to be common to the horse and the ox and every animal. There remains the doing of what has reason. But of this, the one as obeying or persuaded by reason and the other as having reason and thinking.<\/em>[9]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n What is proper to human beings, what\ndistinguishes them from other bodily, living things is reason. The absolutely\nfinal end of human beings is an act of reason that completely transcends human\nnature: Beatific Vision. In the natural order, the highest act is the\ncontemplation of God through His effects in philosophical wisdom. Wisdom is the\nhighest intellectual virtue\u2014 the others are understanding (knowing the first\nprinciples of reasoning), science (knowing the conclusions of reasoning), and\n(in a qualified way) art and prudence. <\/p>\n\n\n\n But, Aristotle points out that there are\nparts of the human souls beside reason itself that have acts proper to human\nnature: namely the parts that obey or are persuaded by reason. These are the\nparts of the soul that have to do with desire in all its forms. \u201cFor the\nvegetative element in no way shares in reason, but the appetitive and in general the desiring element<\/em> in a sense\nshares in it, in so far as it listens to and obeys it.\u201d (1102b) Taken together,\nwe might call these desiring parts \u201cthe heart.\u201d The virtues of these parts of\nthe soul are called \u201cmoral virtues.\u201d Because, as Aristotle points out, when we\nspeak of someone\u2019s morals (\u1f24\u03b8\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2), we mention temperance and good-temper rather\nthan wisdom (1103a). There seems to be a puzzle here. The highest activity of a\nhuman being is found in the acts of the intellect, and yet when we say that\npersons are \u201cgood,\u201d without qualification, we mean that they have the virtues\nof the heart, rather than those of the intellect. <\/p>\n\n\n\n St. Thomas explains the reason for this.\nVirtue is what makes both a thing and its proper act good without\nqualification. Now, what moves a person toward an end as good is the heart (any\none of the desiring faculties). Thus, in order to do one\u2019s own act well, and\nthus be oneself good, one\u2019s heart must be rightly directed toward the good. If\nI do not desire the good, I will not do the actions which lead to it or in\nwhich it consists, and therefore I will not myself be good. Thus St. Thomas\nwrites:<\/p>\n\n\n\n When we speak simply of virtue, we are understood to be speaking of human virtue. But as was explained above (q. 56, a. 3), a human virtue, in the most perfect sense of virtue, is a virtue that requires rectitude of appetite [i.e. the heart], since a virtue not only bestows a facility for acting well but is also a cause of the very use of a good work (usum boni operis causat). Still, in a less perfect sense of virtue, a virtue does not require rectitude of appetite, since it only bestows a facility for acting well but is not a cause of the use of a good work.<\/em>[10]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n Moral virtue causes the right use <\/em>of the intellectual virtues. It will\nbe desire for the good that moves me to use the intellectual virtues to\nactually contemplate some truth. And therefore, the virtues which rectify the\ndesires are necessary for the proper use of intellectual virtues. As Henri\nGrenier puts it:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The intellectual virtues give man the power of performing good acts, but do not give him the right use of this power, i.e., do not make him use this power in a right manner. Hence they render good the operation of a particular faculty, but do not make man good in an absolute sense; v.g., as a result of intellectual Virtue, a person can be a good philosopher, but yet not a man who is good in every respect, for he can knowingly, and without sinning against intellectual virtue, be the author of sophistries. The moral virtues not only give man the power of performing good act[s], but make him use this power rightly, for the moral virtues perfect the appetite, whose function consists in moving the other powers to act. Hence the moral virtues make man good in an absolute sense.<\/em>[11]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n The moral virtues not only immediately enable persons to do the acts of the faculties of the heart well, they are also necessary to use the other faculties\u2014 even the higher faculties of the intellect\u2014 well. A person who has the virtue of science can use that virtue to lead his students astray, and the habit of science does not prevent this. Indeed, it is because<\/em> he has science that he will be good at inventing sophistries. But if such a person also has the virtue of justice, this will mean not only that he will do acts of the will well, but also that he will do the acts of reason perfected by science well\u2014 leading his students to the truth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Human virtues in the strict sense are therefore the moral virtues, which perfect the heart, the desiring and appetitive parts of the soul. But, as we shall see, the greatest of the moral virtues is prudence, which in terms of its subject is an intellectual virtue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Human\nbeings are rational animals. They are distinguished from the other animals by\nhaving the spiritual power of reason. They are distinguished from the angels by\nhaving senses, dependent on material organs. Human knowledge begins with\nsensation. The world is sensed through the five external senses, and the\nsense-impressions are received into the interior senses (the common sense,\nmemory, imagination\u2026). And then these sense experiences are illuminated by the\nintellect, and the intellect abstracts universal truths from them. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The intellect can be considered in two ways: as theoretical, and as practical. The theoretical (or \u201cspeculative,\u201d i.e. \u201clooking\u201d) intellect simply looks at and contemplates the truth. The practical intellect looks at the truth of reality insofar as it contains attainable goods and orders this knowledge to action.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The knowledge of the good causes a desire for the good, or a striving after the good. This takes place already at the level of the sensible soul. The sensible good (the pleasant) is \u201cknown\u201d by the external and internal senses, and this causes the sensible appetites to desire that good or the overcoming of what threatens the good. There are two desiring powers at the sensible level: the concupiscible appetite, and the irascible appetite. The first and more fundamental is the concupiscible appetite, or concupiscence. This is what is usually meant when we say the \u201cdesiring part of the soul.\u201d It answers to epithymia <\/em>(\u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1) in Plato\u2019s tripartite division of the soul. This power strives after the pleasurable and flees the painful. The second is the irascible appetite. This appetite depends on concupiscence, and it is concerned with overcoming difficulties and repelling threats to the goods desired by concupiscence. It answers to thymos <\/em>(\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2) in the Platonic division.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Desire for the good as good, <\/em>and not merely as pleasant, belongs to the practical intellect, which can understand the good and the end. Intellectual knowledge of the good leads to a spiritual desire of the good in the \u201crational appetite\u201d known as the will. The two levels, the sensible and the rational, mutually influence one another. Sensible appetite has an influence on our knowledge of the good, and therefore our will. But on the other hand, sensible appetite can also be directed by reason and will. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Passions are movements of the sensitive desiring faculties, resulting from the sense-knowledge of good or evil, accompanied by bodily changes. The fundamental passion is sensual love which arises in the concupiscible appetite. Love is a conformity of the concupiscence to some desirable object. From love arise desire (when the loved object is not yet possessed) and joy (when it is possessed). From love also arises the opposite sensible passion, hatred, which is the lack of conformity that the appetite has with some sensible evil. To love something implies hating its opposite (to love pleasure is to hate pain). From hatred arise flight (when the evil has not yet come to pass) and sorrow (when it has come to pass). <\/p>\n\n\n\n In the irascible appetite, the passions of hope and despair arise with respect to goods apprehended as difficult to attain, whether possible (hope) or impossible (despair). With respect to evils, the irascible appetite brings forth fear (aversion from an evil considered unconquerable), daring (turning toward an evil considered conquerable), and anger (the inclination to inflict evil for evil). The following diagram gives a rough sketch of the passions. (A deeper consideration would show that more distinctions are necessary.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Thus, there are four powers of the soul that are immediately concerned with the good to be attained through human action: practical intellect, will, concupiscence, and the irascible appetite. There are therefore four principle virtues, dispositions of the soul that allow human beings to do the actions arising from these four powers well:<\/p>\n\n\n\n These four\nvirtues are called cardinal virtues, <\/em>from\nthe Latin cardo, <\/em>meaning hinge,\nbecause all the other virtues hinge on them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The goods and evils with which sensible appetites are concerned are destroyed by excess and defect. For example, it is good to eat food because this is necessary to conserve our substance, but it is bad to eat too much or too little food. It is good to face dangers in pursuing the good, and it is bad to face danger too little (cowardice) or too much (foolhardiness). Thus it is evident that the virtues of temperance and courage are concerned with a mean relative to the subject. The mean is not in this case mediocrity, but perfection, just as in Greek music, the tonic note was called the “mean note” because the scale moved both toward and away from it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Justice is also concerned with a mean because it is concerned with giving to each his due. But this is an objective, rather than a subjective mean. It is the mean between giving someone more than he is objectively due (e.g., punishing a criminal more than he deserves) or less than he is objectively due (e.g., giving a store keeper less than the price of his wares).<\/p>\n\n\n\n In each\ncase, the mean is determined by prudence: prudence rules the other moral\nvirtues by laying down what the mean is for them. By analogy ad unum<\/em>, therefore, we can say that\nprudence is also concerned with the mean. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The powers of the soul are not limited to one fixed activity but are capable of acting in various ways. It is therefore necessary that they be determined to good activity by stable dispositions or habits. Such dispositions are acquired by repeatedly acting in the right way, until it becomes easy. This ease of action allows the pleasure of good activity. Aristotle compares the acquisition of moral habits to the acquisition of skill in making things (art):<\/p>\n\n\n\n Again, it is from the same causes and by the same means that every virtue is both produced and destroyed, and similarly every art; for it is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are produced. And the corresponding statement is true of builders and of all the rest; men will be good or bad builders as a result of building well or badly. For if this were not so, there would have been no need of a teacher, but all men would have been born good or bad at their craft. This, then, is the case with the virtues also; by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly. The same is true of appetites and feelings of anger; some men become temperate and good-tempered, others self-indulgent and irascible, by behaving in one way or the other in the appropriate circumstances. Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of like activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is because the states of character correspond to the differences between these. It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference.<\/em>[12]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n In the case\nof the virtues of the sensitive part of the soul, habituation rectifies the\nappetites by training them to delight in the mean determined by reason. Since our knowledge begins with the senses, our desires begin with\nthe senses as well, and the desires most obvious to us are the desires for\nsensual pleasure. It therefore requires training for the appetites to\nparticipate in reason. The habits resulting from such training are temperance,\ncourage, and the other virtues that flow from them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the case of the will, training is\nnecessary that the will can choose not only the closest and most immediate good\n(the proper good of the one willing), but also to love a more transcendent good\n(the good of the other). This is justice: willing the due good of the other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the case of the practical intellect,\nhabituation is necessary simply because of the variety of circumstances in\nhuman affairs, and the quasi-infinite number of the means that can lead towards\nthe end. The result of such habituation is prudence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If virtue in general is the disposition of a thing which makes it good and its own act good, then we can now see that moral virtues are habits that make the powers of the human soul concerned with practical action good, and the actions proceeding from those powers good.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These notes\nhave only considered natural or \u201cacquired\u201d virtue. There is a higher kind of\nvirtue that is not acquired by training, but is \u201cpoured\u201d directly into the soul\nby God. Such \u201cinfused\u201d virtues are in reality a participation in a higher life,\nthe Divine Life. Through the infused virtues, human beings have a foreshadowing\nand beginning of supernatural happiness. [1]<\/a>\nEdmund Spenser, The Faerie Queene, <\/em>Book\nIV, Canto 10, Stanza 18.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [2]<\/a> T.\nNorthcote Toller (ed.), An Anglo-Saxon\nDictionary: Based on the Manuscript Collections of the Late Joseph Bosworth<\/em>,\nvol. 1 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1882), s.v. \u201cdohtig;\u201d cf. Benjamin Thorpe\n(ed.), Diplomatarium Anglicum<\/em> \u00c6vi Saxonici<\/em> (London: MacMillan &\nCo., 1865) p. 313.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [3]<\/a>\nAlasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, <\/em>3rd<\/sup>\ned. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), pp. 183-184.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [4]<\/a>\nMargalit Finkelberg (ed.), The Homer\nEncyclopedia <\/em>(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), s.v. \u201caret\u00ea.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n [5]<\/a> Meno, <\/em>71e-72a.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [6]<\/a> Nocomachean Ethics, <\/em>VI,2 1106a; trans. C.I. Litzinger, O.P.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [7]<\/a>\nDuane Berquist, \u201cNote\non End or Purpose of Man<\/a>,\u201d p. 1.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [8]<\/a>\nDuane Berquist, \u201cNote\non End or Purpose of Man<\/a>,\u201d p. 3.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [9]<\/a> Ethics <\/em>I,7\n1097b-1098a; trans. Duane Berquist.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [10]<\/a>\nSt. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, <\/em>Ia-IIae\nQ 61, A1, c. In the translation I follow Alfred Frodosso, except that I have\ntranslated usum <\/em>as \u201cuse\u201d rather than\n\u201cexecution.\u201d This sounds clumsy in English, but is essential to the meaning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [11]<\/a> Henri\nGrenier, Thomistic Philosophy<\/em>, vol.\n4, Moral Philosophy<\/em>, trans. J.P.E.\nO\u2019Hanley (Charlottetown: St. Dunstan\u2019s University, 1950), \u00a7 929.<\/p>\n\n\n\n1.2 The General Meaning of Arete From Homer to Aristotle<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
2. Human Virtue<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
3 The Powers and Passions\nof the Soul<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
3.1 The Powers of the Soul<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
3.2 The Passions<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
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<\/figure>\n\n\n\n4. The Cardinal Virtues<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
5. The Mean <\/h3>\n\n\n\n
6. Habit <\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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